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The key questions addressed by this study are; which of the two structural 
theories in international relations explains small state policies better and under what 
international system structure is the significance of small states enhanced so that 
they have greater freedom of maneuver. Using the two theories, balance of power 
and hegemonic change, this thesis extracts several hypotheses about the roles and 
significance of small states under varying conditions. The basic idea of this effort 
was that small states are affected largely by both global and regional international 
systems. Thus, the position, and policy, of a small state is determined more by its 
international context rather than by its own efforts to consolidate internal strength. 
From the perspectives of small states, in the hegemonic system they are often 
constrained in the pursuit of their foreign policies, while in the balance of power 
system they often can play a role as a balancer. To test this developed hypothesis, 
and others, this thesis surveys the diplomatic history of the great powers, and 
selected small states, in Europe from 1815 to 1939; the US-Israeli patron client 
relationship of the Cold War era; and the nuclear policies of Ukraine and North 
Korea. These cases illustrate: how a small state is dealt with by stronger powers 
under varying international system structures, how it may make use of the system 
and achieve its objectives; and what the main factor is that makes a small state 
important or insignificant to the international equilibrium. 
In its concluding chapter, this work derives some implications from the process of 
proving the hypotheses, and suggests some plausible policies for Korea, a quintessential 
small state in Northeast Asia, as to how she can play an important role as a balancer in the 
region. 
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There are two structural theories in international politics. One is hegemonic 
theory, the other is balance of power theory. With these theories, one can explain, 
predict, and describe the characteristics of the international system and, in general, 
the behavior of states. But, these theories of international politics have focused on 
describing great power behavior, because it is assumed that international relations are 
largely ruled by the great powers of the contemporary system. To the contrary, this 
thesis looks at international politics from the perspectives of small states, 
hypothesizing that their influence can, under certain conditions, prove quite 
substantial. 
Small states are not all alike. Some of them have significant weight in the 
international system, while others do not. Geopolitical considerations can be one way 
to differentiate them. Some small states are important, not because of internal 
strength, but because of their positions in the international system, especially among 
or between great powers. The term, position, includes both physical location and 
other tangible factors, as well as less tangible psychological and ideological concerns. 
Small states generally have some common characteristics. They have goals - 
survival autonomy, and prestige, and limits too. They are vulnerable to external 
threats, and moreover, their internal countermeasures are considerably limited if the 
threats come from great powers. To overcome this inherent problem, they usually 
depend on allying with great powers. Balancing and bandwagoning are the two main 
strategies for their alliance policies. 
The value of those policies differs, according to international system structure. 
In a hegemonic system, small states generally do not have any viable alternative to 
bandwagoning. Their first priority is survival. Thus, they are willing to give up 
freedom of maneuver or autonomy. On the other hand, in a balance of power system, 
they would have greater freedom of maneuver, even though they risk being caught in 
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a power vacuum, one of the worst conditions for a small state's security. In addition, 
if great powers are willing to deal with one another, and decide to divide spheres of 
influence among them, there would be great danger for small states in terms of both 
suivival and autonomy. Conversely, if there is conflict among great powers, they may 
be willing to pay attention to small states and seek to ally with them. This is a 
favorable situation for small states, even though it comes at the price of a more 
conflictual international environment. 
On the basis of these ideas, one can imagine that small states would prefer to 
be a balancer rather than to be a scavenger or protectorate of a hegemon, if the 
situation permits. However, they are prone to switch allies, if their survival is 
threatened. In that case, they bandwagon with the greatest power. This movement is 
likely to instigate the escalation of a crisis, by rapidly turning over the balance in 
favor of one side or the other. Thus, small states may, under some circumstance, 
actually become "holders of the balance." 
History provides several useful illustrations. After the Napoleonic Wars, when 
European great powers agreed with one another not to fight, and tried to make peace 
above all, small states were generally unimportant. The fates of Saxony and Poland 
were completely determined by great powers. Many small states, during the Concert 
of Europe period, were partitioned within the spheres of influence of great powers, 
in the name of the equihbrium (or peace). Among the prominent cases featuring more 
important small states, one should note the Anglo-Russian imperial rivalry in the Far 
East and the Middle East. When the two imperial powers struggled, small states of 
the regions enjoyed greater freedom of maneuver than later on, especially after 1907, 
when an Anglo-Russian agreement was achieved. 
This tendency ended with the experience of World War I. The Wilsonian idea 
of collective security enhanced the voice of small states. However, this optimistic 
period could not last long. Appeasement,' as practiced by Great Britain, and 
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'Isolationism' by the United States during the interwar period lessened the competition 
among great powers, and thus, marginalized small states' freedom of maneuver. 
In the Cold War system, small states could take advantage of the superpower 
rivalry. Both superpowers were willing to pay attention to small states, and actually 
poured a lot of money into them. The case of Israel illustrates that this military and 
economic aid should be understood in the context of the international system rather 
than at the domestic level. The Jewish lobby in the United States was an important 
factor that induced the US aid, but it was less important than the strategic 
considerations of the United States. 
Lastly, in the Post-Cold War era, the lack of great power conflict, and 
accordingly, the lack of great power control over the small states, make them more 
nervous as well as more ambitious. The nuclear adventures of Ukraine and North 
Korea illustrate this tendency. Moreover, through comparing these cases with the 
previous ones, one can extract some inferences for small state policies. 
In Chinese, the word "crisis" has two meanings; danger and opportunity. This 
is an appropriate word to apply to the dilemma of small states in international politics. 
They may have greatest influence in a situation of great power conflict, that generally 
enhances their 'autonomy,' but endangers their 'security.' Thus, the ability to balance 
between security and autonomy, to search out prospective allies and to ally with them 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
World politics, in Organski's view, consists of the "doings" of America and 
Russia, Britain, China, "and of the other great nations. It is not much concerned 
with relations between Ireland and Liberia or with the latest twist of foreign 
policy in Paraguay." Why? "They are simply less powerful. What they or their 
governments do does not much effect on the rest of the world. The importance of 
power is obvious."' 
Michael P. Sullivan 
The majority of small states in Europe are not constituents in the 
exclusive club of the powerful, and these states have often had a considerable 
impact on events and on the machinations of the great powers. A failure to 
understand the conditions, concerns, and desires of the larger part of the 
membership of the continent would leave a glaring gap in our knowledge of the 
European setting. "2 
Allen Sens 
The end of the Cold War system has brought about power vacuums in some regions, and thus, 
the eruption of nationalism which had long been suppressed by the ideological solidarity or the 
imminent external threat of superpower involvement. Now, small states are given added opportunities 
to make their voices heard and their desires known. Witnessing this process, John L. Gaddis stated, 
"[in the post-Cold War era,] the new task could well be to balance the forces of integration [such as 
economic, institutional, cultural integrations which will be mainly achieved by education] and 
fragmentation [such as nationalism, religious conflicts and economic and social inequality which will 
be enhanced by the loosened control of the two superpowers] against each other."3 A very similar 
situation existed previously. 
The Benthamite rationalism of'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' not only was the 
definition of the content of the natural law in the nineteenth century when the Great Powers saw eye 
'Michael P. Sullivan, Power in Contemporary International Politics (Columbia, South 
Carolina; Univ. of South Carolina Press,  1990) p. 76. 
2Allen Sens, "The Security of Small States in Post-Cold War Europe," in David G. 
Haglund Ed., From Euphoria to Hysteria (San Francisco; Westview Press, 1993) pp.229-230. 
3John Lewis Gaddis, The US and the End of the Cold War (New York; Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1992) pp. 197-207. 
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to eye to keep peace and order {status quo), but also it legitimized the existence of the empires, 
"established through the sacrifice of unfit Africans and Asiatics," in the name of'the harmony of 
interests.'4 In other words, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' required the sacrifice of 
"those who are not included in the greatest number."5 This Utopian synthesis had been implemented 
into the international system at least up to 1890,6 at which point the Great Powers divided into two 
opposing groups. Thereafter, small states were given more weight in the international system. This 
process was furthered by the collapse of empires (such as the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, and the Chinese Empire) and the establishment of the League of Nations in the wake of 
World War I. Observing the demise of some empires, Thomas Masaryk put it: 
"History is a process of integration, but at the same time of disintegration; 
the double process appears as the strengthening of individualism and 
simultaneous growth of collectivism. History tends not towards uniformity, 
but towards variety, towards organized variety, which very often is 
misrepresented as barren, monotonous, indiscriminate uniformity."7 
From the viewpoint of small states, their positions both in the Concert of Europe and in the Cold 
War system were controlled by the Great Powers. Thus, the collapse of both systems meant that small 
states were released from the tight control and political leverage of the powerful. It is ironic that small 
states were more confined during the period of'long peace' among the Great Powers. On the other 
hand, however, the end of the Cold War system implies some changes for small states' security 
4E.H Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis. 1919-1939 (New York; Harper & Row, 1939) 
Chapter 3 & 4, esp„ pp. 23, 42, 49. 
5Ibid., p.42. 
"Rothstein mentions that after the 1848 revolution there had been the change of the 
intellectual environment which "slowly eroded the legitimacy of the hierarchical principle implicit 
in the Concert System. National self-determinism, liberalism, democracy, internationalism, and 
equality all served in various ways to dilute the acceptability of a distinction based solely on 
power calculation. "Robert L. Rothstein, Alliance and Small Powers (New York- Columbia Univ 
1968) p.16. 
'Thomas Masaryk, The Problem of Small Nations in the European Crisis ( Inaugural 
Lecture of the School of Slavonic Studies at King's College, Univ. of London, given on 19 Oct. 
1915), (London; The Athlone Press, 1966) p.26. 
policies. Previously, when a small state was in the camp of one of the two superpowers, it had the 
clear objective to 'balance' or 'bandwagon' and enjoyed the advantage of'free riding' in some cases. 
Then, which international system is more favorable to small states? Are their roles in the 
international system changing continuously? What should they do in order to survive in this dynamic 
'real world'? To answer these questions, it is needed to "attempt to look at the international system 
through the eyes and experiences" of small states.8 
Generally speaking, it is suggested that the study of small states' policies be conducted through 
the systemic approaches rather than the reductionist ones. Michael Handel explains why; 
"Domestic determinants of foreign policy are less sailent in weak states. 
. .Moreover, because of the reduced scale of complexity of bureaucratic and 
decision-making structures of weak states, there are usually fewer 
bureaucratic influences on foreign policy making."9 
The contemporary systemic approaches are composed principally of the hegemonic theory and 
the balance of power theory. Thus, this thesis employs these structural theories to deduce some 
hypotheses on what relationships exist between each theory and the positions of small states in each 
theoretical framework. Then, the hypotheses will be evaluated by case studies, carefully selected from 
the period of 1815 to the present time.10 
8Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System (London; Frank Cass, 1981) 
p.j. 
''Ibid., pp.3-4. Also, see; J. E. Spence, Republic under Pressure; A Study of South 
African Foreign Policy (London: Oxford Univ., 1967) p.6, and Richard Kennaway, New Zealand's 
Foreign Policy 1951-1971 (Wellington: Hicks Smith, 1972) pp. 153-155. Spence said, "the most 
obvious fact about small powers is that their foreign, policy is governed by policy of others. It follows 
that the student of small power policy, even more than the student of great power policy, must 
concentrate on the environment in which his subject exists." 
1
 "Surely there were many cases of small states that played active roles as balancers, or 
trimmers, or mediators between the great powers such as Syracuse between Rome and Carthage and 
Venice in the sixteenth century played between France and Spain. See; Hans. J. Morgenthau, Politics 
Among Nations (New York; Alfred A Knopf, 1973) pp.193-197; and Ludwig Dehio, The Precarious 
Balance (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1962) pp.25-37. 
As Rothstein pointed out, however, the distinction between Great Powers and small powers 
was implicit in the political practice of earlier centuries. "[It] was not raised into a formal principle 
until the exigencies of the struggle against Napoleon made it convenient, even necessary to do so." 
However, theories "are invented, not discovered," and they have explanatory power "gained by 
moving away from reality not by staying close to it."11 In other words, there has been neither a purely 
hegemonic world nor a pure balance of power system, a completely evenly-distributed system. 
Several empires before the industrial revolution were at best regional hegemons. Also, the dominance 
of the Royal Navy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries could not guarantee Great Britain the 
dominion on the Continent. Even today, though there is no comparable power to the United States, 
she cannot control the whole world at her pleasure. Yet, when one reduces the scope to survey to 
a certain region, he could find the hegemon and the hegemonic system. In other words, even if the 
balance of power system prevails at the golbal level, there would be regional hegemons at the 
subsystem level, and vice versa. On the other hand, even not complete, the balance of power system 
has generally dominated the world since 1815. Consequently, the hegemonic system and the balance 
of power system are not mutually exclusive but symbiotic. While the great powers balance one 
another, at the same time they have their own spheres of influence where they act as a hegemon. On 
the basis of this conceptualization, as for the balance of power theory, multipolar system (such as the 
Concert of Europe, Great Powers' rivalry in Asia in the late nineteenth century, and Central-Eastern 
Europe in the interwar period) and bipolar system (of the Cold War era) are selected, while the 
present American hegemonic system is assigned for the study of the hegemonic theory, though it's 
principally related to the post-1945 economic order of the world. 
Then, why is this study important? Surely, small states do not have as much influence on the 
international system as the great powers do. However, it is also true that if there is no small state 
there is no great power. In addition, the fates of small states are not exclusively in the hands of the 
great powers." The ability to understand, predict, adopt, and adjust to the political changes of 
Because the primary obligation of the Treaty of Chaumont, concluded in March 1814, was the 
promise to provide 60,000 men each for the next twenty years in the event of another French 
aggression, and because small states were not able to conduct it, "the formal and institutionalized 
distinction between Great Powers and small powers" appeared. Robert L. Rothstein,(1968), p. 12, 
Quoted in H.G. Schenk, The Aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars (London- Kegan Paul Trench' 
Trubner and Co., 1947) p. 127. ' 
lit 
'Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York; Random House, 1979) 
pp.5-7. 
international system is important for their survival. Rothschild's statement supports this point; 
"Thus, despite major and avoidable failings (too little intra-regional 
solidarity, too much overpoliticization of human relations, too little strategic 
government intervention in the economy, too much petty government 
interference with the society), thanks to the political performance of East 
Central Europe during the interwar era, it is impossible today to conceive of 
the region without its at least formally independent states."12 
Moreover, after the end of the Cold War, the weight of small states in the international system, at 
least at the reginal level, considerably increased. So did their freedom of maneuver. Thus, they 
became more significant players in international politics. For example, most contemporary crises are 
occurred by small states released from the control of great powers. In this situation this study will 
offer comparative analysis of the two structural theories and general principles for small state policies. 
Lastly, this study is expected to bring about some implications for the policies of South Korea or 
the reunified Korea in the future. It is generally believed that Northeast Asia would be again the arena 
for power competition among the regional states, especially between China and Japan, or China and 
Russia, or Japan and Russia. This so-called the 'back to the future' view,13 demands Korea, the 
quintessential small state of the region, to prepare efficient countermeasures in order to survive. 
Through surveying theoretical as well as historical and practical significance and roles of small states, 
this paper tries to reply to that demand. As the first step, the following chapter will define the key 
concepts of this paper, such as 'power' and 'small states.' 
12Joseph Rothschild, Return to Diversity: The Political History of East Central Europe 
Since World War II (New York; Oxford Univ. Press, 1993) p.24. 
13It argues that Asia could easily de-stabilize, with classical balance of power politics 
coming to dominate the international relations of the region. Buzan and Segal argue why this view 
has distinct possibilities in the region. See; Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, "Rethinking East Asian 
Security," Survival. Vol. 36, No. 2, Summer 1994, p.3. 
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II. CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 
. . . right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in powers, 
while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. 
Thucydides, The History of Peloponnesian 
War, Book V, chap. 17. 
A . POWER 
1 . Definitions and Characteristics 
To study the relationships between men, or groups, or states, one has to begin with understanding 
the medium that establishes, preserves, or changes the relationships. Power is that medium. Thus, the 
study of power has been the main theme for the student of politics, especially for the realists.14 
Nonetheless, it is still impossible to define the concept of power with several sentences because it is 
subjective to the perception or understanding of each person or group or state involved in the 
relationships.15 Therefore, it is more meaningful to sort various kinds of definitions by the 
characteristics in order to grasp the concept of power. 
a . It is a psychological concept There is a group of scholars who give attention to 
psychological aspects of power instead of considering the mere brute force. 
"When we speak of power, we mean man's control over the minds and 
actions of other men. . . . Political power is a psychological relation between 
those who exercise over it and those who it is exercised."16 
"Power can be thought of as the ability of an actor to get others to do 
something they otherwise would not do (and at an acceptable cost to the 
actor). Power can also be conceived in terns of control over outcomes. . . . 
There is rarely a one-to-one relationship between power measured by any type 
"Michael Sullivan put it; "Traditionally, it consists of the realpolitik view that nations 
operate solely for their own interests, that these interests focus around the question of the nation's 
power, that all nations interact with one another over the question of power, and that power is the 
ultimate goal of states. The central concept is normally considered to be power, and it is around 
this concept that much of the recent controversy surrounding the realist approach has centered." 
Michael Sullivan, Power in Contemporary International Politics (1990) p.9. 
15David A. Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old 
Tendencies," World Politics. Vol. XXXI, No.2, Jan. 1979, pp. 161-194. 
16 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (1973), p.28 
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iil7 of resources and power measured by effects on outcomes.' 
"Power ... is the ability to influence the behavior of others in accordance 
with one's own ends. . . . There is a power aspect to every relationship."18 
". . .at least three different meanings of power; power to persuade 
somebody to do something you want him to do, power to persuade somebody 
from doing something you do not want him to do, and power not to do what 
somebody wants you to do."19 
"In a positive sense, it is the ability to influence others to believe in a 
manner desired by the one wielding the power. In a negative sense, it is the 
ability to prevent others from exerting influence on one's own behavior. Is 
power, then, the same as influence? Not quite. Power is the ability to exercise 
influence and the ability to prevent influence from being exercised over 
oneself"20 
"The measure of state's power is the capacity of government to induce 
other states - or governments - to follow lines of conduct or foreign policy 
what they might otherwise not pursue; alternatively it is the capacity which are 
intent on deflecting it from a course which the national interest - or the 
interests of its leader - would appear to require."21 
b . It is a relative concept. The second aspect of power is that it is a relative concept. This 
notion has two different meanings. One is that power is one of criteria that make a person (or group 
or state) perceive his (or its) relative position in the relationships (or systems). In other words, power 
of A is can be perceived only in the interactions with others. Accordingly, if there is no interaction 
between members, there is no existence of power. By the same token, when one say that A is 
powerful, it means A is powerful in a certain situation, not in every situation. That is, power is 
17Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition (Boston; Little Brown, 1977) p. 11. 
"A.F.K. Organski, World Politics(2nd ed.) (New York; Knopf, 1968) p. 104. 
19T 9Erling Bjol, " The Analysis of Small Power Politics," in August Schou and Arne O. 
Bruntland ed., Small States in International Relations (Stockholm; Almquist and Wiksell  1971) 
p.36. 
20Marshall R. Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers. (New York' The Free Press 
1972) p.54. 
2,David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of Small States in the International 
System, (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1967) 
contextual: 
"That is, the pen, or the purse, or the army is powerful only if it used in an 
appropriate context. A brilliant, logical discourse may influence the behavior 
of people who hear it in the quiet of a lecture hall, but it could not possibly 
have any impact on them if they were in the midst of a battlefield."22 
"Any statement about influence that does not clearly indicate the domain 
and scope it refers to verges on being meaningless. When one hear that A is 
highly influential, the proper question is over what matter? The failure to insist 
on this simple question often leads political observers astray."23 
The other is that power increases or decreases relatively not absolutely. It is like a zero sum game. 
Let us assume there are two states. Surely, there could be an absolute growth of power for both 
states, like gaining surplus products through technological innovations. However, at the same time, 
there could be another aspect; one is losing ground, relatively, to the other. Sullivan quoted; 
"For national security issues, maximizing relative power capability is the 
central objective of policy, even if this means sacrificing absolute utility."24 
"If one nation is gaining power, then some other nation is losing it. One 
implication of this, of course, is that all nations cannot gain in relative power 
at the same time."25 
Also, Morgenthau noticed the significance of understanding this characteristic of power; 
"During the interwar period, France failed to perceive this characteristic 
of power, while Britain understood the relative concept of power and knew 
that not even victory in war could stop its decline, due to the relative growth 
of other powers. "26 
"Marshall Singer (1972) p.55. 
23David A. Baldwin, "Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis," International 
Organization. 34 (4), 1980, p.497. 
24Krasner, Asymmetries in Japanese-American Trade: The Case for Specific Reciprocity, 
(Berkeley; Institute for International Studies, 1987) pp.67-68; Quoted in Sullivan, (1990) p. 100. 
25Siverson, "Theories of Hegemonic War and Soviet-American Relations," Prepared for 
Delivery at the 17th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association. Anaheim, CA 
1986, pp.8-9; Quoted in Sullivan, (1990) p. 199. 
26Hans J. Morgenthau (1973) pp. 155-156. 
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c . It is not a static but a ever changing concept. The third one is that power is changing in 
accordance with technological, economic, political changes. Joseph Nye argued power is becoming 
less fungible, less coercive, and less tangible.27 
d. It is a diffusive concept. Power is diffusing from the core of the international system to 
the periphery. Mainly the hegemonic theorists emphasize this aspect of power to explain the cause 
of the decline of the hegemon. Robert Gilpin said; "Through trade, foreign investment, and the 
transfer of technology, wealth and economic activities tend to diffuse from the old centers to new 
"comers of economic growth."28 Also, in terms of military power, "the spread of modern technology 
has enhanced the capability of backward states," and the growth of indigenous arms industries in 
small states has removed political leverage of the powerful over the diminutive and "increased the 
potential costs of regional intervention by large powers. »29 
2
'Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York; 
Basic Books, 1990) pp.7, 189-196. He pointed out; "The fragmented structure of world politics 
among different issues has made power resources less fungible; that is, less transferable from one 
issue to another.    . Co-optive power is the ability of a nation to structure a situation so that other 
nations develop or define their interests in ways consistent with one's own nation. This type of 
power tends to arise from such resources as cultural and ideological attraction as well as the rules 
and institutions of international regimes. . . The changing nature of international politics has also 
made intangible power resources more important. National cohesion, unversalistic culture, and 
international institutions are taking on additional significance." In terms of the changing concept 
of economic power, he exemplified; "For example, seventeenth-century mercantilist theorists, 
who focused on Spain's reserves of gold and silver bullion from the mines in the Western 
Hemisphere, would not have predicted Holland's commercial rise or the strength of France 
derived from larger population and improved administrative structures. In the eighteenth century, 
those who focused on France's population and rural industry would have missed the rise of Britain 
due to its political stability and favorable conditions for the Industrial Revolution. In 1900, 
American writer Brooks Adams used the control of metals and minerals as an index of future 
military and economic power; he predicted the decline of Britain and ascendancy of Russia and 
China." 
28Robert Gilpin, War and Changes in World Politics (New York; Cambridge Univ Press 
1981) p.178. 
29Joseph Nye (1990) p. 186. However, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it seems 
that the United States has made substantial gains in terms of relative power, even as it draws 
down in absolute terms. 
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The other aspect of power diffusion is that it's components have diffused from a simple one 
to various and complex ones. As Keohane and Nye put it; 
"The traditional view was that military power dominated other forms, and 
that states with most military power controlled world affairs. But the 
resources that produce power capabilities have become complex."30 
Consequently, one can get another definition of power when he combines the whole 
characteristics of power enumerated so far; Power is the practical or perceived ability of one to 
control over the minds or behavior of a certain counterpart, in a certain point of time and place. 
It seems too limited definition. But, power is, first of all, an abstraction not a real thing. Also, power 
exists in every relationship of people (or groups, or states) but with different postures. 
2 . The Functions of Power 
Then, what functions does power accomplish? Karl Deutsch explains it by comparing the role of 
power in politics to the role of money in economics; 
"Just as money is the currency of economic life, so power can be thought 
of as the currency of politics. . . Here, power is a symbolic role taken by the 
government, and ascribed to it by the people, and made credible by an initial 
minimum of readiness, resources, and capabilities to govern. And this 
symbolic role of power, together with their real or reputed capability, serves 
as a currency which mediates the exchange of the many diverse needs and 
wishes - the interest - of the many for the single, legitimate, and widely 
supported role of decision-makers of the few."31 
On the basis of this conceptualization, he considered power as not only an instrument but also an aim 
of a state in international politics. 
-"But if people only spend their money, they end up penniless, and if 
politicians only spend their power, they end up powerless. . . Thus, to invest 
is to spend money to get more money, . . . again and again. In politics some 
people invest in power. They spend their power on other values in such a 
manner that these values in turn will bring more power back to them."32 
30Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (1977) p. 11. 




Also, Hans Morgenthau pointed out why a nation pursues power as its aim; 
"... the nation must try to have at least a margin of safety which will 
allow it to make erroneous calculations and still maintain the balance of 
power. To that effect, all nations actively engaged in the struggle for power 
must actually aim not to a balance - that is, equality - of power but at 
superiority of power in their own behalf"33 
Another one of the most important functions of power is that it determines the type and the 
context of the international systems. E. H. Carr stated that" Power is a necessary ingredient of every 
political order. . .The working hypothesis of an international order was created by a superior power. 
The hypothesis has been destroyed by the decline, relative or absolute, ofthat power."34 
3 . Components of Power and the Ways of Categorization 
Then, how can we measure the power of a state? One cannot set an order in the international 
system unless this question is answered, since power is the "necessary" factor for doing that. At first, 
one should look at the components of power. Traditionally, power is perceived as "a mix of strategic, 
military, economic, and political strengths and weaknesses."35 On the other hand, Michael Handel 
•'-
,
 Hans J. Morgenthau (1973) p.208. However, more widely adopted notion is power as 
an instrument, especially as the method to sanction or coerce. See; Alan C. Lamborn, The Price of 
Power: Risk and Foreign Policy in Britain. France and Germany (Boston; Unwin Hyman, 1991) 
pp.15-16. 
34E. H. Carr (1939) p. 232. Also, see; Robert Gilpin, (1981) p.xi: 
"Ray C. Cline, World Power Assessment. 1977: A Calculus of Strategic Drift. 2nd ed.. 
(Boulder, Colo.; Westview Press, 1977) pp.33-34. Cline put it, more in detail; "It is determined by 
the military forces and the military establishment of a country but even more by the size and 
location of territory, the nature of frontiers, the population, the raw-material resources, the 
economic structure, the technological development, the financial strength, the ethnic mix, the 
social cohesiveness, the stability of political processes and decision-making, and finally, the 
intangible usually described as national spirit." Also, he tried to formalize the way of calculation 
like the following: 
Pp = (C + E + M)x(S + W), Pp = Perceived Power, C = Critical Mass = Population 
+ Territory, E = Economic Capability, M = Military Capability, S = Strategic Purpose, W = Will 
to Pursue National Strategy. Also, see; Inis L.Claude, Power and International Relations (New 
York; Random House, 1962) p.6; Klaus Knorr, Power & Wealth: The Political Economy of 
International Power, (New York; Basic Books, 1973) p.4; Schwargenberger, G., Power Politics 
(3rd Ed.) (New York; Frederick A. Praeger, 1964) p. 14. 
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added "organizational capabilities" (or "power conversion") to Cline's formula instead of the "will to 
pursue national strategy."36 Both of them tried to find the objective way of measuring power, but 
failed because of the inherent limits; power can be measured only in comparative way which is bound 
to be subjective. 
More implicit and abstract criteria are found by Karl Deutsch. He enumerated four dimensions 
of power; weight, domain, range, and scope/7 Knowing these components of power is very helpful 
for the students of international politics to distinguish the small states from others, because "the use 
of multiple criteria in evaluating the position of [small states] leads to a better understanding of their 
relative strength," and because small states are generally score low on "most of criteria employed, the 
36Michael Handel (1968) p.68. Handel pointed out four different elements that determine 
the strength of a state. "They are geographical data, for example the area of the territory and the 
nature of the frontiers; material data, for instance the absence or presence of natural resources 
and industrial capacity (technological development and capital); human resources, such as the 
size of the population, ethnic homogeneity and social integration (cohesion and unity), national 
character and morale; and organizational capabilities (or Raymond Aron's terminology, the 
"collective capacity for action"), administrative capabilities, the qualities of command and military 
preparedness (military decision-making), the quality of diplomacy, and capacity of adaptation." 
Also, see; Joseph Nye, (1990) p.27. He considers "power conversion" as much important as 
power resources; "Power conversion is the capacity to convert potential power, as measured by 
resources, to realized power, as measured by the changed behavior of others." 
"Karl Deutsch (1978) pp.28-40. He defined the four dimensions of the power; "The 
weight of the power or the influence of an actor over some process is the extent to which that 
person can change the probability of its outcome. . . In world politics the weight of the power of 
most governments, and particularly of the great powers, has been declining ever since 1945. No 
government today has as much as had Great Britain, say, between 1870 and 1935. At present, 
Britain cannot control its former colonies; the United States cannot control France or Cuba; the 
Soviet Union cannot control Yugoslavia or China; and China cannot control its neighbors. . . The 
domain of power is the collection of people and resources that are subject and obedient or belong 
to it. . . Range is the difference between the highest reward and the worst punishment which 
power-holders can bestow (or inflict). [Unlike the weight of the power], in international politics, 
governments seem to have increased the range both of rewards they offer and of punishments they 
threaten, in their efforts to control the behavior of other countries and their governments. . . The 
scope of the power is the set of collection of all the particular kinds or classes of behavior 
relations and affairs that are effectively subjected to it." 
- 13- 
lower the [small states] score in comparison to the great and middle powers."38 Then what is the 
definition of small states? 
B . SMALL STATES AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS 
1 . Definition of Small States 
Most definitions of small states made by scholars of international politics so far are the results of 
"identifying characteristics and formulating hypotheses on what differentiates small states from other 
classes of states," rather than "measuring objective elements of state capability and placing them on 
a ranking scale."39 Following definitions are products of those efforts. 
"By itself the concept of small state means nothing. A state is only small 
in relation to a greater one. Belgium may be a small state in relation to France, 
but Luxembourg is a small state in relation to Belgium, and France is a small 
state in relation to the United States."40 
"A small power is a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security 
primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on 
the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the 
small power's belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be 
recognized by the other states involved in international politics."41 
"Small powers are almost by definition 'local' powers whose demands are 
restricted to their own and immediate adjacent areas, while great powers exert 
their influence over wide areas. In the terminology of Harold D. Lasswell and 
Abraham Kaplan the power of small state is narrow in domain, however much 
or little may be its weight."42 
"A small state ... is a state which unable to contend in war with the treat 
"Michael Handel (1981) p. 
39T 9R.P. Barston, The Other Powers: Studies in Foreign Policies of Small States (New 
York; Barnes and Noble, 1973) p. 15. He, suggested four approaches to define the term 'small 
state'; (1) setting up an upper limit on, for example, the population size; (2) measuring objective 
elements; (3) analyzing relative influence; and (4) identifying characteristics and formulating 
hypotheses on what differentiates small states from others. 
4üErlmg Bjol, "The Anaysis of Small Power Politics," in Schou and Bruntland (1971) p.29. 
41Robert Rothstein (1968) p.29. 
42, 
-Annette B. Fox, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War IT (Chicago- Univ 
of Chicago Press, 1959) p.3. °' 
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powers on anything like the equal terms."43 
"[Small states are] consumers rather than producers of security."44 
"The smallness we are talking about when we speak of small powers is 
smallness relative to the international society they belong to."45 
Thus, one can say that small states can be defined only in a relative and subjective way. Small States 
are states that have less power than others in a certain context of relationship, compared by the 
criteria of measuring power; such as weight, domain, range, and scope. In this way, one can 
distinguish small states from the powerful in every situation, because all systems inherently have 
visible or invisible spectrum of states arranged from the most powerful to the least in terms of 
power.46 With the same perception for relationship between small states and the international systems, 
Michael Handel put it; 
"The position and relative security of any weak state must be gauged in 
terms of the specific international system in which it is operating. . . . Even at 
the same period of history, weak states located in different areas have 
different neighbors and thus face different problems. . . . Not Russia but the 
Arab states are the greatest danger to Israel (and vice versa). For India it was 
Pakistan rather than China. . . Therefore, when speaking of the ability or 
inability of a weak state to defend itself, one must immediately ask, 'Against 
whom?'"47 
2 . Small States and the International Systems 
On the other side of the same coin, international systems provide opportunities as well as 
restrictions to small states. Because the international system is mainly changed and established by 
43Army Vandenvosch, "The Small States in International Politics and Organization," The 
Journal of Politics. 26 (1964), p.294. Quoted in Handel, (1981) p.36. 
"Ibid. 
45Martin Wight, Power Politics. Edited by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (New York; 
Holmes & Meier, 1978) p.61. 
46About this fact, Kenneth Waltz's arguments are insightful. He defined a system as "a set 
of interacting units," and said, "since structure is an abstraction, it cannot be defined by enumerating 
material characteristics of the system. It must instead be defined by the arrangement of the system's 
parts and by the principle ofthat arrangement." See; Kenneth Waltz (1979) pp.40, 80. 
47Michael Handel (1981) pp.5, 37. 
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great powers, and because small states inherently lack the internal countermeasures, they must rely 
on external sources in order to enhance their strength and improve their position in the system. Yet, 
"their ability to turn to other states and draw on their resources is largely 
a function of the nature of the particular international system in which they 
operate. Different types of international systems enhance or weaken their 
bargaining position or leverage, encourage or discourage them from seeking 
the aid of other states, or isolate them from other states within the system."48 
Accordingly, small states usually have a narrow range of countermeasures and thus, they are 
vulnerable to external pressure. "Having less margin of error than more powerful states, the small 
states must carefully manage its external relations in order to minimize risks and reduce the impact 
of policy failures."49 However, small states are "by no means impotent, helpless victims of the system. 
On the contrary, some of them are quick to take advantage of the opportunities arising from the 
nature of any given international system."50 For example, Yugoslavia during the cold war era, Cuba 
in 1962, Israel in 1973, and North Korea in these days, all these countries have pursued very active 
and ambitious foreign policies and have not failed to get their objectives or, at least, have not lost 
their initiative by the pressures of the powerful. 
Yet, it is still needed to distinguish the significant small states in terms of the balance of power 
in the international (global or regional) system from the insignificant ones. For example, Costa Rica 
is a small state but not significant for the security of the Central America as much as Pakistan is for 
the South Asian stability. Also, since the international system is changing, so is the significance of 
small states. The present Belgium is not important for the security of Europe as much as it was in the 
"Ibid, p. 171. 
49R.P. Barston (1973) p. 19. This restriction on small states was observed by Rothstein 
also; "Great powers determine the nature of systemic patterns; as such they can alter the system 
or perhaps merely ignore its imperatives without suffering grievously. Small powers on the other 
hand are much more limited in their freedom by the nature of the systemic structure. For the most 
part they are dominated by the system, in the sense that opportunities they have are dependent on 
the kind of system which exists. They can rarely create their own opportunities." See his book, 
Alliances and Small Powers, p. 182. 
50 Michael Handel (1981) pp.45-46. 
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nineteenth century, because the possibility of Franco-German conflict has considerably decreased.51 
One possible way is the geographical approach. Accordingly, the following chapter will examine the 
significance of small states, especially in terms of geopolitics, and survey their general strategies. 
51
 Also, Joseph Malia said, "Belgium, for example, has been for a long time a buffer state 
between Germany and France. However, the emergence of a new European order after World 
War II created a situation in which Belgium was no longer a buffer state." Joseph Malia, "Buffer 
States; The Issue of Sovereignty," in John Chay and Thomas Ross ed., Buffer States in World 
Politics (Boulder; Westview Press, 1986) p.30. 
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Ill. ROLES AND STRATEGIES OF SMALL STATES 
A . THE ROLES OF SMALL STATES : A GEOPOLITICAL APPROACH 
With some degree of exaggeration, one might argue that geography decides the fate of a state. 
Britain and Japan have enjoyed their insular position while Poland, Belgium, and Korea have suffered 
because of their location between hostile neighbors. Many factors affect the geographic value of a 
state. Traditionally, they are "the distribution of land and sea, the topography, the hydrographic 
network, the size of territory, and its aptitude to produce."52 But, for small states strategic location 
is more important than any other factors. For example, "Germany attacked Belgium and Holland not 
because of their inherent weakness but because it was at war with France and Great Britain, and the 
two small countries happened to be located on the strategic highway to France."53 However, this 
vulnerability stemming from location also can be an asset, especially in a time of great power amity.54 
Thus, small states located between great powers enjoy their strategic significance or suffer from it 
according to great powers' policies. Usually, these small states play significant roles in the 
international system, as a buffer state, a client, a balancer, and a risktaker. 
1 . A Buffer State 
The term' buffer state' is defined as a small independent state lying between two or more larger 
powers.55 However, there is a difference between scholars in identifying a buffer state. Martin Wight 
32Jean Gottman, "Geography and International Relations," World Politics. Vol. Ill, No.2, 
Jan. 1951, pp. 157-162. 
53Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System (1981) p.78. 
54For example, the Dutch were elected to play the role of a strong middle power because 
"it dominated three international waterways - the Meuse, the Rhine and the Scheldt, and it was 
flanked by three major European powers viz. Great Britain, Germany and France." However, 
when the agreement among the powers began to collapse, the strategic location of the 
Netherlands brought about a crisis, cf L. G. M. Jaquet, "The Roles of Small States within 
Alliance Systems," in Schou and Bruntland, Small States in International Relations (1971), p.58. 
"A.F.K. Organski defined 'buffer state' as "a weak nation located between two large and 
not too friendly nations. Its function is to keep the two giants apart and thus reduce the chances 
of friction between them." By the same token, gerald Ingalls described it as "a small political or 
administrative unit located between and separating two larger opposing powers." However, their 
cenceptualization is somewhat ambiguous, because it is not clear that "larger states" must be 
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focused more on the role of neighboring great powers and thus included satellites with trimmers and 
neutrals in his three types of buffer states, while Thomas Ross emphasized the role of a buffer state 
as an independent player, pointing out that: 
"buffer states are not satellite or puppet states of either of the powerful 
neighbors, nor are they necessarily strictly neutral states. The concept of a 
buffer state, in presupposing a free and effective organism in the region 
interposed, rules out partition or any form of breakup enforced by the great 
powers on either flanks."56 
However, both identifications are too extreme; one is too broad, the other is too narrow. Thus, 
in this study, a buffer state; 1) should be weaker or smaller than neighboring powers; 2) should be 
located between greater powers that maintain an approximate parity or balance of power. Thus, 
once the balance of power or the parity between great powers breaks down, a buffer state tends to 
lose its autonomy and then its identity as a buffer state. Several cases support this argument.57 On the 
"great powers." Therefore, It might be more appropriate to follow Martin Wight's definition that: 
"A buffer state is a weak power between two or more stronger ones, maintained or even created 
with the purpose of reducing conflict between them. A buffer zone is a region occupied by one or 
more weaker powers between two or more stronger powers; it is sometimes described as a power 
vacuum." A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York; Knopf, 1960) p.276; Gerald L. 
Ingalls,"Buffer States: Outlining and Expanding Existing Theory," John Chay and Thomas Ross 
ed
-, Buffer States in World Politics (Boulder; Westview Press, 1986), p.233; Martin Wight, 
Power Politics, Hedley Bull and Castern Hobraad ed., (New York; Holmes & Meier Publishers 
1978), p.160. 
^Thomas Ross, "Buffer State: A Geographer's Perspective," Chay and Ross ed., Buffer 
States in World Politics (1986^ p. 16 
"When the Concert of Europe collapsed and the probability of war increased, most buffer 
states were endangered and lost their identity, either voluntarily or by force. In the case of Korea, 
"when the power balance broke down twice near the turn of the century (in 1895 and 1905 at the' 
end of the Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War, respectively) the buffer system 
disappeared and with it Korea's independence." Also, as World War II ended and Finland's role as 
a buffer state between Sweden and Russia or between Germany and Russia was over, Finland 
entirely fell into the Soviet sphere of influence, "without the existence of any great power to 
counterbalance Soviet military power. In other words, Finland ceased to be a buffer state and 
became a rimstate." John Chay and Thomas Ross, "Introduction," Chay and Ross ed., pp.4-5; 
Efraim Karsh, Neutrality and Small States (New York; Routledge, 1988) pp.89-90. Efraim Karsh 
distinguished a rimstate from a buffer state; "it is a state located along the borders of a great 
power and coming within its defense perimeter while not being situated between two great 
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other hand, in terms of conceptual understanding, a buffer state doesn't have to be geographically 
located between the great powers. In other words, the small states between the ideologically hostile 
great powers, such as the two superpowers of the Cold War era, can also be defined as buffer states.58 
2 . A Client 
.Another form of small states which have significant weight in the international systems is a client 
state. This term has frequently been used for defining the state in the relationship between one of two 
superpowers and a small state which belonged to one of two blocs.59 Originated from economics, the 
, term 'client' includes rather different concepts from 'satellite' or 'puppet state.' On the contrary, the 
patron-client relationship implies a "reciprocal flow of benefits and the absence of coercion in the hold 
that the patron's leader has over his client states."60 A client state pursues economic and military aid 
from the supplier in exchanges for tangible and intangible goods and services such as military bases 
of commodities and loyalty or deference. A patron state, conversely, tries to buy political leverage 
over the client or to acquire and keep strategic interests in the region in exchanges for economic and 
military assistance like the Soviet Union toward Cuba during the Cold War period.61 However, 
powers. . .[It] does not have the privilege of choosing between two opposing rivals or alignments. 
. .it must find a working modus vivendi with the power immediately adjoining its territory." 
(pp.82-83). 
58Chay and Ross, "Introduction," Chay and Ross, ed. (1986) p.3. 
59Even though there is a view that "weak states can try to behave as patron of even weaker 
states," in this paper, a patron-client relationship is used for describing the relationship between a 
great power and a small state, cf Michael Handel (1968) p. 139. 
60Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations 
(New York; Basic Books, 1975) p.25. Quoted in Yaacov, Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel the 
Superpowers, and the War in the Middle East (New York; Praeger, 1987) pp.3-13.    At this 
point, Yaacov-Siman-Tov described the relationship as the 'bargaining relationship' which 
basically depends on the 'reciprocity.' 
61
 To explain the policy of patron states which aimed to drive their clients states to comply 
by controlling arms transfers, some use 'leverage,' others use 'influence' as the term. While the 
latter ambiguously defines 'influence' as the "ability to alter the policy of the recipient," the former, 
distinguishes the concept of'leverage' from those of'power' and 'influence,' and defines it as the 
"manipulation of the arms transfer relationship in order to coerce or induce a recipient state to 
conform its policy or action to the desires of the supplier." However, both concepts are quite 
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"although the asymmetry of the patron-client relationship may be regarded as a potential power 
resource for the patron, its conversion to active influence does not necessarily bring about the desired 
results. Potential bargaining with a client renders the potential power of the patron less effective."62 
Moreover, a client can penetrate into the internal decision-making process of a patron state. This 
propensity was intensified in the Cold War system. The competitive bipolar system embodied great 
opportunities for small states as the competition between the superpowers for allies afforded the 
clients room to maneuver.63 Therefore, one can say that the position of a client is determined by "the 
availability of other patrons who can render the same protection or material support, and the mobility 
of [the client] between alternative patrons."64 
The policy options of a client state extend from complete allegiance, like the behavior of the pilot 
fish,65 to free-riding, and it chooses its policy according to the environment of the international 
system. Handel put it; 
different from each other. Following Nachmias' identifications, this paper distinguishes 'leverage' 
from 'influence'; "Leverage always implies a strategy aimed at controlling another country's policy 
choices. Influence need not be a strategy. It is a process of interaction in a framework of either 
friendly or unfriendly relations. By contrast, leverage means manipulation of aid, which is coercive 
and aimed at limiting the policy choices of the client states. Influence, unlikely leverage, does not 
depend on a patron-client relationship and does not require dependency." cf Yaacov, Bar-Siman- 
Tov, 1987, pp. 15-24; William B. Quandt, "Influence through Arms Supply: The US Experience in 
the Middle East," pp. 121-122; Marvin Feuerwerger, Congress and Israel (Westport, CT; 
Greenwood Press, 1979) p.l 1; Nitza Nachmias, Transfer of Arms. Leverage, and Peace in the 
Middle East (New York; Greenwood Press, 1988) p. 10. 
62Yaacov, Bar-Siman-Tov (1987) p. 12; and Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and 
Interdependence (1977) p 11 
63Yaacov, Bar-Siman-Tov, "Alliance Strategy: US-Small Allies Relationship," The Journal 
of Strategic Studies Vol. 3, No. 2, Sep. 1980, p.203. 
64 Michael Handel (1968) p. 133. 
"Handel explained the client's voluntary allegiance to the patron using this term; "The 
client state can develop what biologists call synchronism. They describe the behavior of the pilot 
fish as following the shark as a piece of iron does a magnet, obeying instantly the incessant and 
regular changes of direction shown by the shark. . .For example, the Hungarian mission to the 
League of Nations in the early thirties coordinated its speeches with those of Germany, and the 
same must have been true for Albania and Italy." cf. Ibid., p. 134. 
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"the more automatic the security promised to a weak state, the more 
important that state is to the defense system of the superpower, and the fewer 
of its own resources it has to invest in security. . .[This tendency is] 
encouraged not only their perception of their importance to the superpower's 
security, but also two other facts. First, they know that whatever they do, they 
cannot hold out against the onslaught of an attacking superpower. Hence any 
investment in their own defense is waste of resources. . . The development of 
nuclear weapons is a second fact that has encouraged the small states to adopt 
a strategy of coercive defiance. Many of the weak states believe that mutual 
nuclear deterrence will prevent a war and that therefore it would be foolish to 
invest in conventional forces that would never be used or would be unhelpful 
and irrelevant. . . Paradoxically, the failure of burden sharing is an indication 
of the faith of the weak state in the superpower with which it is allied."66 
If the conditions are reversed, the client states should comply on the requests of their patrons. Thus, 
one can conclude that, like a buffer state, as for a client state, the external factors are more important 
than its skillful foreign policy or internal sources of strength to play a significant role in the 
international system. 
3 . A Balancer or A Holder of the Balance 
A balancer (or a holder of the balance) is another type of role for small states located in 
geographically significant positions. Generally it is believed that this role is accomplished by a great 
power able to direct and guide the overall international system, such as Great Britain in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 67 
60
'Ibid., pp. 150-151. One of the prominent example of this argument is the Yoshida 
Doctrine of Japan. Shigeru Yoshida, Prime Minister of Japan from 1948 to 1954, opted for the 
strategy under- which Japan would accept the new constitution and security treaty. He advocated 
the subordination of Japan's international posture to the requirement of national economic growth, 
and reliance on a moderate self-defense capability combined with the US security guarantee. 
cf. Tetsuya Kataoka and Ramon H. Myers, Defending an Economic Superpower: Reassessing the 
US-Japan Security Alliance (San Francisco; Westview Press, 1989) pp.3-4; and Aurelia George, 
"Japan's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Radical Departure or Predictable 
Response?", Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIII, No.6, Jun 1993, p.560. 
67Morgenthau said, "By making it impossible for any nation or combination of nations to 
gain predominance over the others, [the balancer] preserves its own independence as well as the 
independence of all the other nations, and is thus a most powerful factor in international 
politics." Also,Organski noted, "it has become almost an historical truism to identify England's 
secular policy with the maintenance of this balance by throwing her weight now in this scale and 
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In such a multipolar system, a powerful balancer was needed, one able to "set into motion. 
various weights and counterweights on all sides of the chandelier."68 Yet, there is another balance of 
power system including the balancer as a significant player. It is the system of two approximately 
equal, and usually rival, powers with the third one, the holder of the balance between them, such as 
the bipolar system during the Cold War era. It is in this system that small states can play important 
roles as balancers. Colonel Beck of Poland between Germany and Russia, Tito of Yugoslavia between 
the West and the East, Sadat of Egypt between the United States and the Soviet Union, and Kim II 
Sung of North Korea between China and the Soviet Union. All these politicians understood and 
utilized the environment by trying to hold the balance between the two opposing great powers. Thus, 
as Martin Wight put it: "Sometimes a small power, through the accident of the strategic position or 
the energy of its ruler, can contribute useful if not decisive strength to one side or the other, . . ,"69 
However, the practical policies of those small states are not equal, simple or static. Those policies will 
be examined in the latter part of this chapter. 
4 . A Risktaker? 
The last conceivable type of a small state is a risktaker. As Handel put it; 
"In general, weak states must take defensive positions against any 
superpowers. Occasionally, however, a weak state takes a limited offensive 
posture against a great or superpower, often defying it with a certain degree 
of success. In fishing disputes, Iceland and Peru have successfully resisted 
British and American pressures. North Korea challenged the United States 
with impunity, and went unpunished in the Pueblo incident. Serbia risked the 
wrath of Austria before World War I. "70 
now in that, but ever on the side opposed to the political dictatorship of the strongest single state 
or group at a given time." Hans J. Morgenthau (1973) p. 194; A.F.K. Organski (1960) p.279; also 
see, Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?", World ' 
Politics, Vol. V, No.4, July 1953,pp.442-475; and Martin Wight, "Balance of Power'" in Herbert 
Butterfield and Martin Wight ed., Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International 
Politics (London; George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1966) pp. 149-175. 
68Ernst B. Haas, July 1953, p.458. 
69Martin Wight (1966) p. 161. 
'"Michael Handel (1981) p.39. 
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Moreover, in cases of small states' defiance, "the response of the great power will be determined by 
the type of threat, the degree of its active involvement elsewhere, and concern lest any retaliatory 
action might adversely affect its relations with other states in the region."71 Calculating the costs and 
benefits very carefully, some leaders of small states have successfully defied the great powers, even 
the superpowers. 
President Syngman Rhee of South Korea was one of them.72 When the Chinese and North Korean 
Communists began to show a great willingness to negotiate a truce agreement, especially after the 
death of Stalin, President Rhee harshly opposed that truce talk and insisted that the war should be 
ended with the complete reunification of Korea, and even that the UN occupy the territory of Russia 
and China, until permanent peace was established in the Far East. Furthermore, to prohibit the 
progress of the truce talk, he released 27,000 anti-Communist North Korean POW. It was an attempt 
to "discredit the United States in the eyes of the enemy" and, by doing so, "to stop any attempt to 
reach an agreement with the Communists at Panmunjom."73 Through this very carefully calculated 
defiance. President Rhee achieved his primary goals; to make the United States sign a bilateral treaty 
and to get economic aid for rehabilitation. It was the case of a small state's risktaking defiance against 
its own patron in order to increase its commitments.74 
71 R. P. Barston, "Introduction," in R. P. Barston ed., The Other Powers (1973) p.23. 
72General Mark Clark described about him, "I found myself engaged in a two-front 
diplomatic battle. . .with the Communists at Panmunjom and with President Syngman Rhee in 
Seoul, . . The biggest trouble came from Rhee." cf. Mark Clark. From the Danube to the Yalu 
(New York; Harper, 1954) p.256. Quoted in Chang Jin Park, "The Influence of Small States upon 
the Superpower: US-South Korean Relations as a Case Study, 1950-1953," World Politics. Vol. 
XXVIII, No. 1, Oct. 1975, p.97. 
73Chang Jin Park noted; "Rhee's action was hailed in South Korea as an act of great 
statesmanship. The release of anti-Communist prisoners was the only option available for the 
Seoul government in its effort to break up the truce talks, and to unify Korea by defeating the 
enemy militarily. Rhee's daring action was primarily intended to break up the truce talks rather 
than to undermine the foundation of the US-South Korean alliance. From the American 
perspective, however, it seemed to sabotage the efforts for peace, and the American Government 
openly expressed misgivings with regard to Rhee's intentions." Chang Jin Park, 1975, pp.99, 113. 
74
 Another similar example is Sadat's expulsion of the Soviet military experts in 1972. By 
doing that, he "compelled the USSR to supply his country with massive shipments that it had 
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The other type of defiance is that against its enemy. This can be illustrated by North Korea's direct 
challenges against the United States in 1968, 1969 and 1976, respectively the Pueblo incident, the 
shooting down of the EC-121 A/C, and the ax-slaying incident at the Panmunjom area. In the case 
of the Pueblo incident, Kim II Sung understood the immobility, and also unwillingness, of the United 
States due to its involvement in the Vietnam War. Also, he knew he could succeed at the negotiation 
table because North Korea seized a critical 'bargaining card,' the American hostages.75 Moreover, 
heightened tension in Korea might well force the withdrawal of nearly 50,000 South Korean troops 
then fighting alongside the United States.76 In case of the EC-121 incident, Kim clearly ascertained 
that the United States would be self-constrained because of the reflection of the Gulf of Tonkin 
incident and because of the ongoing Vietnam War. In addition, he might calculate that the United 
States worried that the North Koreans might have reacted in a way that would precipitate a wider 
war, if she assaulted North Korea.77 Also, even the case of the ax-slaying incident in 1976 when the 
United States was not bound by the Vietnam War, Kim escaped the crisis with just a verbal 
concession, saying it was 'regretful.78' Other than the show of force with bombers and other air-power 
assets, no countermeasure was taken by the United States.79 
previously refused to provide." cf. Michael Handel, The Diplomacy of Surprise: Hitler. Nixon. 
Sadat (New York; Harvard Univ. Press, 1981) p.3 and pp.241-297. 
7yPeter Grose noted in his editorial for The New York Times; "A bold commando sweep 
into Wonsan harbor to recover the ship might conceivably succeed. But, it was thought, it would 
only endanger the hostages." The New York Times(NYT), "Limitation of Power," Jan. 27, 1968. 
7<W777Jan. 28 and 29, 1968. 
77MT, May 1, 1969. 
78T 8Kim said, "It is regretful that an incident occurred in the Joint Security Area, 
Panmunjom, at this time. An effort must be made so that such incidents may not recur in the 
future." And, he urged the UN side " to prevent the provocation," pledging that the North Korean 
side "will never provoke first, but take self-defensive measures only when provocation occurs " 
cf. ATT', Aug. 23, 1976. 
79, At the time of this writing (Spring 1995) North Korea appears to be repeating this 
risktaking pattern in its intransigent negotiating behavior in response to U.S. efforts to curtail its 
nuclear program. 
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From the perspectives of the great powers, all these roles of small states mentioned so far depend 
on the geopolitical context of the international systems rather than their leaders' statesmanship. 
However, to understand the whole international system and to find the niche or the window of 
opportunity for small states may depend on the competence of their statecraft. Then, what are their 
measures to seize those relatively scarce opportunities? 
B . STRATEGIES OF SMALL STATES 
1 . Aims or National Interests of Small States 
Before searching for the strategic alternatives of small states, it is necessary to understand their 
general aims or national interests. In a Hobbesian world, the primary goal of a state is to survive. 
Even though the international system is becoming integrated and institutionalized, the basic unit of 
it remains the nation-state; and moreover, the basic conception of statesmen will continually be 
"realistic." Besides, since the inequality of states is inevitable, even if there were an effective 
international organization in the future, the role of small states will be marginal not just relatively but 
also absolutely. In this self-help system, small states' practical objective was and still is "simple and 
clear; to stay out of the hostilities,"80 or "to avoid conflict with a great power."81 However, in reality, 
the survivability of small states has considerably increased. Comparing the twentieth century with 
other centuries, especially with the nineteenth century when the notion of "the white man's burden" 
was prevalent, this fact can be clearly observed. On the contrary, a lot of new states were de- 
colonized through this century. Even some states devoured by Russia, such as Lithuania, Estonia and 
Latvia, also achieved their independence. 
Then, what is the real issue for small states? What is the most important concern for small states? 
Obviously, it is sovereignty (or autonomy). Allen Sens noted, "The political life of small power is a 
struggle for political, economic, and social autonomy as much as it is a struggle for national survival 
or territorial integrity."82 
p.29. 
80Annette B. Fox, The Power of Small States (1959) p. 181. 
81David Vital, "The Analysis of Small Power Politics," in Schou and Bruntland (1971) 
82Allen Sens, "The Security of Small States in the Post-Cold War Europe," in David 
Haglund ed., From Euphoria To Hysteria (1993) p.231. 
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Then, what is sovereignty? It is understood as "the independent right of the state over its own 
territory and its autonomy vis-a-vis other states,"83 or as "the preeminence of the national polity in 
relation to both the larger world polity and various local polities."84 It means the exclusive right of 
a state to wield its power over its territory and population without being subordinated to another 
country. Thus, sovereign states "develop their own strategies, chart their own courses, make their 
own decisions about how to meet whatever needs they experience and whatever desires they 
develop."8" 
However, the concept of sovereignty is not practical but theoretical. John Boli describes it this 
way: "The essence of sovereignty is thus theoretical, not empirical; it is the theory that the national 
polity, as organized by the state, is the pinnacle of authority, neither subordinate to the world polity 
nor defied by local polities or organizations. How much the sovereign state is in fact influenced by 
external or internal actors is a question of power, status, will, and effectiveness, but not one of 
authority per  se."S6  He   considered   sovereignty   as  being   confronted  with  the  increasing 
interdependence of the international system; 
"As the world polity intensifies, state concern to delimit the polity, reduce 
the influence of outside actors, and gain greater influence over the outside 
environments is heightened. Conceptually, this triple concern has two major, 
contradictory implications; (a) National Sovereignty becomes an increasingly 
powerful ideological claim, and (b) The incapacity of the sovereign state 
acting alone to assure national success becomes increasingly apparent. tf&l 
Actually, though the world has been integrated by several technological development, it could not 
satisfy or alleviate the inextinguishable demand for the sovereignty of a state (or nation). This can be 
illustrated by the contemporary crises proclaimed by small states in the name of'national sovereignty' 
83Joseph Malia, "Buffer States: The Issue of Sovereignty," in Chay and Ross, (1986) p.31. 
84John Boli, "Sovereignty from a World Polity Perspective," presented at the Annual 
Meetings of The American Sociological Association. Miami, FL, Aug. 1993, p.9. 
^Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (1979) p. 96. 
S6JohnBoli, (1993) p. 11. 
&1Ibid., p.23. 
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or 'self-determination,' such as the conflicts in the Balkans and in Russia, Iraq's rejection of UN 
sanctions on oil exports, several Arab and other states' rejection of the extension of NPT, and so on. 
In other words, it is hard to identify the scope of sovereignty.   Sovereignty is a very subjective 
concept. Thus, on the one hand, it is usually conceived as natural objective of a state, but, on the 
other hand, it is used as an excuse to legitimize a country's violation or deviation of international 
norms. Consequently, especially for small states, 'sovereignty' is not only 'indispensable' as an 
objective of a state but also 'useful' as propaganda. Accordingly, they may use this term more 
frequently and enthusiastically than great powers do. 
Another conceivable aim of small states is 'prestige.' In general, it is believed that prestige is not 
much related to small states policies. Erling Bjol put it; 
"Time and again considerations of prestige tend to influence great power 
behavior, both in its relation with its peers, and in relations with small states. 
This concern with prestige seems much less important in playing the small 
state role . .the dimension of security for a small state will often be far wide."88 
Surely prestige is not the first priority of small states' policies. But, it also can be an aim of them. If 
one considers the simple meaning of prestige - the recognition of one's strength "by other people" and 
also "by oneself,"89 he could find there is no reason to exclude it as an aim of small states. 
Actually, several cases can be picked up as illustrations. One of the reasons for Sadat's invasion 
of the Sinai Peninsula in Oct. 1973 was the calculation that he could be a leader of the Arab world 
even if he was defeated. One of the intentions of North Korea's several challenges to the United 
States, previously mentioned, was also aimed at being considered as a leader of the third world 
seeking freedom of maneuverability unbridled by either Washington or Moscow. Also, South Korea's 
somewhat excessive efforts to lure the World Cup (soccer game) of the year 2002 is another form 
of pursuing prestige. 
88Erling Bjol, in Schou and Bruntland,(1971) pp.32-33. 
89Martin Wight (1978) p.98. 
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Accordingly, even limited due to the lack of power90, in a certain environment and in a certain 
manner, small states can pursue prestige and implement it as a policy aim. Now, let's look into small 
states typical strategies to achieve these goals. 
2 . Strategies of Small States 
Then, what are the strategies of small states to achieve those aims9 Obviously, there are two 
approaches to enhance their power and significance; increasing internal strength and inducing external 
aid. This paper categorizes them into six items; military build-up and economic independence as for 
the internal efforts, neutrality, alliance, non-alignment and collective security as for the external 
efforts. 
a. Military Build-Up 
Biologically, all living things have their own last countermeasures to defend themselves from 
external attacks. So do small states. Nevertheless, like a weak animal unable to defend himself from 
the attack of a natural enemy, small states cannot generally stand up to attacks from a great power. 
However, even though it is true, it is still necessary to "avoid becoming just a defenseless prey." 
Michael Handel and Jacques Freymond put it; 
"A weak state needs to be able to hold out long enough to prevent a quick 
takeover, or until external help from other states can be obtained. Second, and 
more interesting, is the development of military power by a weak state in 
order to deter stronger states from attacking it."91 
"The greater danger for a small country is that of being speedily overrun 
by a great power, thus establishing a. fait accompli, which the other powers 
would be inclined to accept, for fear of being exposed to an atomic [or any 
other] conflict, for an objective which, in itself, is of no great importance."92 
90A Martin Wight said, "[Prestige is] too closely connected with power to be considered as 
belonging to the moral order. It is the influence derived from power. And unless the power is 
present power there can be little prestige." Ibid., p.97. 
91 Michael Handel (1981) p.92. 
92Jacques Freymond, "The Foreign Policy of Switzerland," in Joseph E. Black and 
Kenneth W. Thomson ed., Foreign Policies in a World of Change (New York; Harper and Row, 
1963) p. 155 Quoted in Handel, p.92. 
This importance of the minimum military build-up in small states is proved to be an obligatory 
option when Kuwait was taken over by Iraq within hours in August 1990. It was not rapidly 
responded to by external powers. On the contrary, in the early stage of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, 
Israel's well-prepared defense system enabled her to check the initiative of the Arab state - Egypt, 
Jordan and Syria - and to prevent a fait accompli. Other successful cases were the military build-up 
of Sweden and Switzerland. They could "develop large armies without suffering an overwhelming 
burden by building up their reserve system. Reserves can be called up on short notice, and their 
quality and training are almost equal to that of the regular units."93 On the basis of this 
conceptualization, typically to aid with material support is more convenient for the great powers than 
to dispatch their troops, the military build-up in small states can be seen as another way of inducing 
external aid in times of crisis. 
In general, it is directly connected with the establishment of domestic military industries, 
which has several advantages as well as disadvantages in terms of small states; 
Advantages: (i) A small state can be less dependent on great power's aid, 
especially in wartime it does not have to depend on the continued supply of 
spare parts or maintenance services of a great power, (ii) A small state can 
have their own weapons system appropriate to their strategic environment. 
Disadvantages: (i) It is too expensive. It is not reasonable for small states 
to produce, maintain, research and develop the modern technological 
weapons, (ii) A small state cannot produce the most sophisticated weapons.94 
Thus, the success of this policy depends on the degree of economic and technological development 
of small states as well as the competence of decision makers. 
b. Economic Independence 
In the earlier stage of the economic development  and especially in peacetime, economic 
dependency on great powers is somewhat necessary for small states. That is, small states may benefit 
disproportionately by imitating the advances of the great powers. As Robert Gilpin put it; 
"In adopting new forms, the backward society is able to skip historical 
stages, exploit the experience of the more advanced society, and thereby 
93Michael Handel (1981) p.79. 
94Ibid., pp.78-86. 
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outstrip its predecessors: Although compelled to follow after the advanced 
countries, a backward country does not take things in the same order. The 
privilege of historic backwardness - and such privilege exists - permits, or 
rather compels, the adoption of whatever is ready in advance of any specified 
date, skipping a whole series of intermediate stages.' n95 
However, if a great power becomes irredentist or becomes protective of small states, their 
dependence, or interdependence,96 is doomed to be an Achilles' tendon. This negative result of 
economic dependence on a great power was illustrated by the case of an Eastern Europe that 
depended primarily on German products during the interwar period, 1919-1939. 
On the basis of this conceptualization, several small states tried to avoid economic dependence 
by the policy of self-reliance or autarky. Among them the most obvious example is North Korea.97 
This somewhat extreme policy was employed by them due to political reasons rather than economic 
ones, because they thought economy was not everything. Holsti pointed out; 
"Other values - in the Burmese case, national pride and fear of loss of 
autonomy - are also relevant. Economic gains may be forsaken in order to 
maximize other values. . .The incidence of international disintegration or more 
moat-building foreign policies in the future remain problematic. Weak and 
vulnerable societies involved in highly asymmetrical relationships no doubt 
find strategies of self-sufficiency and autarky politically, if not economically, 
appealing; if only to break down dependency and to reduce foreign 
penetration of their institutions."98 
93Robert Gilpin (1981) p. 179. Italic, quoted from Trotsky. 
96Because usually economic interdependence is also progressed asymmetrically, it is 
argued that not always does economic interdependence increase the strength of small states of 
bring about political integration in the international system. K. J. Holsti, "Changes in the 
International System: Interdependence, Integration, and Fragmentation," in Ole R. Holsti et. al., 
ed
- Change in the International System (Boulder; Westview Press, 1980) p.40. 
9
'The Kim II Sungism or Chuche Idea, is based on this conception. For studying more 
detail; cf. Ed Paisley, "Prepared for the West," The Far Eastern Economic Review Feb. 10, 1994, 
p.23; Tony Clifton, "Inside a New Nuclear Nemesis," Newsweek. Feb. 21, 1994, pp.28-29;'Chin-' 
wi Chong, Pyongyang between Peking and Moscow: North Korea's involvement in the Sino- 
Soviet disputes. 1958-1975 (Univ. of Alabama Press, 1978) . 
98K. J. Holsti, "Changes in the International System," (1980) pp.40-46. 
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Also, E. H. Carr said, "Autarky is not only a social necessity but an instrument of political power. It 
is primarily a form of preparedness for war . . . and autarky was developed as the natural defensive 
armament against the weapons of blockade."99 However, this policy has a critical weakness. That is, 
it is expensive and also inefficient. Moreover, it is likely doomed to fail, consequently; because it 
demands abdication of the benefits of the economies of trade and to quarantine oneself from the 
world of technology and information. Nevertheless, autarky will remain as an alternative for small 
states who fear the loss of identity as a state or of sovereignty. 
These internal efforts, however, are less crucial for small states than external sources of 
strength and "constitute a relatively [smaller] part of their strength than is the case for the great 
powers."100 Thus, it must seek external support. 
c. Neutrality 
Another option is to achieve neutrality. Rothstein explains why a small state wants to be a 
neutral: 
"One reason is that small powers tend to rely on the hope that they can be 
protected by their own insignificance. If they can appear detached enough, 
and disinterested enough, and if they can convincingly indicate that they are 
too powerless to affect the issue, they hope the storm will pass them by."101 
However, without respect to small states' will, neutrality seems to be conditioned on the acceptance 
of the great powers: 
"Neutrality requires the tolerance, agreement, or approval of the great 
powers - at least those in the immediate vicinity - to underwrite or guarantee 
the neutrality of the small state, as in the case of Belgium and the Treaty of 
London. Several neutrality policies adopted in the interwar period were 
rendered superfluous when Nazi Germany simply chose not to honor them. 
Neutrality arrangements are usually founded on the mutual self-interest 
principle, and if this mutual self-interest on the part of the great powers breaks 
99E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis. 1919-1939 (1939) pp. 120-123. 
100Michael Handel (1981) pp.68-70. 
101 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (1968) p.26. 
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down, so too does the viability of the neutrality policy."102 
"[success] depended on convincing the power pressing the small state that 
its continued neutrality was advantageous to the great power too. The small 
state's leaders had to make clear that the belligerent's major requirements 
could be satisfied without the use of force or that the use of force would be 
too expensive in terms of the benefits sought and the larger dividends 
available if applied elsewhere. 11103 
By the same token, as Efraim Karsh said in terms of the geographical situation of oneself, "neutrality 
did not constitute a viable foreign policy course for a buffer state," because it "exposes itself to the 
force of both belligerents at once."104 This restriction can be illustrated by the experiences of Belgium 
and the Netherlands. 
Neutrality had been the general security policy of Belgium and the Netherlands since the 1815 
Congress of Vienna had established that they were to be buffer states against future French 
expansion. But, with the Belgian War of Independence in 1830, this first version of neutrality 
collapsed and was replaced at the London Conference of 1839 by the policy that the neutrality of both 
countries would be enforced and protected by the great powers, especially by the United Kingdom. 
Actually, in 1870, when France and Prussia were on the verge of war, Great Britain extracted 
a promise from both to leave neutral Belgium untouched. The Belgians were saved and their 
"achievement of noninvolvement and non-immolation created a state of euphoria in the country."105 
However, the experience of World War I changed Belgian security policy. In 1914, the Schlieffen 
Plan's success depended on Germany's swift defeat of Belgian resistance. This experience of overrun 
and occupation led the post-World War Belgium to attempt to make bilateral treaties with Britain and 
France rather-than stick to the neutrality syndrome, simultaneously trying to join the League of 
Nations. The first result was the military accord with France, but the accord did not guarantee 
237. 
2Allen Sens, "The Security of Small states in Post-Cold War Europe," (1993) pp.236- 
103Annette B. Fox (1959) p.180. 
104Efraim Karsh (1988) pp.4, 87. 
105Robert Rothstein (1968) p.66. 
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automatic military assistance.106 In 1924, Belgium took part in the Locarno Pact which "strengthened 
the guarantee provided by Great Britain and the League of Nations and rectified the imbalance 
exhibited by the accord with France."107 For Belgium, Locarno meant a return to the past. Belgium 
could concentrate on other matters, while security was left to the great powers. She "began to feel 
as secure as under the aegis of the treaties of 1839, and, again, began to make the same mistakes."108 
In late 1930s, Belgium became to perceive the scene changed and proclaimed the new policy of armed 
neutrality. But, it was too late. 
On the other hand, the Netherlands was untouched during the first World War. Thus, her 
security policy during the inter-war period was "simply a continuation of the successful policy of 
unarmed neutrality, a moralistic public philosophy stressing the role of international law, and 
abstentionism from security alliance."109 By the same token, the Dutch were reluctant to join the 
League of Nations, since "league members might have to apply sanctions against aggressor states."110 
Thus, despite the increasing insecurity in Europe, they remained firm to declare unarmed neutrality. 
d. Alliance 
Another alternative of small states policies is to seek allies. Generally, two different ways are 
employed; balancing and bandwagoning.111 
1()6Rothstein said, "the official version of the accord eliminated 'a la fois (at once)1. Hence 
the accord would come into operation if either Belgium or France were attacked separately." 
Ibid., p.83. 
107Luc Reychler, "The Passive Constrained: Belgian Security Policy in the 1980s," in 
Gregory Flynn ed., NATO's Northern Allies (London; Rowman & Allanheld Publisher, 1985) p.4. 
'""Robert Rothstein (1968) p.95. 
I09George J. Stein, Benelux Security Cooperation : A New European Defense 
Community? (San Francisco; Westview Press, 1990) p.4. 
110Jan G. Siccama, "The Netherlands Depillarized: Security Policy in a New Domestic 
Context," in Gregory Flynn ed., (1985) p. 115. 
111
 Stephen Walt explained, "When confronted by a significant external threat, states may 
either balance or bandwagon. Balancing is defined as allying with others against the prevailing 
threat; bandwagoning refers to alignment with the source of danger." Stephen Walt, The Origins 
of Alliance (Ithaca; Cornell Univ. Press, 1987) p. 17. 
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(1) Balancing and Bandwagoning 
Traditionally balancing as a way of foreign policy had implied the balance against the 
emergence of a predominant power. This idea was fashioned during the Renaissance period,112 and 
consolidated by the real implementation of it into the international system through interstate 
agreements, such as the Treaty of Utrecht and the Congress of Vienna. Rather than confirming this 
belief, Walt reveals the missing point of the traditional balance of power concept. He proposes that 
"states do not balance solely against power, but they balance against threat," especially in case of a 
small state, because, in general, they are "indifferent to the global balance of power."113 Here, the 
concept of threat is broader than that of power, since "it includes [the several variables, such as] 
aggregate power, proximity to a target, offensive capability, and perceived intentions."114 
However, the more important thing for small states is geographic location, as previously 
mentioned. If a small state is situated in the middle of two confronting great powers, its balancing 
behavior will be effective. Since its own weight is not heavy enough, a small state can hold the 
balance of the fulcrum only in the very limited situations. Thus, in most of cases, small states are 
"likely to bandwagon rather than balance."115 On the other hand, another view of alliance reveals the 
112 2Alfred Vagts, "The Balance of Power: Growth of an Idea," World Politics. Vol. I, No.l, 
Oct. 1948, p.83. Organski also said that Even though "some writers," [such as Thucydides who 
many times pointed out that Sparta was responding to the "rising power" of Carthago, "] "have 
trace the operation of the balance of power back as far as the Greek city states, there is general 
agreement that the balance of power was operating by the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries are 
believed to have been the golden age of the balance of power, the period when this complicated 
international mechanism worked best. The 19th century saw a continuation of the operation of the 
balance of power. It is only in the 20th century that the mechanism is believed to have broken 
down, and already, new balances are seen to be emerging." A.F.K. Organski (1960) p.280. 
'"Stephen Walt, (1987) pp.17-32, pp.147-180 He clarified this point, saying "if states 
were concerned solely with balancing power, we would expect to see many of the current allies of 
the United States align with the Soviet Union instead," because the United States has been 
stronger than the Soviet Union in global terms throughout the period since World War II. (p.275) 
"'Robert O. Keohane, "Alliance, Threats, and the Uses of Neorealism," International 
Security, Vol. 13, No.l, Summer 1988, p. 171. 
Stephen Walt proposed that the weaker the state, the less possible the outside 
, the more imminent the war, a small state tends to bandwagon, cf. Stephen Walt (1987) 
115 
assistance, the ore 
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missing point of the Walt's 'balance of power threat' theory. Randall L. Schweller criticizes; "Balance 
of threat theory is designed to consider only cases in which the goal of alignment is security, and so 
it systematically excludes alliance driven by profit," in other words, "bandwagoning for profits" or 
"predatory buck-passing: riding free on the offensive efforts of others to gain unearned spoils."116 
Noticing that "the concept of bandwagoning is not the opposite of balancing," he defined them; 
"balancing is driven by desire to avoid losses; bandwagoning by the opportunity for gain. . . In the 
language of systems theory, bandwagoning is a form of positive feedback. By contrast, the purpose 
of balancing behavior is to prevent systemic disequilibrium or when, deterrence fails, to restore the 
balance. Balancing is a form of negative feedback."117 However, his explanation is still ambiguous in 
terms of small states behavior, since they also bandwagon to avoid losses or to be delivered (passed 
over) from the crisis, such as the bandwagoning of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria before Hitler's 
irredentist threat.118 Therefore to distinguish balancing from bandwagoning in terms of aims, 
whichever it is to avoid losses or to gain profit, is not worth, because balancing and bandwagoning 
are simply opposite sides of the same coin. In other words, a coin has two sides, with different 
designs respectively, but the value of the coin is not affected by its posture, but rather by the general 
monetary market. Similarly, the two main policies of alliance, balancing and bandwagoning, are 
pp.28-32. Previously, Rothstein put it; 
"Small powers threatened by neighboring great powers, or intent on 
securing benefits for themselves in the course of great power conflicts, were 
forced to play a perilous game: moving quickly from the lighter to the heavier 
side of the balance as soon as an apparent victor in any contest could be 
dis'cerned. . .Small powers conceived as scavengers, forever seeking the 
crumbs left over from a great power settlement." 
Robert Rothstein, (1968) pp.11-12. 
1I6RandallL. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit," International Security. Vol. 19, No. 
1, Summer 1994, pp. 74 (footnote), 79. 
ulIbid., pp.74, 92-93. 
u8Even though Rumania had territorial gain in mind when it joined Hitler's 1941 invasion 
of Russia, as did Finland, it is overstating that she bandwagoned only for getting that profit 
without mentioning the intention of avoiding losses or being delivered from Hitler's likely 
aggression, in case of rejecting to cooperate. 
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seemingly different. But, the effectiveness of alliance does not depend on the policy itself but on the 
international system where the alliance belongs to. On the other hand, the types of alliance can be 
distinguished by the number of members composing it; bilateral, multilateral alliance and alliance 
among small states. 
(2) Bilateral Alliance (with a great power) 
Alliance, especially a bilateral alliance, is contracted when both participants have common 
interests. As for small states, their concerns for security from regional threats (rather than global 
ones), regional stability and an increase in status make them search out a strong ally.119 On the other 
hand, as for great powers, their motives to enter into bilateral alliance with a small state can be 
summed up; 1) aggregation or addition of power; 2) preclusive alliance, that is, diversion of small 
state power from alliance with an adversary; and 3) disguise of their control over the lesser ally's 
actions.120 
However, despite common interests, there still are several problems for each state, 
because the small state may "insist on its right to be consulted, but de-emphasize the relevancy of the 
power contribution it can make" and, on the other hand, the great power, "with interests and 
responsibilities in a various areas, may seek a narrowly conceived alliance in order to be free to use 
its noncommitted power elsewhere."121 Besides, small states would fear unwilling involvement in the 
conflicts of the great powers, the great power's unilateral abdication of the alliance, the reduction in 
foreign policy flexibility and freedom, and the great power's economic, social and cultural penetration, 
and so on. On the other hand, the great powers would also be reluctant to ally with small states 
119/ 9George Liska, Alliance and the Third World (Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins Univ. 
Press, 1968) pp.27-29; Allen Sens (1993) pp.234-235. 
120; 
°Ibid., pp. 3 0-3 2. These motives of great powers' involvements into bilateral alliances are 
well matched with the inherent functions of an alliance. In general, it is said that the functions of 
alliance are the aggregation of power, inter-allied control, promotion of international order and 
deterrence by the enhancement of counteraction probability,  cf George Liska (1968) pp.24-25; 
and Robert Kann, "Alliance versus Entente," World Politics. Vol XXVIII No 4 July 1976 
pp.616-619. 
121 Robert L. Rothstein, (1968) p.58. 
because they tend to shop freely.122 Then, how can a small state induce a great power and strengthen 
its commitment to the alliance? Michael Handel answered acutely: 
1) Strategy of unilateral invoking: The small state will very often clarify the 
verbal commitments unilaterally, in such a way as to favor its own interests. 
The great or superpower can do very little about this, short of openly 
repudiating the weak state's actions and thus further diluting its own 
commitments. 
2) Strategy of penetration: The small state can appeal to public opinion in the 
strong state. There are three ways of penetration achieved through; public 
officials, lobbyists and foreign propaganda. 
3) Strategy of trip-wire: The small state can induce the great power to station 
troops and maintain bases on their territory.123 
(3) Multilateral Alliance 
Since it is usually a more institutionalized type of alliance, the multilateral alliance has 
"traditionally been regarded as a favorable option for small states."124 Several advantages for small 
states are enumerated: 1) greater deterrent effects; 2) the potential defense capability; 3) heavier 
political weight in the decision making process among allies; 4) less dependence on a single powerful 
state within or outside the alliance than a bilateral alliance; 5) expanded role of a small state as 
mediator among the allies; and 6) increased influence and prestige of small states.125 
Nevertheless, this type of alliance is hard to achieve, since it is not easy to find the 
common interests among several states. Moreover, even if there are stakes for all of them, the profit 
of the alliance does not dispel the problem of the responsibility. The decision making process would 
be more complex and less flexible. Also, when the crisis emerges, it would be more fragile than the 
bilateral one. Furthermore, in terms of military operations, it needs hard-to-achieve cooperation, such 
as combined command and control system, combined doctrine and weapons system, and so on. Thus, 
it tends to be more nominal than the bilateral one. On the other hand, if the alliance is based on the 
'"About the disadvantages of the unequal bilateral alliance, see; Michael Handel (1981) 
pp. 127-129; Allen Sens (1993) p.235; and George Liska (1968) pp.3-5. 
123Michael Handel (1981) pp. 123-126; and Stephen Walt (1987) pp.46-47. 
124Allen Sens (1993) p.235. 
n5Ibid., pp.235-236. 
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strong leadership of a predominant power and if she is willing to take the burden, like the United 
States in NATO, the situation, so called "the equilibrium of complementary (global or regional) 
imbalances under the leadership of a primary world power,"126 would be very practical and beneficial 
to small states. 
(4) Alliance among Small States 
Besides alliances with great powers, it is possible for a small state to ally with other small 
states for coping with the 'regional threat.127 These small states, in general, gather together for the 
. limited purposes of; l)"showing the coordinated opposition" to the expansionist state, and thus, 
enabling her to save face; 2) controlling or preventing other small allies from provoking expansionism; 
3) consolidating the economic, political, social and cultural exchanges.128 
In the case of the security alliance, the aggregation of small states does not yield sufficient 
weight. On the contrary, it would aggravate the situation, once the threat from a great power 
emerges, due to the disorder among them. In that case, each member of the alliance would seek 
another great power instead of consolidating the alliance. Thus, this type of alliance is not fit for 
confronting serious security threats. The failure of the Little Entente to keep the solidarity among 
them in the face of the German threat illustrates the weakness of an alliance of small states.129 
126George Liska (1968) p.17. 
127An alliance among small states is restricted in terms of its capability to meet the threats. 
Rothstein and Handel put it; 
"An alliance of small powers is an instrument of limited utility. It 
neither can nor is designed to handle major military threats. When small 
powers are threatened by great powers, they must turn to other powers for 
support. . .Statesmen are wrong in assuming that a combination of small 
powers is equivalent to a great power." 
"Alliances of weak states are usually created an hoc for a temporally 
limited goal or a single issue." 
Robert Rothstein (1968) pp.169-171; and Michael Handel (1981) p.153. 
128George Liska (1968) pp.50-53. 
129Martin Wight summarizes the situation; 
"They (Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia) had no common 
policy towards the other great powers. Czechoslovakia and Rumania 
established diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union when she adopted 
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e. Non-alignment 
Non-alignment was the by-product of the East-West confrontation. The advocates of non- 
alignment proclaimed; "The world does not consist of black or white only. There are many grey areas 
too. Since there is a third choice, why should one color-blindly and inflexibly follow either the black 
or white path9 We will follow our own path separately from the East and the West."130 Also, it should 
be differentiated from 'neutrality' or 'neutralism.' Radovan Vukadinovic put it; 
"In the first years of their action, the non-aligned countries resolutely 
refused the policy of neutrality in international relations, emphasizing that they 
were not passive observers of international relations, but that they wanted to 
influence by their policy in international relations, a new trend indicating the 
abolition of the bloc restraint and of the domination of great countries."131 
Opposing the duopolistic international system, where the two superpowers succeeded in emphasizing 
their "privileged rights," the advocates of non-alignment policy proclaimed "the universal 
democratization of international relations"; respect for the sovereignty, independence and equality 
of all states, and the repugnance of the policy of force and of interference into the businesses of other 
countries.132 Accordingly, their power-base was the aggregate veto in the international organizations. 
an anti-revisionist policy and entered the League of Nations in 1934; 
Yugoslavia oddly refused, because of the Tsarist loyalties of King Alexander 
and his successor the regent Prince Paul. Czechoslovakia made a defensive 
alliance with the Soviet Union in 1935, and one of the subsidiary themes of 
the Munich crisis was uncertainty whether Czechoslovakia's ally Rumania 
would allow Soviet forces to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia across her 
own territory that intervened. When the Nazi Revolution began to spread its 
ripples across Europe, the Little Entente powers did not unite more closely 
against a danger greater to each of them than the Hungarians." Martin Wight 
(1978) pp.134-135. 
13uHae Kwang Chang, Non-alignment: Rhetoric and Behavior; A Study of North Korean 
Foreign Policy with Special Reference to Titoism, 1955-1975 (Ann Arbor; Univ. Microfilms 
International, 1984) p. 144. 
131Radovan Vukadinovic, "Small States and the Policy of Non-alignment," in Schou and 
Bruntland(1971)p.l06. 
132Ibid., pp. 103-105, 110. 
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However, like the alliance system among small states, non-aligned states were inherently 
unable to cope with threats, especially those from great powers. Thus, once the danger increases in 
the region, non-aligned states would "veer toward alignment," because they would find that "a free 
hand" means an "empty and unarmed hand."133 Actually, non-alignment was not only nominal and 
propagandistic, such as Cuba's "crypto alignment,"134 but also a disguise for nationalism, furthered 
by anti-colonial movements and the emergence of independent small states in the Third World. 
Moreover, it was also possible only in the diffusive" international system, that is, a less coercive or 
hierarchical system.135 
/. Collective Security 
If it works well, the collective security system would be the most favorable one for small 
states to pursue. It "binds and restricts the great powers, and in the case of potential aggressors, 
deters them in a fashion the small states could not hope to achieve through bilateral or even 
multilateral efforts."136 The idea of colletive security came from the critics for the evil nature of 
balance of power policy. To keep the world out of war, international organizations have been 
embodies in the name of collective security. The League of Nations and the United Nations were the 
products. However, this idea inherently lacks understanding of nature of international politics. Inis 
L. Claude criticized it as just an ideological and too moralistic device: 
"Collective security has been adopted but not accepted; it had been 
vaguely institutionalized but without serious prospect of implementation. The 
wilsonian drama had been a success at the ideological box office and a flop 
in the critical circles where policy was determined. . . It requires a belief that 
what is good for the world is good for the state. . . It's not unrealistic about 
liJGeorgeLiska(1968)p.20. 
1;,4Cuba was a prominent member of the conferences of the non-aligned countries. But, its 
actual policy was, geneally speaking, bandwagoning with the Soviet Union. 
!3TC. J. Holsti, International Politics (Prentice Hall, 1977) 3rd ed., pp.361-364; Quoted in 
Hae Kwang Chang, " (1984) p. 146. 
l36AUen Sens (1993) p.232. 
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power but unrealistic about policy 11137 
In addition, even it is working well, the principal requirement of the implementation of its norm is the 
existence of a leader. This was illustrated by the successful cases of UN operations in Korea and in 
Kuwait. Conversely, the collapse of the WTO (Warsaw Treaty Organization) after the disintegration 
of the former Soviet Union and the recent disputes in NATO on the issue of the Bosnian crisis are 
cases that illustrate how much important the leadership role of a great power is in the collective 
security organization. 





Two different, but possibly complementary, realist interpretations of international relations, 
structural theories (or systems theories) are relevant to the objective of this study of small states. Both 
hegemonic theory and balance of power theory can be used to develop hypotheses regarding the role 
and significance of small states as active and influential players. 
A . HEGEMONIC THEORY 
The common starting point of the hegemonic theories is that the international system is 
continually changing with recurrent patterns, such as Gilpin's four cyclical phases,138 or with the 
combined pattern, such as the linear change of the international system from the preindustrial system 
to the post-industrial stage, accompanied by repetitive changes of war and peace or equilibrium and 
disequilibrium.139 This change of the international system is caused by the 'uneven growth' among 
members owing to the 'diminishing returns' and the 'advantages of peripheries.' Thus, peace can be 
established and guaranteed only when the control of a hegemonic power is firm;140 and becomes 
138Robert Gilpin categorized the phases of the system (or systemic) change by four stages - 
stability and change, growth and expansion, equilibrium and decline, and hegemonic war and 
change. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (1981) pp.9-49. 
139A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1960) pp.300-325. 
140This is another main argument of the hegemonic theory. E.H. Carr's remarks that "any 
international moral order must rest on some hegemonic power " and "The new international order 
can be built only on a unit of power sufficiently strong to maintain its ascendancy" are believed to 
affect Organski's conceptualization of the precondition for peace. He said, "Peace is possible only 
when those possessing preponderant power are in firm control and are satisfied with [the existing 
international order]. . .A preponderance of power on one side, on the other hand, increases the 
chances for peace, for the greatly stronger side need not fight at all to get what it wants, while the 
weaker side would be plainly foolish to attempt to battle for what it wants." Gilpin also agreed on 
this point, saying "although the rights and rules governing interstate behavior are to varying 
degrees based on consensus and mutual interest, the primary foundation of the rights and rules is 
in the power and interests of the dominant groups or states in a social system." Modelski, 
Johnson, and Wu also emphasized the 'police actions' of the predominant power and wrote that 
"we would expect these wars to be relatively more likely . . . when the global system is moving 
toward multipolarity and losing its capacity for maintaining order, possibly in part because of the 
strain occasioned by the police actions of an earlier phase." And, these arguments were confirmed 
again by Robert Keohane's thoery of'a period of hegemonic stability.' cf E.H. Carr, The Twenty 
Years Crisis (1939) pp. 168,235; A.F.K. Organski (1960) pp.293, 364; Robert Gilpin (1981) p.35; 
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threatened when challengers have grown strong enough to confront the predominant power. At this 
point, it is usually hard to avoid hegemonic war, because the "intensification of conflicts among states 
is the consequence of the closing in of space and opportunities." That is, there is no more free space 
(or power vacuum) to exploit without being confronted by other powers, because, for the declining 
power, it is hard to aggregate power by alliances in order to keep its predominance, and because even 
appeasement cannot satisfy the demands of the challengers. To the contrary, it will only "whet the 
appetite for still greater concessions.",4i 
From this theory, at least two hypotheses are available for small states. At first, if the 
international system is stable, that is, if a predominant power controls the whole system firmly, 
there is no choice for small states but to bandwagon to the hegemonic power (Hypothesis I) In 
this environment, the weight of small states is determined by the will of the hegemon.142 Loyalty may 
be the most feasible option for small states. This is based on the conception that, as for the hegemonic 
Modelski, Johnson, and Wu, The Long Cycle and Wars, 1770-1975: A Preliminary Test of 
Theory (International Studies Association/West, Annual Meeting, Portland, Oregon, 1979) pp. 5- 
6; Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (1977) pp.44-66; Robert 
Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 
1967-1977," in Ole Holsti et. al. ed., Change in the International System (1980) pp. 132-138; 
Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton; Princeton Univ. Press, 1984) pp. 31-46; Alan C. Lamborn, The Price of Power (1991) 
pp.35-38. 
141 
'About the difficulty of the peaceful change, see; Robert Gilpin (1981) pp.188-207 and 
A.F.K. Organski (1960) pp.323-325. Gilpin writes, "In the absence of shared values and interests, 
the mechanism of peaceful change has little chance of success, "(p.209) 
142Robert Keohane put it: 
"Hegemons may prevent middle-sized state from exploiting small ones 
and may construct a structure of order conducive to world economic growth; 
but they may also exploit smaller states economically or distort their patterns 
of autonomous development through economic, political, or military 
intervention. The issue of whether hegemony helps poor countries cannot be 
answered unconditionally, because too many other factors intervene. Until a 
more complex and sophisticated theory of the relationships among hegemony, 
other factors, and welfare is developed, it remains an empirically open 
question." 
Robert Keohane (1984) p. 45 (footnote). 
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power, since there is no imminent threat, there is no reason to stir up other states by punishing a loyal 
state. Yet, in this system, small states are prone to be ignored. 
On the other side of the same coin, one can notice that if the international system is approaching 
a hegemonic war, that is, if the challenging power has become strong enough to confront the 
dominant power, or if the latter has weakened so much, due to diminishing returns, that it cannot 
prevent the challenging power from growing further, the significance of small states may increase, 
as would their flexibility in security policy. The predominant but declining power tries to aggregate 
power by allying with other states, even with small states. The former tends to "increase its 
commitments without a commensurate increase in the resources devoted by its allies to finance those 
commitments." However, as their capabilities increase by the commitments of the great but declining 
power, small states "may turn against" it.143 Thus, during the period between when the predominant 
power perceives its decline and the necessity of aggregating power, and when the power balance is 
becoming visibly inclined to one side, small states enjoy greater freedom of maneuverability and 
possess heavier weight on the 'fulcrum.' Yet, this situation is not exclusively favorable for small states 
because of increased probability of war. Therefore, one can hypothesize that; The more unstable the 
dominance of the hegemonic power, the greater the importance of small states, but the more 
dangerous to their security, or even survival (Hypothesis II). 
B . BALANCE OF POWER THEORY 
Unlike hegemonic theory, balance of power theory proposes that if power is evenly distributed 
among states, that is, if there is an international equilibrium in terms of power, there would be peace. 
Since "war is begun with the expectation of winning,"144 if there is the parity among states, it would 
keep a potential transgressor from attacking others. In other words, peace is achieved when power 
is distributed and balanced among two or more great powers, but not when predominantly possessed 
I43Robert Gilpin (1981) p. 193. Organski, with the similar perception, put it; "They do not 
possess the power to overturn the international order by themselves. They are dangerous only 
collectively, if they join the side of a major challenger. . . Therefore, [they] will not become 
involved in a major war against the dominant nation unless it can team up with a real challenger of 
considerably great strength." A.F.K. Organski (1960) pp. 330, 334. 
144Inis L. Claude, Power and International Relations (New York; Random House, 1962) 
p.56. 
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by one great power. ' Thus, the balance of power system is likely to protect small states' 
independence, "for [the balance of power] prevented the rise of any one nation to such power as 
would have enabled it to destroy the independence of all the others."146 However, the term 'balance 
of power' itself is not clear but very abstract and confusing concept.147 Organski criticized that "the 
term is used to refer to an equal distribution of power, sometimes to a preponderance of power, 
sometimes to the existing distribution of power regardless of whether it is balanced or not, sometimes 
to any stable distribution of power. Worst of all, the term is sometimes used as a synonym for power 
143
 About this argument, there have been a lot of disputes between the hegemonic theorists 
and the balance of power theorists. Inis Claude examined those disputes in detail. See; Ibid., 
pp. 11-93. On the other hand, Michael Sullivan carefully described the relationship between power 
parity and the stability of the international system as: "The more parity nations have with each 
other, the greater the probability of conflict, but the closer toward a one-to-one relation, perhaps 
the opposite process may begin to operate, stifling aggressive tendencies because of the fifty-fifty 
chance of losing. Inequality may be more plausibly linked to a low probability of conflict as well 
as low levels of intensity in any conflict that does break out; the greater the equality, the greater 
the probability of conflict breaking out as well as the greater the likelihood of highly intense 
conflict. However, the closer a dyad is to perfect parity, the probability is that conflict might 
decrease At the same time, if conflict were to break out in such an equal situation, the intensity of 
that conflict would likely be high." cf Michael Sullivan, Power in Contemporary International 
Politics (1990) p.79; also confer, Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs Neo-realist Theory," 
International Security. Vol. 19, No.l, Summer 1994, pp. 129-148. 
146T Hans J. Morgenthau, p.205 Also, Spykman said, "A small state is a vacuum in a high 
pressure area. It does not live because of its strength but because of nobody wants its territory, or 
because its preservation as a buffer state or as a weight in the balance of power is of interest to a 
stronger nation. When the balance disappears, the small state usually disappears with it." N.J. 
Spykman, quoted in Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System (1981) p. 176. 
l4Martin Wight pointed out this problem, distinguishing the 'balance of power' from the 
'pattern of power': "It means thinking of the powers less as pieces on a chessboard than as weights 
in a pair of scales; we mentally pluck them out of their geographical setting and arrange them 
according to their alliances and affinities, with the underlying notion of matching their moral 
weight and internal strength. The pattern of power leads to considerations of strategy; the balance 
of power leads to consideration of military potential, diplomatic initiative and economic strength." 
Martin Wight, "The Balance of Power," in Diplomatic Investigations (1966) p. 149; and also see, 
Martin Wight, "The Balance of Power and International Order," in Alan James ed., The Bases of 
International Order (London; Oxford Univ. Press, 1973) pp.85-115; Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance 
of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?" World Politics. Vol. V, No.4, July 1953 
pp.447-468. 
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politics in general. The balance is all thing to all men."m For convenience, therefore, in this study, 
the 'balance of power' system is generally used as an equivalent conception with the 'competitive' 
system, in other words, a 'non-unipolar' system. 
However, this is not to say that, in a competitive system, small states are always more secure and 
beneficial than in a hegemonic system. Still it should be articulated that the great powers intentions 
are also important. If they are willing to restrain themselves and cooperate to maintain the balance, 
that is, if they tend to keep the equilibrium, small states would become more dependent on the 
decisions of great powers, and moreover, lose freedom of maneuver considerably. Many examples 
illustrate the validity of this argument. Those are the four partitions of Poland, the Anglo-French 
Entente of 1904 dividing North Africa, the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907 dividing Persia, the 
Munich Treaty, and the Russo-German Non-aggression Pact in 1939.149 On the other hand, if great 
powers are more willing to compete for the aggregation of relative power advantages, they would 
be more favorable to small states. That is, "as long as the great powers fear each other, the small 
states are assured a certain amount of independence."150 Actually, this is a more permanent 
characteristic of the behavior of great powers, because, as Morgenthau pointed out, "all nations 
actively engaged in the struggle for power must actually aim not at a balance - that is, equality - of 
power, but at superiority of power."151 
Thus, one can hypothesize that: If the division of strength between (or among) great powers 
is almost even - if the system is in tension and there is a state of conflict, that is if the balance of 
power context is at stake132, or if all great powers are weakened or not willing to take part in the 
,48A.F7K. Organski (1960) p.285. Emphasis added by the author. 
149Michael Handel (1981) p. 177. 
150AF.K. Organski (1960) p.279. 
151Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (1973) p.208. 
l52From the perspective of the balance of power theorists, a war results from the failure to 
maintain the balance, or from the calculation that it "is the final method for preserving the balance 
as a system." cf. Inis L Claude (1962) p.52; Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance of Power as a Guide to 
Policy-Making," The Journal of Politics. Aug. 1953, Vol. 15, p.377; George Liska, The 
International Equilibrium (Cambridge; Harvard Univ. Press, 1957) p.34; Edward Vose Gulick, 
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balance of power system,153 the significance of small states increases and so does their freedom 
of maneuver in foreign policy. On the other hand, the greater the gap between (or among) great 
powers, the less the powerful pay attention to small states (Hypothesis III) In other words, the 
more great powers are prone to pursue prestige, namely 'the policy of prestige,' or the "balance of 
disequilibrium,"154 the more they are willing to pay to small states to attract them to their side, the 
greater the benefits small states are able to get. Also, if "great powers are oriented toward 
maintaining the Status Quo, or when no agreement can be reached between (or among) them, 
they neutralize each other (or one another) and thus strengthen the position of small states. [But,] 
if they can reach an agreement, it would be disadvantageous to small states, "15S and thus, small 
states' concerns are likely to be ignored (Hypothesis IV). 
Europe's Classical Balance of Power (New York; Cornell Univ. Press, 1955) p.36. 
153i, 3Michael Handel described this type of system as the "balance of weakness." He put it; 
"These were the circumstances in which the Baltic States were established at the end of the First 
World War, when Russia and Germany, the two great Baltic powers, were temporarily defeated 
and weakened internally, and could not object by force. . . The Danubian states also enjoyed 
considerable freedom of maneuver during the 1920s as a result of the power vacuum left by the 
weakening of Germany and Russia. This situation changed once German power revived in the 
mid-thirties, for the Germans began to penetrate the Danubian and Balkan countries " Michael 
Handel (1981) p.180. 
'^Nicholas J. Spykman's comment has been usually quoted for describing this term. He 
put it;   "The truth of the matter is that states are interested only in a balance which is in their 
favor. Not an-equilibrium, but a generous margin is their objective. There is no real security in 
being just as strong as a potential enemy; there is security only in being a little stronger. There is 
no possibility of action if one's strength is fully checked; there is a chance for a positive foreign 
policy only if there is a margin of force which can be freely used. . .The balance desired is the one 
which neutralizes other states, leaving the home state free to be the deciding force and the 
deciding voice." 
Also, Martin Wight expressed it as "the principle that my side ought to have a margin of 
strength," and "possessing predominance." cf. Nicholas J. Spykman, America's Strategy in World 
Politics (New York; Harcourt, 1942) pp. 21-22; Ernst B. Haas (1953) p.450; Inis L. Claude 
(1962) pp. 14-15; Arnold Wolfers, Britain and France Between Two World Wars (New York; 
Harcourt, 1940) pp.115, 126; and Martin Wight (1966) pp. 158, 165. 
155 Michael Handel (1981) pp. 184-185. 
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On the other hand, while the domain of the international system has expanded from a region to 
cover the whole world, "there has been steady reduction in the number of great powers." That is, 
"though the field of the balance of power expanded, the number of decisive weight has decreased."156 
This fact gives us another insight into the relationship between the significance of small states and the 
number of great powers balancing one another. Simply, if there are three great powers, i.e. Power 
A, B and C, and if Power A and B are willing to aggregate power, it would be natural for them to seek 
first Power C rather than other small states. The same conception can be applied to an international 
.system that has more great powers. On the contrary, if there are only two hostile great powers, they 
would compete for allying with small states without any hesitation. 
However, this argument may be accused of oversimplification and ambiguity of using the term 
'small states.' For example, from the perspectives of the Superpowers during the Cold War era, there 
was no single smaller state that could turn the balance between them. Yet, it was also true that no one 
can regard Germany as a small state like India. In other words, all states were small states compared 
to the two Superpowers, but, among them, there was a stratification of priority the alliance partner 
for the Superpowers. Accordingly, it would be rational to hypothesize that; the less the number of 
the balancing great powers (or group of nations), the more the significance of small states, 
because a great power is generally "interested in a balance which is in her favor" - "balance of 
disequilibrium" and is thus willing to aggregate power by allying with the greatest one among 
others not involved in alliance with her (Hypothesis V). 
Through combining the hypotheses developed so far, one can imagine that the "competitive 
system," namely the balance of power system, is more favorable to small states than the hegemonic 
one.157 It does not mean that the balance of power theory is more viable than hegemonic theory, but 
156Martin Wight (1966) p. 167. 
l37Michael Handel observes that small states in a hegemonic system "can get protection or 
material aid in time of need, but in return it has to render services which considerably limit its 
freedom of action and decision on a large variety of international issues. On almost every issue 
[they] have to follow the great power's lead and continuously try to please it." On the other hand, 
he compares the competitive system with the hegemonic system, and identifies small states as 
great power's assets in three types of competitive systems - multipolar, bipolar, and unit-veto 
system, where it is "important for the great powers to secure the friendship of the weak states not 
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it means that if there are two or more conflicting great powers, it would be better for small states as 
they would enjoy relatively greater freedom of maneuver. Therefore, from the viewpoints of small 
states, the more competitive and the more balanced the international system, the more 
advantageous to them, and thus, the more they are apt to pursue the policy of status quo (a kind 
of balancing behavior). Besides of this, in this situation they can also seek to change the status 
quo by enticing a giant power's support (another type of balancing behavior). Accordingly, in the 
competitive system small states would prefer balancing to bandwagoning in order to maintain the 
favorable environment last longer (Hypothesis VI) m 
Unfortunately, however, this favorable period usually quickly passes way, if there is no consensus 
and cooperation made among great powers. Also, since small states tend to be more sensitive to even 
a minimum threat and they are likely to seek "survival" rather than "freedom of maneuver," when one 
of great powers gets the initiative, they will bandwagon with the most imminently threatening 
power.159 Here, one can differentiate between offensive bandwagoning, such as Italy's attack on 
France in 1940, and defensive bandwagoning, such as Hungary and Finland right before the Second 
only for their positive support and potential contribution to the war effort, but also to prevent 
them from diverting the strength of the powers to secondary threats of war and thus reducing 
their ability to concentrate against the major opponents." Michael Handel (1981) pp.132, 183. 
l38George Liska supports this point. He writes, "when, however, the balance is rigid and 
the withholding power of a smaller state nil, international conflict is likely to diminish yet further 
the independence and the security of a minor ally." George Liska (1957) p.49. 
159About this point, Stephen Walt, Paul Schroeder and Randall Schweller all agreed, even 
though they are opposed as to 'balancing' and 'bandwagoning.' For example, Stephen Walt argued 
that states are prone to balance against threats not against power, and said "weak states will be 
concerned primarily with events in their immediate vicinity. Moreover, weak states can be 
expected to balance when threatened by states with roughly equal capabilities but they will be 
tempted to bandwagon when threatened by a great power." By the same token, yet merely using 
different term - "balance of interests," Randall Schweller pointed out states are likely to 
bandwagon for profit. Thus, it is a kind of common sense that small states are apt to bandwagon 
with a great power when they are threatened by another great power. But, the difference is that 
whether the object of bandwagoning is the source of threat (as Walt said) or the source of benefits 
(as Schweller said), cf. Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliance (1987) pp.29-30, 158; Randall 
Schweller, "Bnadwagoning for Profit," (1994) pp.74, 88-99; Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality 
vs Neo-realist Theory," (1994) pp. 121-123 
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World War. The latter was resulted largely from the willingness to avoid being attacked, while the 
former was resulted from the intention of sharing interests. Ironically, however, this movement, 
termed as the policy of "escapism"160 and "anti-balance of power, "m may accelerate the de- 
stabilization of international system (Hypothsis VII). 
Figure 1 shows the combination of these hypotheses. It is based on two principal assumptions; 
1) The international system is shaped and transformed by the politics of great powers; 2) Small states 
behavior is affected by the type of the international system. The upper graph describes the transition 
of power and the change of or within the internatoinal system. The second one tells the weight of 
small states changing along with the transformation of the international system. Whatever one follows 
of the two structural theories - hegemonic theory and balance of power theory, or whatever he 
believes that which one brings about peace and stability to the international system of the 'police 
action' or 'leadership' of a hegemonic power and 'balance of power' or 'international equilibrium,' one 
thing is clear. Even though the figure is very simplified, it still hold a significant message for small 
state decision makers. That is, in the hegemonic system small states are prone to bandwagon while 
they are more willing to balance in the competitive system. The following chapter is expected to 
compare the hypotheses developed so far to the historical reality. 
160Handel explained this policy by illustrating the cases of Belgium, Oslo groups (Norway, 
Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands), Yugoslavia, and Rumania. "[Their policies] were not 
detrimental to the European balance of power —. But their behavior further undermined, even 
marginally, the stability of the European balance of power, and contributed to an atmosphere 
which turned away from cooperation and mutual aid." Michael Handel (1981) pp. 184-185. 
161
 Annette B. Fox, The Power of Small States (1959) p. 187. She explains the effect of 
small states bandwagoning behavior as; "Instead of moving to the side of the less powerful and 
thereby helping to restore the balance, they tended to comply with the demands of the more 
powerful and thus accelerated any shifts in the balance of forces caused by changing fortunes of 
war or prospects of ultimate victory. Viewed in this way, the small states' characteristic behavior 
may be described as anti-balance of power while that of a great power is characteristically pro- 

























Figure 1. Svstem Change and Small States' Policy 
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V. CASE STUDIES 
A . THE CONCERT OF EUROPE 
In world history there emerged a peculiar period in the nineteenth century at least in terms of 
interstate relations. After the Napoleonic Wars which had swept the whole continent of Europe for 
over twenty years, the great powers created an international system that secured the peace for 
roughly a century. Unlike others, it is said that in this period "statesmen were more successful in 
managing and controlling the unavoidable tensions, [and] exercised self-restraint and cooperated in 
regulating several diplomatic crises that could easily have degenerated into catastrophe."162 There was 
no war among the great powers except the period between 1854 and 1871. Jervis has one explanation 
for this tendency: 
"After wars against potential hegemons, the incentives for the former allies 
to maintain good relations are unusally high. Even if mutual cooperation is the 
states' second choice and they would all prefer a situation in which they 
themselves defected while the others cooperated, the gap between the value 
of their first and second choices is relatively small." 
The new international system, the Concert of Europe,163 thus was achieved by the combination of 
"evaluation of power and legitimacy."164 In other words, it was "created more explicitly in the name 
,62Richard B. Elrod, "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System," 
World Politics. Vol. XXVIII, No.2, Jan. 1976, p. 159. 
163There have been some disputes about whether the Concert should be distinguished as a 
peculiar system or not. For example, Elrod said, "Concert diplomacy admittedly accepted and 
incorporated the principle of the balance of power. But I believe that a distinction must be drawn 
(and in fact was drawn) between the balance of power, seen simply as a distribution of power 
among essential members of the state system, and balance-of-power politics, which featured 
confrontation as the first premise, and which had a natural tendency to seek preponderance rather 
than balance." On the other hand, Edward Gulick considered the Concert as "just the old balance- 
of-power system perpetuated in another guise." According to his assumptions of balance of power 
system - the existence of state system, framework, and common culture, the Concert was a kind 
of balance of power system, not a fundamentally different system. This chapter follows the 
definition of Elrod.   cf Richard Elrod (1976) p. 159 and Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical 
Balance of Power: A Case History of the Theory and Practice of One of the Great Concept of 
European Statecraft (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1955) pp.4-10, 156-159. 
164This 'legitimacy was well identified by Kissinger as: "it means no more than an 
international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible 
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of balance of power than any other before or since," but "relied the least on power to maintain 
itself."165 This multipolar system of five great powers can be divided into four distinguishable 
subsystems: the restored balance (1815-1848), the shattered Concert (1848-1871), the Bismarckian 
Concert (1871-1890), and the imperial rivalry (1890-1914). 
1 . The Restored Balance (1815-1848): The Congress of Vienna 
Soldiers fight in the battlefield to win; diplomats vie at the negotiation table to end a war in their 
nation's favor. The defeat of Napoleon in Russia brought about hot discussions among the allies as 
to the matter of the treatment of the defeated and the restoration of balance on the continent. The 
allies agreed that they should be rewarded according to the degree of their contribution to the victory 
and that they should not be vindictive toward the French people. Moreover, they asserted on the 
declaration of Frankfurt that "they wanted France to be strong because French power was one of the 
bases fundamentales of European life."166 However, there were several controversial issues in 
drawing the new map of equilibrium. At first, Castlereagh who was largely influenced by Pitt, 
designed to strengthen Holland to check France and to consolidate the cooperation of the German 
states, Prussia and Austria, to resist potential threats from east or west.167 
The objection came from Tsar Alexander. He feared the resurrection of the Kingdom of Poland 
and also the strong German States. The Tsar proposed that Russia retain Poland; that Prussia receive 
aims and methods of foreign policy. It implies the acceptance of the framework of the 
international order by all major powers, ... A legitimate order does not make conflicts 
impossible, but it limits their scope." Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich 
Castlereagh and the Problem of Peace 1812-1822 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1973) p.l. 
IfoHenry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994) p.79. 
166Edward V. Gulick (1955) p. 140. 
161
 Ibid., pp.208-209. Here Gulick explains, "Two alternatives alone presented themselves 
for consideration - a union of the two great German powers, supported by Great Britain, and thus 
combining the minor States of Germany, together with Holland, in an intermediary system 
between Russia and France (STRONG CENTER) - or a union of Austria, France, and the 
Southern States against the Northern Powers, with Russia and Prussia in close alliance. 
[Castlereagh] did not want to fall back upon the second choice, because it would be difficult to 
cement, on account of the fundamental jealousy existing between Austria and France; because it 
rendered Holland and the Low countries dependent on France for their support, ..." 
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Saxony; and that Austria be compensated principally in Italy. Both Castlereagh and Metternich 
refused this proposal. Castlereagh regarded Alexander's demand "as a threat to the European balance 
of power and proposed to check it by weakening the bond between Prussia and Russia and 
substituting an Austro-Prussian nuclear bond."168 As for Metternich, according to Gulick: 
"the cession of the Duchy of Warsaw to Russia meant an uneasy proximity 
of Russian soldiery on the immediate north and northeast frontier of the 
Hapsburg Empire and a consequent threat to the Austrian military frontier in 
that sector. It suggested the unwanted necessity of compensating Prussia in 
Saxony, which would further weaken Austria's northern frontier, enhance 
Prussian influence in Germany, tend to consolidate the Russo-Prussian bond, 
and stir the potential enmity of Austria and Prussia."169 
However, Metternich "did not wish to resist openly since this would cause the brunt of the effort to 
fall on Austria, the most exposed power, while surrendering the policy of close cooperation with 
Prussia which Metternich considered the key to Austrian security."170 Thus, the ball was now in the 
Prussian court. Even though she was guaranteed her territories of 1805, those, "composed of former 
provinces or former satellites of France, primarily in the Rhineland, were inadequate. And they were 
undesirable because of their geographic separation, . . . Thus Prussia came to look toward Saxony, 
coveted since the time of Frederick the Great, contiguous with its own territories and with a 
predominantly Protestant population."171 Thus, Prussia supported the Russian proposal. 
This formation of the two blocs (Great Britain and Austria on the one hand and Russia-Prussia 
on the other hand) increased the weight of France. Having clung to the issue of Saxony and the 
Prussian expansion, France joined the side of Great Britain and Austria. As a result, "[France] gained 
l6
*Ibid, p.205. 
169Gulick also pointed out that if Alexander's demand is accepted, "Austria would have 
new common boundaries with Prussia and Russia which together amounted to almost 500 miles. 
Both Prussia and Russia were formidable military powers, and, more important, both tended to 
act in concert from the time of their alliance in the Treaty of Kalisch on." Ibid, pp.201, 205. 
,70Henry Kissinger, "The Congress of Vienna: A Reappraisal," World Politics. Vol. VIII, 
No.2, Jan. 1956, p.270. 
mIbid 
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something more important, the end of the isolation and the real recognition of its equality."172 Even 
though this was frustrated by the Hundred Days of Napoleon's Return, the great powers, except 
Prussia, were still averse reducing the position of France. 
The process of this settlement reveals the fact that "the importance of power-relationship was 
never lost sight of"173 In other words, the Concert was not the natural product of the Napoleonic 
Wars but the fruit of great powers agreement reached through both 'balance of power calculation' and 
'self-restraint.' Another implication can be observed is that the Concert meant "great power tutelage 
over the rest of Europe."174 As Elrod put it, "it consisted only of the great powers; lesser states were 
occasionally consulted when their interests were involved, but they possessed few rights and certainly 
not that of equality."175 The principle of the Concert was thus that the great powers must not be 
humiliated," and that "they must not be challenged either in their vital interests or in their prestige and 
honor."176 Ironically, during the period of the great powers' peace based on their self-restraint (or 
legitimacy), small states had little autonomy, especially in terms of foreign relations. As mentioned 
before, the fates of the quintessential buffer states in the Continent, Belgium and the Netherlands, fell 
to the whims of the great powers. 
2 . The Shattered Concert (1848-1871) 
The revolution of 1848 undermined the previous international system, the Early Concert or the 
Metternichan Concert,177 which has been based on the balance between conservative and liberal states. 
}nIbid, y.211. 
l73Ibid, p.279. 
174 Richard Elrod, "The Concert of Europe," 1976, p. 163. 
Ibid. 
176) 6Ibid., p. 166. Once Castlereagh said that he was believing that "the key powers had to 
operate the balance-of-power system and that the interests of the small powers could justifiably be 
sacrificed to those of the great if the balancing process demanded it." See; Edward Gulick (1955) 
p.209. 
177/ 7Craig and George described this earlier Concert; that it had five great powers that 
maintained the equilibrium of forces by forming two roughly balanced ideological blocs - the 
Anglo-French entente on the one hand and the combination of the northern courts on the other 
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Ironically, the Conservatives were strongly united when confronted by external liberalists but not 
against the internal contamination of liberalism and nationalism. Here, the latter, even inspired by the 
former through "the popular government groundswell against Napoleon, . . . had intrinsically a much 
greater appeal than liberalism."178 Even though the revolutions of 1848 failed, they destroyed the 
traditional conservatism which "fostered international consensus" and forced a new conservative 
synthesis. Rosecrance noted: 
"The revolution of 1848 had shown that all conservative states could not 
co-exist in the face of growing nationalism; when this was realized, the 
conservatives turned on each other. Previously the Concert had faltered when 
charged with the task of bringing about co-operation of different ideological 
camps. After 1848 it could not bring about the co-operation of a single 
ideological camp."179 
From this transformation of the principle of foreign policy, modern Realpolitik began to emerge. 
It was the outbreak of the Crimean War that "opened the way to the fulfillment of the ambitions of 
Realpolitiker[s]."180 The French Emperor Napoleon III, having just come to power by a coup and 
lacking natural domestic solidarity, had to create it. He tried to involve himself in the Balkans, 
demanding the Turkish Sultan to "grant him the sobriquet of Protector of the Christians in the 
Ottoman Empire, a role of the Russian Tsar traditionally reserved for himself."181 In response, enraged 
and unaffected by the revolutionary ideas, the Tsar acted at first without knowing the changes in 
other conservative states, Austria and Prussia. Furthermore, Russia wanted to gain Constantinople 
and that each bloc was not immune from the inter-penetration of the other. Craig and George, 
Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time. 2nd ed.. (New York; Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1990) p~35. 
178Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics (Boston; Little & 
Brown, 1963) p. 105. 
l79Ibid, p.UQ. 
180Craig and George (1990) p.35. Also, the famous words spoken by Palmerston illustrate 
the norms of contemporary international relations: "We have no eternal allies and no permanent 
enemies, but national interests. Our interests are eternal, and those interests it is our duty to 
follow." See; Henry Kissinger (1994) 96. 
lxlHenry Kissinger (1994) p.93. 
-59- 
and the Straits while France was eager to break up the Holy Alliance, and Britain was uneasy due to 
the Russian expansion toward the Strait. 
The impacts of the warthat ensued from 1853 through 1856 were various. The Holy Alliance of 
the conservative states collapsed and the hostility and suspicion between Austria and Russia began 
to grow. In addition, Russia itself was also doomed to change.182 Thereafter, several successive wars 
followed until 1870, The Italian War of 1859, The war between Denmark and the German States in 
1864, The Austro-Prussian War of 1866, and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. 
Once the ideological solidarity began to collapse and each great power pursued its own national 
interests, certain areas became arenas for power competition: France and Russia over the Balkans, 
Britain and Russia over the Strait and Turkey, Britain and German states over Denmark, and so on. 
The disputes over those areas were not new, but those were reified as tangible and critical issues 
during that period. Now, it seemed that the window of opportunity for small states located in those 
areas was opened more widely. 
However, it was not what happened in reality. The freedom of maneuver of small states was still 
marginal, because the balance between the great powers was not much changed or threatened until 
the unification of Germany. By the same token, from the perspective of hegemonic theory, one can 
say that the British hegemony system was still retained, and furthermore, that the British strategy of 
'splendid isolation1 was not revised yet. Thus the overall structure of balance-of-power politics was 
preserved in some degree. In sum, even though attitudes of the great powers were somewhat 
transformed, small states were still in a familiar international system of general equilibrium. 
The cases of the Polish Rebellion in 1863, the Schleswig-Holstein crisis of 1864, and the issues 
of Belgium's independence support this argument. When the Poles rebelled against Russian rule, 
neither France nor Britain was in a position to go to war with Russia, despite their traditional 
182Rosecrance put it: "The Crimean War was for Russia what the revolutions of 1848 were 
for Austria and Prussia in that both led to new domestic and international policies - reform 
domestically and self-protection internationally. The emancipation of the peasants was the Russian 
equivalent of Prussian liberalism and Austrian constitutionalism, ..." See' Richard Rosecrance 
(1963) p.113. 
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sympathy.183 Also, Russia couldn't but restrain itself when the German States attacked Denmark, 
because "though Russia had a traditional connection with Denmark and did not wish to see Prussia 
increase her territory in the Baltic, the prospect of a British-led Scandinavian bloc was even more 
unattractive."184 This kind of great power self-restraint, forced by the international balance of power 
system, reappeared in 1870. Neither France nor Germany was willing to violate the neutrality of 
Belgium and the Netherlands to improve the effectiveness of military operations. Limited warfare 
aimed at achieving specific objectives was the common interest for all the powerful; and actually wars 
in the previous century were successfully accomplished like that. Consequently, small states could 
not attract other powers to meet the threats from a great power. That means that there was no choice 
for small states but to be subjected to a preponderant power or to imminent threats. The fate of small 
states remained entirely the product of great powers interactions and calculation. This worked out 
to the detriment of Poland, Schleswig-Holstein, and a variety of German peripheries, but worked to 
the advantage of Belgium at least until 1914. 
3 . The Bismarckian Concert (1871-1890) 
The impact of German unification in 1871 on the other powers was significant. First of all, for 
France it meant the end of "the old Richelieu formula: France had the right to resist German 
unification first in the name of the independence of the German States, . . . second, in the name of her 
own independence, and finally in the name of the European balance."185 A weak Central Europe had 
been in France's national interest. The same logic was applicable to Russian security. The buffer zone 
of the German States now disappeared and she had to meet the descendants of the Teutonic Knights 
who were willing to pursue "expansionist policies in both Posen and Elsass-Lothringen (the former 
Alsace-Lorraine)."186 
1S3T 
'Hugh Seton-Watson. The Russian Empire. 1807-1917 (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1967) 
p.433. 
mIbid, p.435. 
185Henry Kissinger (1994) pp.116-117. 
186Geoffrey Parker Ed., The Times Atlas of World History. 4th edition (Maplewood, NJ; 
Hammond, 1993) p.213. The situation was well explained by Rosecrance: "The opportunities for 
friction between the powers were many after 1870, not only because all of the free territory in 
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It was the brilliance of Bismarck that enabled Germany to avoid isolation, and to the contrary, 
to become a center of alliances among the great powers in that unfavorable environment.187 Kissinger 
put it: 
"Bismarck's diplomacy had produced a series of interlocking alliances, 
partially overlapping and partially competitive, which ensured Austria against 
Russian attack, Russia against Austrian adventurism, and Germany against 
encirclement, and which drew England into resisting Russian expansion 
toward the Mediterranean. . . He encouraged French colonial expansion, in 
part to deflect French energies from Central Europe, but more to embroil 
France with colonial rivals, especially Great Britain."188 
Also, Metternich was very cautious not to provoke the British concern for the equilibrium and the 
Russian interests in the Balkans. His strategy was to be "one of the three on the European chess- 
board," where five players were engaged. He said, "Nobody wishes to be a minority. All politics 
reduce themselves to this formula: to try to be one of three as long as the world is governed by an 
unstable equilibrium of five great powers."189 
However, since, of the five powers, "France was [irrevocably] hostile, Great Britain unavailable 
due to its policy of splendid isolation, and Russia ambivalent because of its conflict with Austria [over 
the Balkans], Germany needed alliance with both Russia and Austria for such a grouping of three. 
. Thus, the relationship between Germany and Russia became the key to the peace of Europe. n 190 
Europe, all of the buffers and shock absorbers, had disappeared with the completion of Italian and 
German unification (so that the great powers now had common borders and rubbed up against 
each other uncomfortably), but also because the age of free trade was coming to an end and the 
age of neomercantilism and imperialism dawning, so that tariff wars and colonial competition 
between powers would soon be order of the day." See; Richard Rosecrance (1963) p.36. 
187T Rosecrance described this context of alliances as: "The outcomes of the Bismarckian 
Concert were those of a unipolar international system. Bipolar antagonism did not exist, and there 
was a single directorship of alliance combinations at Berlin. . . Bismarckian Germany was in a 
position of leadership of the entire international system." Richard Rosecrance (1963) pp.252-253. 
18S Henry Kissinger (1994) p. 159. 
'Craig and George (1990) p.38. 
Henry Kissinger (1994) p. 139. 
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On the other side of the same coin, besides the interlocking alliance system, the stability of the 
Bismarckian Concert also depended on great powers' expansionism outside Europe. Imperialism was 
an outlet for the increasing demands of nationalism and liberalism. Rosecrance pointed out: 
"Before 1890 there was colonizable territory left to be seized and possibly 
taken without bringing on a war between imperial competitors. . . . During the 
period of the Bismarckian Concert, imperialism was on the whole a beneficent 
phenomenon reducing European hostilities without creating important ones 
in Asia or Africa. After the Bismarckian Concert, imperialism was a disastrous 
movement that instead of reducing conflict, fomented it."191 
In the Balkans, the two leading imperialistic rivals, Great Britain and Russia, had clear conflicts 
of interests. British interests were primarily in preventing Russian control of the Straits. Even though 
she had less interests in general goings-on throughout the Balkans, according to Kissinger, the Balkan 
crises "laid bare the conflict which would ultimately doom Bismarck's European order and plunge 
Europe into World War I."192 In April 1876, an armed rising had broken out in Central Bulgaria 
against Turkish rule. Turkey responded quickly and the Bulgarian people were subjected to 
bloodthirsty reprisal by the Turks. Russia threatened to intervene on the side of Bulgarians in the 
name of Pan-Slavism.193 This movement stimulated the concern of Britain who "believed that a 
weakening of the Ottoman Empire must damage British interests, and feared any expansion of 
Russian power in the Strait area. "194 However, after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, the British 
!91Richard Rosecrance (1963) p.41. 
192Henry Kissinger (1994) p. 148. 
193Pan-Slavism was a concept based on the brotherhood of equal Slav nations. But, the 
Russian Pan-Slavism was different one. Hugh Seton-Watson noted: "[The Russians] believed that 
the smaller Slav peoples should accept the Russians as leaders, and doubted the loyalty of those 
who were not Orthodox. Of the Catholic Slavs, the Poles were regarded as enemies, and the 
Czechs were distrusted as being too Germanized and Westernized, even if it was admitted that 
individual Czech scholars or statesmen were good Slavs." Hugh Seton-Watson (1967) p.448. 
MIbid, p.451. Also, Kissinger said, "Ever since Canning, British statesmen had observed 
the maxim that, if Russia controlled the Strait, it would dominate the Eastern Mediterranean and 
the Near East, thereby threatening Great Britain's positions in Egypt. Therefore, according to 
British conventional wisdom, the Ottoman Empire, decrepit and inhuman as it was, had to be 
preserved even as the risk of war with Russia." See; Henry Kissinger (1994) p. 148. 
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policy of supporting the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was abdicated because: 1) British public 
opinion was becoming less credulous of Turkish promises to reform and thus, maintaining the old 
policy had become a serious political risk for a cabinet, and 2) tangible compensation must be sought 
within the Ottoman Empire to offset the Russian influence in the Balkans and the Russian menace in 
central Asia.195 
Thereafter, the British policy was changed by Gladstone. Judging foreign policy by moral instead 
of national interests, he criticized economic imperialism and objected to the use of British troops in 
Asia and Africa. Also, in the matter of the Balkans, he argued that the nationalism of Bulgarians was 
in fact legitimate and that as Christian brothers the British should support Bulgarians against the 
Muslim Turks. About this moralistic implementation, Kissinger stated, "Gladstone's ideas on foreign 
policy suffered the same fate as Wilson's, in that they stirred his compatriots to withdraw from global 
affairs rather than greater participation. . . [His policy] had the paradoxical effect of removing the 
safety net under Bismarck, . . . just as Canning's withdrawal from Europe had driven Metternich 
toward the Tsar."196 Thus, the Bismarckian Concert was nearinf an end. 
What was the status of small states during this period? In general, they suffered once again from 
the great powers' agreements. For example, at the Congress of Berlin, Britain and France mutually 
accepted the British occupation of Cyprus and the French rule over Tunisia. The principle of 
'compensation' was generally accepted by the powerful: 
"powers would accept as accomplished facts - fait accomplis, in the 
language of diplomacy - acts of aggression against weak states, in return for 
the assurance that similar acts contemplated by them would not be opposed. 
A European power protests against the violation of a weak state's territorial 
integrity by another European power; but, unable or unwilling to prevent it, 
the protesting power makes an academic profession of the intention of 
protecting the despoiled state, in return for which it receives some other 
195T 
'Herbert Adams Gibbons, An Introduction to World Politics (New York- The Century 
Co., 1928) pp. 84-86. 
196T Henry Kissinger (1994) p. 162. On the other hand, Paul Kennedy considered this policy 
of Gladstone as a kind of appeasement policy reappeared in the tenure of Chamberlain later on. 
Paul Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy. 1870-1945 (London; George Allen & Unwin 1983) 
pp.21-22. 
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portion of the victim's territory ii 197 
Even though there were some cases of disagreements among great powers, they did not want to fight 
one another. When Great Britain occupied Egypt for securing the Suez Canal, France protested 
formally against the abolition of the dual control. Then, "the French made trouble for the British in 
Egypt and encouraged nationalist movement,"198 but they did it in the extent of not provoking direct 
confrontation with Britain. Nevertheless, disharmony among the great powers had principally 
increased compared to the previous Concert of Metternich and Castlereagh.199 
Consequently, even though the great powers did not have any ideological solidarity among them, 
they avoided being engaged in conflict with other powers. And it was possible due to the web of 
alliance systems and due to the alternatives, such as colonies in Asia, the Near East, and Africa. 
Accordingly, "the small states in Europe were rarely at stake. "200 However, their concerns were apt 
to be ignored, as mentioned above. In short, compared to the system of the earlier Concert, the 
Bismarckian Concert offered wider room of maneuverability to small states, but not to the degree of 
playing a significant role as balancers, because the great powers were not willing to take a risk of 
direct confrontation with other powers. Thus, the small states were routinely sacrificial to maintain 
peaceful great power relations. 
,97Herbert Gibbon (1928) p.87. Craig and George also considered the flexibility of 
alliance and the principle of compensation as bases for the stability of the Concert. They said, 
"Permanent, rigid alliances were to be avoided, a rule violated with disastrous consequences in the 
variant of the system that came into being during the years 1907 to 1914. . . When one of the 
great powers acquired - or wished to acquire - additional territory or resources, it was understood 
that the other powers also had to receive appropriate payoffs of territory, population, or 
resources, usually at the expense of weaker states inside or outside of Europe." Craig and 
George (1990) p.44. 
198 Herbert Gibbon (1928) p.92. 
,99The comparison of those two Concert systems was made by Craig and George on the 
basis of the ideological integrity and the degree of domestic influence stemmed out from public 
opinion or interest groups. See; Craig and George (1990) pp.32-34. 
200Michael Handel (1981) p.5. 
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4 . Imperial Rivalry (1890-1914) 
The dismissal of Bismarck was followed by significant changes in German foreign policy. The 
Post-Bismarckian leaders decided to make their foreign policy as "simple and transparent" by 
dropping the connection with Russia that had been maintained after the Congress of Vienna, and by 
the secret Reinsurance Treaty consolidating the commitment toward Austria. However, as Kissinger 
noted, "complexity was inherent in Germany's location and history; no simple policy could take 
account of its many aspects. It had been precisely the ambiguity of a simultaneous treaty with Russia 
.and alliance with Austria that had enabled Bismarck to act as a balancer between Austrian fears and 
Russian ambitions for twenty years without having to break with either or to escalate endemic Balkan 
crises."201 Thus, the new policy brought about the opposite results, the limitation of German options 
and the promotion of Austrian adventurism. Furthermore, unlike Bismarckian self-restraint policies 
with regard to expansion outside Europe, the government of William II pursued an aggressive and 
offensive policy, involving imperial competition in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. The negative 
impacts of this policy were noticeable. Craig and George enumerated them precisely: 
"The Russians, who tended still to be closer ideologically to the Germans 
than to the western powers and who regarded the British as their chief 
antagonist in the Middle East, were unpleasantly surprised, at the end of the 
nineties and the beginning of next decade, to find the Germans moving into 
their sphere of interest in the Persian Gulf, and they began to revise their 
views. The British and the French, who were at loggerheads in Africa after 
1882 and came uncomfortably close to war in the Sudan in 1898, discovered 
that Germany was becoming a nuisance and a potential threat to both of them 
and began to mend their fences."202 
Actually, once Germany declared its irrevocable commitment to Austria, France and Russian 
needed each other, "because neither could achieve its own strategic objectives without first defeating, 
or at least weakening, Germany."203 Thus, the Franco-Russian alliance was a natural result. In 
addition,   noticing   German   expansionism   and   its   challenge   for   maritime   supremacy,   and 
201Henry Kissinger (1994) p. 179. 
202Craig and George (1990) p.41. 
20: Henry Kissinger (1994) p. 180. 
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acknowledging it would not be able to meet the German threats by its own resources, Great Britain, 
at last, abdicated the policy of splendid isolation,' and joined the side of France (1904) and Russia 
(1907), thereby forming the Triple Entente.204 Thereafter, the European Continent divided into the 
two camps of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. One of the most significant effects of this 
division was the loss of flexibility in terms of alliance. That is, it "prevented the creation of an 
overpowering coalition against any untoward act."205 
On the other hand, during this period of great power regrouping, the status and role of small 
states also changed accordingly. If one looks into small states' situations in the Middle East and the 
Far East where the imperial rivalry between Britain and Russia was hot before and after the Anglo- 
Russian agreement in 1907, he will find that several hypotheses of this study are confirmed. 
Both Great Britain and Russia enjoyed favorable strategic locations. They were virtually immune 
from invasions, and also less affected by internal uprising of endemic revolutions than other powers. 
Thus, the two great powers could continually grow and expand. The 'new imperialism' in Britain 
appeared with the withdrawal of Gladstone who "had publicly espoused Little Englandism and 
expressed [his] belief in the inevitability of the disintegration of the Empire."206 The basis of this 'new 
imperialism' was generally explained in economic terms. The British leaders perceived the economic 
204Ludwig Dehio put it: "In order to make certain of the Tsar's help in the case of a war 
against the two German powers, which Britain had in vain tried to pry apart, she further took the 
risk of incredible concessions to Russia in the Near East and the Balkans. She sacrificed Turkey, . 
. . . and generously accorded the Russians a large sphere of interest in Persia, regardless of the 
threat to India. . ." Another reason was the fear that had always existed in Britain: Other powers 
would combined against Britain; "possibly Germany and France, as Germany intended in 1897; 
more probably France and Russia, between whom an alliance looked in the offing from the 
beginning of the 1890s, though it was not openly acknowledged until 1895." See; Ludwig Dehio, 
The Precarious Balance (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1962) p.237; and Bernard Porter, The 
Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism. 1850-1983 (New York; Longman, 1984) 
p.125. 
2toRichard Rosecrance (1963) p. 160. Craig and George agreed on this opinion; "It is 
enough to say that in the simplest terms, the First World War resulted from the inflexibility of the 
alliances and the lack of control by the senior members over the most irresponsible of their 
partners." Craig and George (1990) p.43. 
206Arthur P. Newton. A Hundred Years of the British Empire ("London: Duchworth, 1947) 
p.233. 
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decline of their Empire. Britain was falling back in the world in the 1890s, due to the emergence of 
strong competitors in the world market. Bernard Porter wrote; 
"In the 1880s Britain was overtaken in steel production by the United 
States, and in the 1890s by Germany. In 1990 Britain was still overall the 
greatest manufacturing and trading power in the world: but her lead over 
others was being cut back remorselessly year by year."207 
Furthermore, generally Britain had chosen, "under the persuasion of the Wealth of Nations, to 
concentrate her productive capacity on the things she produced best."208 This specialization now 
became a burden that Britain should always have foreign markets. Also, this economic demand of the 
markets for capital and goods was intensified with the logic of "Social Darwinism" and "The White 
Man"s Burden." Social Darwinism, seeing foreign hostility and rivalry as a biological imperative, 
proclaimed: 
"Nations may roughly be divided between the living and the dying. . . . For 
one reason or another - from the necessities of politics or under the pretence 
of philanthropy - the living nations will gradually encroach on the territory of 
the dying, and the seeds and the causes of conflict among civilized nations will 
speedily appear. "209 
Also, like the body, a state should actively involve itself in the competition to maintain or enhance 
its power.210 Besides this, some arrogant and jingoistic slogan reflected another logic of imperialism. 
207T 
^Bernard Porter (1984) p. 120. An economic historian David Landes has put it, "the 
period leading up to the First World War saw a shift from monarchy to oligarchy, from'a one- 
nation to multi-nation industrial system. In the new oligarchy England was no longer even primus 
inter pares" Quoted in Aaron L. Friedberg, "Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 
1895-1905," The Journal of Strategic Studies Vol.10, No.3, Sep. 1987, p.332. 
20S Bernard Porter (1984) p. 139. 
'Ihid, p. 127. 
210- 
°This was articulated as follows: "The stimulus of a great patriotic excitement, the 
determination to endure burdens and makes sacrifices, the self-abnegation which will face loss, 
and suffering, and even death, for the commonweal, are bracing tonics to the national health, and 
they help to counteract the enervating effects of'too much love of living,1 too much ease, and 
luxury, and material prosperity. . . . Strength is not maintained without exercise." Quoted in 
Bernard Porter (1984) p. 129. 
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Kipling's poem, "The White Man's Burden, "was frequently quoted at this time. The new imperialists, 
such as Dilke and Rosebery, believed; that "Britain carried the blessings of civilization to barbaric 
peoples and thus provide a luxury of statesmen and of warriors to be leaders of the nation"; and that, 
therefore, "the British Empire was for the interest of the whole human race."211 
On the other hand, as for Russia, "up to the middle of the nineteenth century, Russian expansion 
was not, strictly speaking, colonial, but was rather the natural, autonomic development of a unitary 
political empire."212 Unlike the other powers, Russia was "not feeling the use of emigration to escape 
overpopulation, or of developing new lands and exploiting alien peoples to secure raw materials or 
to provide markets for their surplus protection."213 However, the efforts to acquire outlets to warm 
water had incessantly caused Russia to march toward the Black, Baltic, White, and Yellow Seas, the 
Persian Gulf, and the Adriatic, Aegean, and Mediterranean Seas. The march to those seas to obtain 
ice-free ports proceeded without making "maritime jumps." That is, while Great Britain depended on 
the maritime capacity to expand and exploit colonies, Russia depended on the construction of the 
railway. This was instigated by Russian defeat in the Crimean War. Thus, the two expanding powers, 
Great Britain (a maritime power) and Russia (a continental power) met each other at several points 
on their imperial peripheries. 
One of those points was the Far East, especially China and Korea. Russian advance toward the 
Far East was accomplished by the extension of railways. From 1895, the Trans-Siberian Railway 
began to operate section by section. Russia soon gained Vladivostok, but it was icebound in winter. 
So she demanded the control of all Manchuria and the Liao-Tung Peninsula. During this period, 
Russia enjoyed support from France and Germany. France financed Russian construction of fleet in 
Asia hoping it would weaken British power in Africa, and Germany "was strongly encouraging Russia 
to devote her efforts to Far Eastern affairs, and wished to do as much as possible to clear up Austro- 
Russian disputes in the Balkans."214 
211Arthur Newton (1947) pp.241-242. 
212Herbert Gibbon (1928) p. 113. 
213Ibid, pp.113 & 121. 
2,4Hugh Seton-Watson (1967) p.575. 
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As for Britain, Russia "presented a threat to her interests from the Mediterranean right through 
the East China Sea. That was extent of her land frontier with British colonies or satellites."215 This 
map of the borders between the two empires seems to be an earlier version of the Containment 
scheme of George Kennan. However, the difference between British containment against Russia and 
American containment against the USSR is that "Britain's interest there was mainly commercial and 
there was no substitute for it."216 Also, Britain was on the way to declining, especially at sea where 
she had generally commanded the world after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, by controlling the 
narrow seas. Now, Britain had to cope with new competitors: the United States, Japan, and 
Germany.217 
Then, once the German threat in the North Sea was viewed as more imminent than the Russian 
threat in China, the 'rising sun1 was considered as a very attractive alternative for checking Russian 
expansion in the Far East. Japan, after defeating China on the Korean Peninsula, was now competing 
with Russia in Korea, and probably further in Manchuria, the quintessential areas for the Russian 
dream of ice-free ports. Thus, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed in 1902. The treaty was 
compensating Japan with recognition of its 'special interests' in Korea. After the defeat of Russia in 
1905, imperial rivalry entered a new phase. Then, Britain could heave a sigh of relief. As Porter 
wrote: 
"Elsewhere the main points of friction with her two main colonial rivalry, 
France and Russia, were gradually smoothed away by agreement before they 
could explode into conflict: Persia divided between Russia and Britain in 
1907, the Middle East and North Africa similarly demarcated between Britain 
and France."218 
215Bernard Porter (1984) p.152. 
2i6Ibid, p.\54. 
21
'Friedberg noted the change of British maritime policy as: "By the close of the nineteenth 
century a number of naval intelligence officers and fleet commanders had reached the conclusion 
that long-term British interests could best be served by pursuing a third line of policy, one of 
accommodation and, perhaps, of alignment with the peripheral powers." Actually Britain did not 
oppose the US plans to build the Panama Canal and to ally with Japan. See; Aaron L Friedberg 
(1987) pp.344-345. 
218 Bernard Porter (1984) p.201. 
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Here one can extract some lessons for small states.219 There had been the continuous 
compensations or give-and-takes between Russia and Britain including other involving powers - 
France, the United States, and Japan. For example, when Japan advanced the Liao-Tung Peninsula 
and Formosa, after the victory of the Sino-Japanese War, Russia, France, and Germany intervened 
and made Japan give up the peninsula. Then, "China had to borrow with a Russian guarantee the 
money to indemnify Japan for the releasing the Liao-Tung Peninsula. The compensation for the 
guarantee was a railway concession in northern Manchuria."220 It was a common policy for the great 
powers in China. She was just a objective for haggling among the great powers. Gibbon put it: 
"By becoming creditors of the Chinese government they hoped to gain 
further economic advantages and to have means of keeping the country in 
tutelage. China was thus saddled with a debt whose principal, with interest at 
four per cent, amounted to nearly one and one half billion dollars."221 
On the other hand, the Chinese government should be condemned for its inaction. When the 
Russian covetousness for the Liao-Tung Peninsula became obvious by the completion of the railway 
construction in Manchuria, Yuan-Shih-Kai, Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Army, suggested to 
declare war on Russia and invite the cooperation of Japan. But it was not accepted by the government 
in Peking, where "European representatives worked against an agreement between the two Oriental 
states."222 Even though the Chinese government had little option to cope with the crisis, yet a certain 
resolution to side with one of two conflicting powers in its own land was necessary. The same fault 
219At that time, China could be regarded a small state in relative terms, like India at the 
present. 
220Herbert Gibbon (1928) p.139. 
221
 Ibid, p. 151. 
222Ibid, p. 157. Gibbon strongly criticized the failure of the Chinese government to follow 
the suggestion of Yuan-Shih-Kai: "Chinese statesmen failed to see that by siding with Japan China 
might have defended her territorial integrity and her sovereignty against all foreign encroachment. 
While Japan engaged in a life-and-death struggle with Russia, China remained neutral, suffering 
the ignominy of neutrality with all the inconveniences of belligerency. . . Japanese and Russians 
lived on the country, and finally made peace with each other, disregarding China and dividing 
between themselves one of her largest and richest provinces." Ibid. 
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was committed by the Korean government previously, during the Sino-Japanese War. Both Korea 
and China, "unable to defend their own interests, and unwilling to take sides, simply put up their 
country as a prize to be fought for and won by the strongest."223 So, there was room for lesser states 
to maneuver which they failed to do. 
On the other hand, from the cases of Persia and Afghanistan in the same period, we can get some 
implications for small states caught up in the system of imperial rivalry. For Russia, Persia was a 
natural route to approach the open sea. Thus the Russians began to build railways to the frontiers of 
Persia and Afghanistan. Britain, which had prevented Russia from getting to the Mediterranean Sea 
in 1854 and in 1878, felt the threat to her sphere of influence. Also, economically "Britain's trade 
acquired almost a monopoly of the foreign commerce of the Gulf ports, and maintenance of the 
British position in the Persian Gulf was regarded as vital to the safety of India."224 But, Britain had 
no legal base for stopping the Russian approach to the region. Thus, she had to prevent it indirectly. 
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was, in part, a result of this calculation.225 Paradoxically, however, "the 
defeat of Russia in the Far East led only to the redoubling of [Russian] efforts to open a way to the 
sea through Persia."226 Then, a short period of a stalemate followed until both governments felt the 
threat of German intervention through its projects for building the Berlin-Baghdad Railway system 
and invading the financial and commercial fields. Now, the British began to reconsider the situation. 
They thought it would be better to confront Germany with Russia together rather than to fight against 
each other. Also, Russia was already an ally of an ally, France. Thereafter, Britain and Russia divided 
the region and moreover prevented interventions by other countries.227 The provisions of the Anglo- 
L7/>/6Cp.l28. 
224r Rouhollah K. Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran: A Developing Nation in World 
Affairs. 1500-1941 (Charlottesville; Univ. Press of Virginia, 1966) p.90. 
225Herbert Gibbon (1928) p. 179. 
226Ibid, pp. 179-180. 
227/ 7Gibbon pointed out, they "not only refused to lend the money, but kept in their own 
hands the revenues accruing in the zones occupied by them - the richest parts of Persia, including 
all the customs - and prevented Persian from raising a loan ar Paris or Berlin." Ibid., p. 182; and ° 
Hugh Seton-Watson (1947) p.681. 
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Russian Convention of 1907 "amounted to de facto partition" of Iran, and Britain and Russia 
destroyed the new Iranian parliament, and furthermore, even controlled the seat of Prime Minister. 
It was said, "no Prime Minister took office unless he was either their man or would not stand in their 
way."228 
At a glance, Afghanistan seemed to have the similar fate with Persia. It was also situated in the 
geopolitically significant point. David Jenkins put it: 
The Afghans, "occupying the area of the Hindu Kush - the 600 mile long 
natural barrier between Central Asia and India - found themselves almost 
midway between the expanding power of Britain to the south and Russia to 
the north. Afghanistan became the classic buffer state, created through 
diplomacy by the two powers in order to prevent their empires from adjoining 
physically, and thus theoretically keeping the peace in the region."229 
As for Britain, India was the "jewel of in the crown of the British Empire,"230 but it was vulnerable 
to landward attack. Thus, Afghanistan was a critical state to defend India from the north.231 On the 
other hand, Russian interests in Afghanistan were more various, but no more vital than those of Great 
Britain. Jenkins enumerated them as; 
"Russian expansion into Central Asia was based on: need to curb Kazakh 
raids on Russian caravans and border villages; desire for the agriculturally rich 
lands of the steppes; greed for the fabled wealth that lay beyond the steppe in 
Turkestan, India and Persia; the continuing quest for an open, warm water 
port; and concern about increasing political and commercial penetration by the 
228Rounollah K. Ramazani (1966) pp. 92, 94, 103-111 Also, for more detail, see; Briton 
Cooper Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf 1894-1914 (Berkeley; Univ. of California Press, 
1967)pp.384-386. 
229David B. Jenkins, "The History of Afghanistan as a Buffer State" John Chay and 
Thomas Ross Ed. (1986) p. 171. 
230Ibid, p. 174. 
2jlEven though a neutral zone between Britain and Russia in Afghanistan once had been 
established by the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1873, the British conservatives called as the new 
imperialists later on, did not wish to maintain it. Instead, they accepted the 'forward policy' - 
territorial expansion toward a defensible border. 
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British into Central Asia ii232 
This hostility was also changed by the result of the Russo-Japanese War and the German threats. 
At the 1907 Convention, both powers settled the matter of Afghanistan; 1) Russia agreed that 
Afghanistan was outside its sphere of influence; and 2) Britain agreed not to interfere in the internal 
affairs of Afghanistan. Here, one can easily find the difference between the cases of Persia and 
Afghanistan. Unlike the case of Persia, "no territory would be annexed, provided that the Amir also 
fulfilled his obligations. Russian and Afghan authorities were permitted to establish direct non- 
political relations. Equal facilities were to be granted to both powers, and the Convention was to be 
considered in force with the consent of the Amir."233 Even though the Amir protested against this 
agreement and his argument was ignored by the two powers, the contents of the agreement were less 
aggressive than that about Persia. Also, unlike Persia, Afghanistan was preserved as a buffer state 
rather than divided into zones of influence.234 
One more point worth mentioning here regards Afghanistan's foreign policy. Abdur Rahman, 
Amir of Afghanistan at the end of the nineteenth century, saw the situation positively and tried to 
make use of it through balancing between the two great powers. Adamec articulated his strategic 
thinking; 
"To contain Russian expansion, Britain had an interest in the existence of 
strong Islamic states along Russia's southern borders. Therefore, the Islamic 
states, trying to preserve their independence, had a community of interest with 
Great Britain and should seek her alliance. But since Britain was also an 
absorbing power which might respond to Russian aggression by helping 
herself to a portion of the land of the Islamic states, a "middle course" policy 
was required: an alliance with Britain, but not one that would lead to 
integration; hostility to Russia, but not to an extent as would result in 
provoking aggression; preservation of an equilibrium which would permit 
Afghanistan to remain independence if not neutral . . . Since neither Russia 
nor Britain could take all of Afghanistan without arousing the hostility of the 
other, the Amir considered the presence of two powerful neighbors as not 
232/fe/.,p.l77. 
^"Ludwig W. Adamec, Afghanistan: A Diplomatic History. 1900-1923 (Berkeley Univ 
of California Press, 1967) p.70. 
234 David Jenkins (1986) p. 183. 
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altogether a bad thing. He felt that although these neighbors are cause of 
much anxiety to Afghanistan yet, as they are pulling against each other, they 
are no less an advantage and protection for Afghanistan that a danger and 
indeed a great deal of the safety of the Afghan Government depends on the 
fact that neither of these two neighbors can bear to allow the other to annex 
an inch of Afghan territory. 
'O1' 
ii235 
Even though Abdur Rahman's policy was not well achieved either by him or by his successor 
Habibullah, that effort was not worthless. Through it, he could demonstrate the possibility of 
combining with Russia against Britain if the British tried to control Afghanistan again by force in the 
future. Thus, actually, when the Anglo-Russian agreement was declared and Habibullah vetoed it, 
Britain depended neither on force nor on domestic intervention - banishing the regime and 
establishing a new Anglophobe regime, as shown in Persia. 
5 . Analysis 
The Concert of Europe, generally speaking, was a balance of power system. It was a 
"decentralized, self-regulating system - one in which power and responsibility remained in the hands 
of the constituent state."236 Also, the system was established by the self-restraint of great powers who 
had experienced the disastrous results of the Napoleonic Wars.237 Thus, even though there was 
ideological distance between conservative countries and liberal ones, peace among the great powers 
was maintained. The stumbling of the Concert began to emerge with the revolution of 1848. The 
impact of this incident was that; "National self-determination, liberalism, democracy, internationalism, 
and equality all served in various ways to dilute the acceptability of a distinction based solely on 
power calculations. Of course, the influence of these ideas was more formal that substantive. It 
235Ludwig W. Adamec (1967) pp.24-26. Also see; William K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan : 
A Study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia. 2nd Ed.. (New York: Oxford 
Univ. Press, !953) pp.150-180. 
236 Craig and George (1990) p.45. 
2,7Kissinger described this as: "There was not only a physical equilibrium, but a moral one. 
Power and justice were in substantial harmony. The balance of power reduces the opportunities 
for using force; ashared sense of justice reduces the desire to use force." Henry Kissinger (1994) 
p.79. 
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primarily affected the ways in which statesmen were required to justify their policies."238 From then, 
the principle of international politics became Realpolitik. However, the general picture of the system 
was not changed yet. Even though ideological solidarity was diluted at that time, the balance or the 
equilibrium of Europe was the primary aim of the powerful. The case of the preservance the neutrality 
of Belgium and the Netherlands during the Franco-Prussian War by both sides illustrates this 
tendency. 
The unification of Germany, however, was one of the most significant incidents in the history of 
international relations in Europe. The belief system based on 'legitimacy' collapsed. All powers 
searched for national interests rather than international equilibrium. Furthermore, the experiences of 
the limited wars in the mid-nineteenth century made the powers consider a war as a somewhat 
effective instrument of foreign policy. Nevertheless, there were safety devices for the preservation 
of the system. First of all, the Bismarckian web of the alliances functioned as 'check-and-balance' 
device itself. Alliance with other powers was the primary security guarantee for oneself. From the 
viewpoints of small states, however, this tendency did not offer opportunities for them to ally with 
the powerful, and thus to secure themselves, because the great powers had enough big powers 
available to ally to cope with other powers' threats (Hypothesis V). Secondly, "the competition 
among the major actors was not conceived of, or pursued, in terms of a zero-sum game."239 Peace 
was not maintained by 'self-restraint' of each power but by the 'self-restraint' of the system itself This 
rule continued up to the outbreak of the First World War. During these processes, small states were 
being "woken up". This period presents potential for the rising of new independent small states and 
the enhancement of their significance. Revolutionary ideas stimulated their national self-identities. 
Imperial rivalry offered an opportunity to balance between the great powers (Hypothesis III). The 
238Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York; Columbia Univ Press 
1968) p. 16. 
239Craig and George (1990) p.46. They explained, "the actors viewed each other as limited 
adversaries: not only was a gain for one necessarily a loss for one, but the principle of 
compensation was invoked as a means of moderating the competitiveness of the game. . . .the 
amount of territory and resources available to be contested and divided up among the great 
powers was not fixed and finite. The struggle over 'who gets what' was alleviated because the 
European powers were competing for an expanding pie." 
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case of Afghanistan in 1880s, led by Amir Abdur Rahman, supports this point. Abdur Rahman 
principally sought the sponsorship of Britain, but also feared Russian interventions from the north. 
Strategically, to balance against the threat from the north, the Amir had to bandwagon with Great 
Britain. On the other side of the same coin, Russian threat to the region was inducing the mildness 
of British policy. Thus, the Amir could enlarge his territories and consolidate his control over there 
for his tenure. 
However, the efforts of small states have inherent limits in themselves. They could not overcome 
.the negative results of great power agreements for partitioning sphere of influence among them 
(Hypothesis IV). Afghanistan's strategic advantage as a buffer state disappeared with the Anglo- 
Russian agreement of 1907. 
B . THE INTERWAR PERIOD 
1 . The Collapse of the Old Balance of Power 
The Concert of Europe, which developed after the experience of the Napoleonic Wars, was a 
historic achievement. The main base on which the Concert was established was a "good deal of 
transparency in great power relations. "240 However, it was not an institution, and also "the Concert 
entailed more than balancing power. It entailed the imposition of power."241 It was a "great 
condominium, in which the great powers debated and decided on the critical issues of the day; a great 
power concert explicitly marginalizes the small states."242 
The experience of the First World War elicited the opposite view from Woodrow Wilson. He 
"believed that balance of power politics was a contrivance of states that had always been prone to 
absolutism, militarism, and antidemocratic behavior that the coming of the in 1914 was rooted in its 
240Gregory F. Treverton, "Europe's Past, Europe's Future; Finding an Analogy for 
Tomorrow," Orbis, Vol. 37, No.l, Winter 1993, p.4. 
241
 Ibid., p.5. 
242Allen Sens, "The Security of Small States in Post-Cold War Europe," David G. Haglund 
Ed., From Euphoria To Hysteria (San Francisco; Westview Press, 1993) p.233. 
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acrobatics and intrigues."243 In addition to this kind of liberalism, the term "self-determination" and 
the first global international organization were the green signs for small states. 
However, this new system of the Versailles Treaty had inherent defects in itself. Ironically, 
"France's vulnerability and Germany's strategic advantage were both magnified by the Treaty of 
Versailles despite its punitive provisions. Before the War, Germany had faced strong neighbors in 
both the East and West. It could not expand in either direction without encountering a major state- 
France, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, or Russia. But after the Treaty of Versailles, . . .[w]ith France 
weakened, the Austro-Hungarian Empire dissolved, and Russia out of the picture for some time, there 
was simply no way of reconstructing the old balance of power, especially since the Anglo-Saxon 
powers refused to guarantee the Versailles settlement."244 Furthermore, as a traditional balancer in 
Europe, Britain suspected the efficiency of the Cordon Sanitaire, contrived by France to keep Russia 
out,245and "the British showed periodic disrespect for the pretensions, and even the rights, of small 
243Gordon Craig and Alexander George, Force and Statecraft (New York; Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1990) p. 52; also ,see; Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York; Simmon & Schuster, 
1994) p.222. Kissinger supports this point, "Throughout the nineteenth century, for example, 
Great Britain and Austria resisted the backup of the Ottoman Empire because they were 
convinced that the smaller nations emerging from it would undermine international order. To their 
way of thinking, the smaller nation's inexperience would magnify endemic ethnic rivalries, while 
their relative weakness would tempt great power encroachment. In the British and Austrian view, 
the smaller states had to subordinate their national ambitions to the broader interests of peace." 
244Henry Kissinger, pp.242-243. Also, Joseph Rothschild noticed, "The very existence of 
the newly independent but highly vulnerable states of East Central Europe, endorsed by the 
victorious Western Allies, proved on balance a political and diplomatic asset to Germany. It (i) 
initially buffered Germany against a spillover of the Bolshevik Revolution, (ii) then tempted 
Soviet Russia to collaborate with Germany throughout the 1920s and in the partition of this area 
in 1939 and 1940, and (iii) ultimately frustrated efforts at Soviet-Western cooperation to halt 
Nazis in the late 1930s, as the West was then inhibited by its commitments to the successor states 
from paying the Soviet Union's price for such cooperation - sacrifice of East Central Europe's 
effective independence to Soviet hegemony." See; Joseph Rothschild, Return to Diversity: The 
Political History of East Europe Since World War II (New York; Oxford Univ. Press, 1993) p.4. 
245T 3For example, Lord Balfour, the British foreign minister, said in 1916, "Poland was made 
an independent Kingdom, becoming a buffer state between Russia and Germany, France would be 
at mercy of Germany in the next war, for this reason, that Russia could not come to her aid 
without violating the neutrality of Poland."  Quoted in Kissinger, p.243. 
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states."246 This British policy, expressed as "a modified form of isolation,"247 had no commitment 
beyond the France's frontier. 
In addition, there was no strong feeling of solidarity among East European nations. On the 
contrary, there were territorial disputes between Poland and Czechoslovakia over Teschen, Poland 
and Lithuania over Vilna, Hungary and Czechoslovakia over the borders of Slovakia and Capatho- 
Ruthenia, Rumania and Hungary over Transylvania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia over Macedonia, 
Bulgaria and Greece over the access to the Aegean, and so on. Even though Eastern European 
countries had common interest - "the continued independence of the area" or "a continuation of 
Russian and German weakness,"248 they could not institutionalize their needs. 
For them, "there were two possibilities open ; to gain support from other great powers, more 
specifically, the victors of the First World War; and to work among themselves in building up their 
collective strength."249 Actually, there were two formal alliances made up of small states - the Balkan 
League of 1912 and the Little Entente. But both alliances were limited to confronting temporary 
threats of revisionism of the Ottoman Empire and of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, both of which 
ceased to exist in 1919. The members of the Balkan League, "having successfully eliminated the 
remnants of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, turned against [one another] again, and remained 
divided during and after the First World War,"250 until the second trial of 1934. On the other hand, 
the latter also had inherent obstacles - exclusion of the Great Powers, lack of faith among members, 
and its own domestic difficulties.251 Moreover, there were several elements of disunity between 
246, Craig and George (1990) p. 55. 
247A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (New York; Atheneum, 1961) 
p.34. 
24SHenry Roberts, Eastern Europe: Politics, Revolution. & Diplomacy (New York; Alfred 
A Knopf, 1970) pp.57, 60. 
U9Ibid, p.6l. 
250Michael Handel (1981) pp.153-154. 
2MRothstein pointed out that the Little Entente was directed against illusory threats, 
Hungarian Revisionism, and also it excluded the Great Powers. In addition, the internal disruption 
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France and Britain on the issues of Reparations, Disarmament, the War Guilt Clause of Article 231, 
and of the British reluctance to involve itself in the Eastern European problems. All these factors 
accelerated the collapse of the Versailles Treaty and the creation of the new balance of power system. 
2 . The New Balance of Power : The Locarno System 
As previously surveyed, the establishment of Locarno system was a natural byproduct of the 
Versailles Treaty and the geopolitical situation of Eastern Europe. Newman emphasized the 
importance of Eastern Europe, "this area determined the power of Germany, and hence, the 
distribution of power throughout Europe. If France and/or Britain should control Eastern Europe, 
Germany would be weak. If Germany should gain control, France would be weakened by a loss of 
power to Germany, although French control over the Rhine would continue to give France a strong 
offensive-defensive position. Thus, as early as 1925, Eastern Europe was vital in the conflict between 
Germany and France."252 France feared German revisionism while Britain feared more Bolshevik 
expansionism than that of Germany. Moreover, the British felt that if they supported France's demand 
for a permanently diminished Germany, they would have lost their traditional job, holding the balance. 
At that time, British national interests were resuming economic life without a heavy burden of 
armaments, maintaining the Commonwealth, and dealing with issues of class conflict. Thus, her 
slogan was "a minimum of commitment and a maximum of security in Europe."253 Stresemann, a 
brilliant politician, knew this gap between the victors and aimed the "peaceful revision of the 
Versailles Treaty." He was "as determined as the most extreme nationalist to get rid of the whole 
treaty lock, stock, and barrel; reparations, German disarmament, the occupation of the Rhineland, and 
the frontier with Poland. — [He, however,] wanted to do it peacefully. He thought this the safer, the 
of Yugoslavia and Rumania was de-stabilizing factor. See; Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small 
Powers (New York; Columbia Univ. Press, 1968) pp. 139, 169, 176, & 177. Also, See; Henry 
Roberts, (1970) p.64; He said, "Since each of the three members was potentially threatened by a 
different great power; Czechoslovakia by Germany, Rumania by Soviet Russia, and Yugoslavia by 
Italy, there was no immediate community of interest." 
2i2William J. Newman, The Balance of Power in the Interwar Years. 1919-1939 (New 
York; Random House, 1968) p.58. 
253 
'Ibid., pp. 65-66. 
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more certain, and the more lasting way to German predominance."254 At any rate, Stresemann "was 
in the driver's seat much more than Briand and Chamberlain. In return for renouncing the revisionism 
in the West, he drew from Briand and Chamberlain an implicit recognition that the Versailles Treaty 
required revision in the East."255 
The illusion of the success of the Locarno Treaty might be that it would persist like the Treaty 
of Vienna, because all participants were satisfied. On the contrary, however, the result of Locarno 
devalued the collective security of the League of Nations rather than strengthening it.256 "For, if 
collective security was in fact reliable, Locarno was unnecessary; and if Locarno was necessary, the 
League of Nations was, by definition, inadequate to assure the security of even its principal founding 
members."257 Obviously, the Locarno Pact shored up the balance of power in the West, but not in the 
East. From the perspectives of small states, it meant the return to the pre-War system of "Great 
Powers' Condominium." 
Then, having failed to induce a British guarantee over Eastern Europe, France tried to embrace 
Soviet Russia to check Germany's expansionism in the eastern borders. The result was the Eastern 
Locarno Pact of 1935. However, unlike the initial plan which Germany, Russia, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic states were to be signatories with France, the new pact was signed 
only by France, Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia. The failure of this effort resulted from the 
objections of significant players in the region - Germany and Poland. "Germany did not want any 
extension of French influence in Eastern Europe. The Poles were determined that Russia should not 
be allowed to re-enter European affairs."258 
French-Polish relations, another main pillar of French policy for checking Germany, deteriorated 
also. After Locarno, Polish foreign policy began to change. The leaders of Warsaw directly 
254A.J.P. Taylor, (1961) p.51. 
255Kissinger, (1994)p.274. 
256Max Beloff, The Balance of Power (Montreal; Mcgill Univ. Press, 1967) p. 54. 
257Kissinger, (1994)p.275. 
258A.J.P. Taylor, (1961) p.84. 
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contracted with their enemies. Having successfully attempted to build up non-aggression pacts with 
its two powerful neighbors during 1932-1934, Poland endeavored to separate Russia and Germany 
by making friends with one at the expense of the other (balancing behavior). Yet, the experiences of 
Four Power Pact and of the formation of the Eastern Locarno made the Poles consider Soviet 
intervention more seriously, and thus be pro-German. 
On the other hand, the Little Entente remained, and even consolidated. Italy's challenge to the 
French system in the Balkans and its hostility toward Yugoslavia inflicted a significant blow on the 
Little Entente, and the effect was enhanced after Eastern Locarno.259 Nevertheless, the Little Entente 
remained unified for a decade more after the Locarno, because "it was still too early to jump aboard 
the German ship, or to jump off the French one."260 
Another attempt of Eastern European countries to sustain their independence was the formation 
of the Balkan Entente, composed of "Greece, Turkey, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, but not Bulgaria, 
which was not willing to accept the premise of no territorial revision,... and was very sensitive about 
being an island of Latinity in a sea of Slavs, as the phase went."261 Furthermore, it was aimed to 
defend the members "against a Balkan aggressor only, not against a great power."262 
In sum, during the first decade after the Locarno, there were significant changes in international 
relations in Eastern Europe. Germany and Soviet Russia were returning as great powers. France was 
diminishing while Italian involvement was increasing. Now, small states in the region had to find or 
establish a reliable system of alliance. However, there was still unmitigated hostility among them, and 
furthermore, they could not find an appropriate great power(s) without harming the solidarity among 
them. In addition, it was still too ambiguous for them to choose the proper partner, because not all 
259ii 9
"Just as Rumania and Czechoslovakia were loath to embroil themselves in the Italian- 
Yugoslav crisis, and Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in the Rumanian-Soviet struggle, so now 
Rumania and Yugoslavia were reluctant to involve themselves in a situation which threatened the 
Czechs more than themselves." See; Robert Rothstein, (1968) pp. 149-152. 
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options were complementary. Thus, it was hard to calculate the costs and benefits of choosing a great 
power instead of others. 
3 . The Collapse of the Interwar Balance of Power 
From 1935, Hitler's ambitions began to be incoporated into Nazi Germany's diplomacy. This 
period, from 1935 to 1939, can be divided two phases - 'testing' and 'aggression',263 or 'half-armed 
peace' and 'pre-war period.'264 No matter how was it divided, the prominent incidents of this period 
were a series of German aggressions and concessions by its counterparts. Germany achieved its 
objectives; withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference, the reoccupation of the Rhineland, 
Anschulss in Austria the acquisition of Sudetenland, the annexation of Czechoslovakia, and the 
aggression on Poland, with little resistance from other great powers. Among those objectives the 
reoccupation of the Rhineland was really "a bold gamble on Hitler's part," because "conscription had 
been in effect for less than a year," thus "German army was far from ready for war."265 Moreover, it 
meant the destruction of the Locarno balance. 
Nevertheless, Britain insisted on a 'policy of appeasement.' There were two different explanations 
available. With the hegemony theory, Britain, at that time, sought to arrest if s decline by decreasing 
costs rather than by increasing resources.266 On the other hand, Newman agreed that appeasement 
was not an act of weakness, but a right policy for preserving the balance. "In order to do so it was 
necessary to bring Hitler into the balance and to get him to accept demands, that is, limits on his acts, 
as well as to make demands."267 If it was a right policy, then, why did it fail? Newman answered that 
Britain should have used coercion with appeasement in order to convert Hitler, a risktaker, to deal 
263Craig and George, (1990) p.97-98. 
264A.J.P. Taylor, (1961) p.131. 
265Kissinger, (1994) p.302. 
266Robert Gilpin, (1981) p. 196-197. 
267William Newman, (1968) p.165. 
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in a situation in which he was in a position of military inferiority, but "in the period, 1933-1938, the 
British tried appeasement without coercion."268 
As for France also, appeasement became an official policy. "They assumed that a stalemate had 
been established in Western Europe. They could not impede the advance of German power in Eastern 
Europe."269 This was proved by the Maginot Line. "In the event of German aggression, Eastern 
Europe could only be saved if France adopted an offensive strategy centered on its using the 
demilitarized Rhineland as a hostage. Yet the Maginot Line indicated that France intended to stay on 
.the defensive inside its own borders, thereby liberating Germany to work its will in the East. "270 
After the Munich Treaty of 1938, the turning point of western policy, small states in Eastern 
Europe now had more clear alternatives - bandwagoning with Germany, or balancing against 
Germany by making alliance with the Soviet Union or Britain. Among those alternatives, the most 
viable one was bandwagoning, because British resolve not only was suspected, but also came too late, 
and because the Soviet Union was seen as more unreliable than Germany.271 Thus, "in one form or 
another, all the states of the region eventually succumbed to German offensives, as resisting victims 
(Poland, Yugoslavia), as passive victims (Czechoslovakia), as calculating satellites (Hungary, 
Rumania, Bulgaria), as ephemerally independent dependencies (Slovakia, Croatian), or as trophies 
from the midwar collapse of Italy (Albania)."272 
Exceptionally, Poland resisted to choose neither Germany nor Russia. Taylor criticized at this 
point. "They regarded themselves as an independent Great Power; and forgot that they had gained 
their independence in 1918 only because both Russia and Germany had been defeated."273 In reality, 
267te/.,p.l68. 
269A.J.P. Taylor, (1961) p. 188. 
27()Kissinger, (1994)p,280. 
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however, Beck was not a megalomaniac. He "did not see the British guarantee as a reversal of his 
previous policy of negotiating with Berlin, and managed to convince himself that Hitler was a 'timid 
Austrian' who would not risk alienating Poland and thus drove her into an alliance with Russia."274 
Also, "putting Poland in the secondary category (middle power), - [Beck] always denied that Poland 
was a great power in the sense of having worldwide interests - he was intent on maintaining an 
independent course against the infringements of the great powers and the submissiveness of the client 
states."275 Beck's policy was somewhat unique one among the policies of small states in the region. 
He wanted to walk along the middle line between Russia and Germany, while other buffer states 
chose the rising, aggressive power. In light of the traditional hegemonic theory, Poland had to choose 
Germany in order to survive. Otherwise, she had to choose Russia in order to keep Germany from 
being a dominant power, on the basis of the traditional balance of power theory. 
Here the dilemma of small states can be seen most clearly. For them, it is too dangerous to be an 
independent player (or the holder of the balance) in such a crisis, because it means that they are not 
only friends but also foes of the great powers, at the same time. It is like as "riding two horses at 
once" which might "lead to some exceptionally strenuous acrobatics."276 Oh the other hand, if they 
cling to the most prominent great power, their movement of bandwagoning would accelerate the 
process of disequilibrium practically as well as psychologically. 
4 . Analysis 
World War I and the Versailles Treaty brought about, literally, "systems change." The Ottoman 
Empire disappeared right after the Great War. The Austro-Hungarian Empire disintegrated to several 
nation states. Germany was defeated. Russia retreated from the scene. France tried to keep its 
position as a continental power, but she had been a secondary position since the Franco-Prussian War 
of 1871. The situation was worse than before. Britain already passed its apex point as a global power. 
Now she tried to delay the process of decline. Most of all, the prominent political change was to be 
274Martin Kitchen, Europe Between the Wars; A Political History (New York; Longman, 
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275Henry Roberts, (1970) p. 139. 
276/fe/.,p.l56. 
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found in the establishment of an international organization and in the prevalence of liberalism. 
This optimistic period, however, could not last long. As for small states it ended with the Locarno 
Treaty. During those years, small states could advocate their claims and act as a victor of the war. 
However, Great Powers, especially Britain and the United States, did not turn their eyes to them, 
because there was no critical crisis that challenged their national interests. Thus, it is not an 
overstatement to say that each state in the region had some freedom of maneuverability to focus on 
the intra-regional issues, i.e. territorial disputes, without great powers' intervention (Hypothesis I). 
This period was "the calm before the storm." 
Once Germany and Russia emerged again, the international system of the region turned out to be 
more competitive. Now, small states' voices could be heard by the Great Powers more seriously. As 
a traditional buffer-zone between Germany and Russia, Eastern Europe became again the key to 
Mackinder's heartland (Hypothesis II).277 Even though there was the equilibrium of power (evenly 
distributed power in this case) among the great powers, Great Britain, a key power278 for the balance 
of Europe was nor willing to keep it through actively engaging the crisis. On the contrary, she was 
striving to preserve the balance by making agreements among the great powers during the most time 
of the period. Therefore, even though there were hot disputes between France and Germany, this did 
not affect most of Eastern European small states. Actually in Eastern Europe, Germany was a 
regional hegemon, inducing states to bandwagon. Thus, generally speaking, small states could not 
enjoy the advantage of great powers' conflicts, especially after the treaty of Locarno. On the contrary, 
as studied previously they carefully chose to bandwagon to Germany, except the case of Poland 
(Hypothesis III & IV). Britain's concerns were primarily focused on the great powers rather than 
lesser states (Hypothesis V). Nevertheless, despite their anti-Russian feelings, small states did not yet 
get on the side of Germany totally. Most of them spent some time moving between Great Powers, 
especially before Locarno. 
27? 
'Mackinder said, "Who rules Eastern Europe commands the heartland, who rules the 
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When Germany became a prominent power, and when small states felt that they could not depend 
on the promises of the West, they (most of them) decided to bandwagon. Then, they could preserve 
their national base free from Nazi attack, even though this behavior had accelerated the collapse of 
the balance (Hypothesis VI & VII). No one can criticize them, because survival of nation (or state) 
is itself moral. However, what should be noted is that they could have cooperated with each other, 
thereby avoiding, possibly, what became such a great catastrophe. 
The interwar period shows us a period of dynamic change in the international system. This 
dynamism gave small states in the region not only difficulties but also opportunities. In the time of 
political change, whatever it is - whether it is systems or systemic or domestic change, the survivor 
and ultimate winner is always one able to adjust himself to the change. However, it is not a simple 
task, because it is extremely difficult and burdensome for small states to choose the RIGHT TIME 
to change sides, even if they know to whom or in what direction they have to move. 
Once their survival is confirmed, their next job is to grab sovereignty. Then, small states can play 
a role as the holder of the balance. This role will not only consolidate their position but also extend 
the favorable situation {Status Quo), evenly distributed equilibrium or the competitive system. Martin 
Wight said about this role, "It is not the only the great powers that can aspire to the role (holding the 
balance). Sometimes a small power, through the accident of its strategic position or the energy of its 
ruler, can contribute useful if not decisive strength to one side or the other, . . ,"279 
C . THE COLD WAR ERA 
The explosion of A-Bombs in Nagasaki and Hiroshima not only ended of the Second World War, 
the most terrible disaster in the human history, but also presented a premonition of the potential for 
total destruction in the future. Thereafter the opposing two superpowers, based on their ideological 
leadership and nuclear capabilities, led world policy. The one common objective of common for both 
superpower rivals was to prevent World War III. This objective has been successfully achieved by 
them mainly because the annihilating power of nuclear weapons contributed to the stability of the 
279Martin Wight, "The Balance of Power," in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight Ed., 
Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (London; George Allen 
&UnwinLtd„ 1966) p. 161. 
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bipolar world. John Lewis Gaddis argued that; 
"The abrupt psychological effect of nuclear weapons was a moment of 
historical punctuation, in that it represented a sharp acceleration in the trend 
toward the obsolescence of war, . . . The stability followed - that is, the 
perpetuation, for over four and a half decades, of a world order dominated by 
two nations preeminent in nuclear capability - resulted, in large part, from 
initial shock."280 
Also, Craig and George agreed on this point, saying that; 
"... critical foreign policy decisions during the Cold War was similar to 
its employment by the major powers during the old European balance-of- 
power system. One difference, however, was that the fear of a thermonuclear 
holocaust, which had no counterpart in the old system, discouraged both the 
United States and the Soviet Union from resorting to war as a way of 
preventing an undesired change in the existing balance of power if to do so 
would result in a direct clash between American and Russian forces."281 
Another argument about the stability of the Post-World War II era was that the bipolar system 
"was a simple one that did not require sophisticated leadership to maintain it."282 This logic was well 
developed by Kenneth Waltz previously. He put it; 
"When possible enemies are several in number, unity of action among 
them is difficult to arrange. . . Interdependence of parties, diffusion of 
dangers, confusion of responses: these are the characteristics of great-power 
politics in multipolar system. . . In a bipolar world there are no peripheries. . 
. . Self-dependence of parties, clarity of dangers, certainty about who has to 
face them: these are the characteristics of great-power politics in a bipolar 
system."283 
280John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Clod War (New York; 
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However, this is not the whole story of the Cold War system. Even without nuclear weapons, 
John Mueller argued, the destructive capabilities of conventional weapons and the experiences of the 
two world wars caused by the failure of foreseeing the escalation to wars of attrition would bring 
about the remarkable durability of the international system. Illustrating this point the wars in Korea, 
Vietnam, Afghanistan, Algeria, and the Falklands occurred where nuclear countries had been militarily 
challenged based on the belief that the conflict would not escalate.284 He argued the essential 
irrelevance of nuclear weapons with the stability of the Cold War system. Thus, according to him, the 
post-World War II system was maintained not by nuclear weapons but by the fear of the escalation 
to the war of attrition. On the other hand, regarding the Waltz's argument, there was an opposite 
view, too. Snyder and Diesing propose that an international system composed of two dominant 
nations and a number of smaller units is principally unstable: "In bipolarity ... a power gain for one 
superpower means a power loss for the other. . .[and] resistance to the opponent's every move, no 
matter how minor, is . . . the guiding rule of behavior."285 This hot competition between the two 
superpowers offered small states greater freedom of maneuver. Yaacov said, "the competitive 
character of the bipolar system embodies great opportunities for small states as the competition 
between the superpowers for allies affords the clients room to maneuver between them."286 
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that both superpowers tacitly or overtly agreed with each other 
to avoid the Third World War. Unlike the cases of great power agreements at the turn of the century, 
however, this consensus between the United States and the Soviet Union did not produce peacefully 
divided spheres of influence. Using limited wars, they competed to expand their own influence to all 
available states. In some places, one yielded to the other, but in some places of vital interest, they did 
284John, Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar 
World," Lynn-Jones and Miller Ed., (1993) pp.45-69. 
^Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations (Princeton, N.J.; Princeton 
Univ. Press, 1977) p.425. Quoted in Dina A. Zinnes, "Prerequisite for the Study of System 
Transformation," in Ole Holsti, et. al. Ed., Change in the International System (Boulder; 
Westview Press, 1980) pp.9-10. 
286Yaacov, Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel, the Superpowers, and the War in the Middle East (New 
York; Praeger, 1987) p.9. 
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not hesitate to engage in limited war - often a proxy war. As for small states, that situation was not 
only dangerous; but also offered opportunities.287 The most common type of opportunity was to 
obtain the patronage of a superpower. Thus the patron-client relationship was the typical type of 
'asymmetrical alliances.'288 This relationship was considered as a kind of "Autonomy-Security Trade- 
Off' between a great power and a small state. A great power can offer a small state a large increase 
in its security, but it demands a high price in autonomy to form an alliance. A small state can offer 
concessions that increase the counterpart's autonomy.289 
However, this principle depends on the situation which both parties are in. If a small state is 
strategically important for a great power, the latter would be willing to offer more even though it can 
get few concessions from the former. This was the case of the US-Israeli relations. During the Cold 
War era, the most important region for both superpowers was obviously the European continent. But, 
in Europe, a general balance or status quo based on conventional and nuclear balance should not be 
violated. Europe was too sensitive to be changed even a little. The next important region was the 
Middle East. Here both superpowers engaged in the Arab-Israeli conflicts through supporting arms 
to their clients. The United States offered Israel a huge amount of aid. Roughly 20% of total US aid 
287, Craig and George articulated this point: "Crises often offer statesmen opportunities for 
constructive change the Chinese character for crisis (g^ has two meanings: the first is the 
same as the standard meaning of the word in English - that is, threat or danger to important 
values. The second connotation, however, is something quite different - not threat but 
opportunity. ... in the context of international relations, suggests that a crisis can loosen things 
up: it can lead policy makers to question and to revise if not totally discard some of the old beliefs 
and policies that led to the impasse; it can make them willing to strike out in new directions." 
Craig and George (1990) p. 129 
288James Morrow said, "the typical view of alliances as tools of capability aggregation and 
threat deterrence alone is incomplete, but it can be subsumed in a more general model. Nations, 
particularly great powers, can use alliance to further their pursuit of changes in the foreign policy 
status quo. Weaker parties can off concessions, such as military bases or the coordination of 
foreign and domestic policies that increase a stronger ally's freedom of action while increasing 
their protection from external threats." James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An 
Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," American Journal of Political 
Science. Vol.35, No.4, November 1991, p.905. 
^IbicL, p.913. 
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were headed for Israel after the Yomkippur War (see Table 1). This result cannot be explained only 
with the Morrow's Trade-Off model. A structural explanation is needed to be employed. 
The case study of the US-Israeli relationship will offer an interesting inference; that in some 
places, even a small state's security matter should be understood at the global context as well as at 
the regional level. Also, it will show several general rules of the patron-client relations that was the 
typical type of alliances for small states in the Cold War system, and help to evaluate the hypotheses 
developed so far. 
1 . Patron-Client Relationship : The US-Israeli Case 
Since World War n, arms transfers have played a role of making, maintaining and consolidating 
alliances. Unlike the interwar arms trade system, in the post-war period, as national governments 
became the suppliers, "arms transfers used as a bargaining tool to gain political influence continued 
to dominate as a rationale for the major suppliers."290 In the Middle East, however, stemming from 
the declaration of Israel's independence, very complicated power relationships have existed between 
regional countries and between the superpowers as well. As for the United States, in the context of 
strict confrontation with the USSR, Israel was the most coherent and reliable ally in the Middle East. 
Therefore, the United States has strongly supported Israel with a great deal of military and economic 
aid. Nevertheless, there have been many critics of this policy. Some of those who have pessimistic 
views, but consider arms transfers as tools for political leverage, have pointed out Israel's 
intransigence and the roles of pro-Israeli interest groups in the United States.291 Then, which 
explanations are the more persuasive, to be fitted to the reality in the Middle East and then explored 
for describing other regions? Also, did political leverage work in the patron-client relationship; and 
290In addition, Laurence analyzed that "arms transfers are not a reliable bargaining tool for 
influencing the short-term behavior of clients in a system where recipients are acquiring arms less 
for military reasons and more for prestige and regional, political power, especially when they can 
spread their dependence among several suppliers, develop indigenous systems, or accomplish 
national security objectives with less modern equipment." On the other hand, he argued that "arms 
transfers result in structural influence of the patron over the client's medium-term behavior and 
ensure stability in the dominant supplier-recipient relationship. "Edward J. Laurence, The 
International Arms Trade (new York; Lexington Books. 1992) pp.75-76, 121-123. 
291Gabriel Scheffer and Menachem Hofhung, "Israel's Image," in Gabriel Scheffer, Ed., 
Dynamics of Dependence: US-Israeli Relation (Boulder; Westview, 1987) pp.7-36. 
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if it worked, what factors had influence on the effectiveness of the leverage? Or, if it didn't work, 
what limitations made it fail? 
The United States has surely granted a vast amount of aid to Israel since the late 1960s as Table 
1 reveals. Why has the United States so strongly supported Israel? There have been many 
explanations, but few of them give us a clear understanding, due to the complexity of the international 
system in the Middle East. Nonetheless, one can roughly sort out the explanations into three 
categories; domestic, regional and global. 
a. Domestic Level 
Many scholars have pointed out the roles of pro-Israeli interest groups in America as the main 
reason of US support to Israel. Scheffer and Hofnung studied four representative pro-Israeli groups 
and explained the factors and perceptions influencing pro-Israeli attitudes.292 Laufer also emphasized 
the role of the pro-Israeli lobby, especially the ATP AC (American-Israel Public Affairs Committee), 
the major Israel lobby in Washington. He noted that The Near East Report, a weekly newsletter 
produced under AIPAC's sponsorship that both summarizes and analyzes Mid-East development, is 
sent to every member of Congress in addition to 60,000 subscribers.293 Also, Eytan Gilboa examined 
the public opinion polls on Israel. In his article that covered from 1947 to 1982 and data gathered 
from eight sources, he concluded that "at least one third of the American people supports Israel even 
under the most adverse circumstance like the one right after the tragic events in Sabra and Shatilla."294 
On the other hand, A.F.K. Organski pointed out the weakness of this argument: 
"The S-shaped curve traced by the pattern of US assistance does not tell 
why this fundamental shift occurred. ... We know that for the entire period 
of Israel's existence between 1948 and the present public opinion polls find 
American Jewish support for Israel has been mostly over 90 percent. ... If 
one argues that it was American Jewish support that produced the large US 
assistance to Israel after 1970, one is duty-bound to explain why before 1970 
292Ibid, pp. 13-21. 
Leopold Y. Laufer, "US Aid to Israel," p. 149. 293 
294T Eytan Gilboa, "American Attitude toward Israel," in Gabriel Scheffer (1987) p.126. 
Sabra and Shatilla were refuge camps, nominally under Israeli control, where massacers occurred. 
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equally high support had the opposite effect."295 
This observation suggests the need to use other levels-of-analysis to answer this question. 
 Table 1; US Assistance to Israel. 1955-1983* (mil, of dollars)296 
Total Total        Economic     Economic     Military Military      Resettlement 
Year      US Aid       US Aid to        Loans Grants Loans Grants For Soviet 
Israel Jewish 
1955 4.864 32.7 30.8 21.9 - - - 
1956 5.402 50.8 35.2 15 6 - 
1957 4,976 40.9 21.8 19.1 - 
1958 4,832 61.2 49.9 11.3 - - - 
1959 4,954 50.3 39.0 10.9 0.4 - - 
1960 4,804 55.7 41.8 13.4 0.5 - - 
1961 4,737 48.1 29.8 18.3 - - . 
1962 7.034 83.9 63.5 7.2 13.2 - - 
1963 7,314 76.7 57.4 6.0 13.3 - - 
1964 5,215 37.0 32.2 4.8 - - - 
1965 5,310 61.7 43.9 4.9 12.9 - - 
1966 6,989 126.8 35.9 0.9 90.0 - - 
1967 6,440 13.1 5.5 0.6 7.0 - - 
196X 6.894 76.8 51.3 0.5 25.0 - - 
19(,9 6,791 121.7 36.1 0.6 85.0 - - 
1970 6,787 71.7 40.7 0.4 30.0 - - 
1971 8,078 600.8 55.5 0.3 545.0 - •- 
1972 9,243 404.2 53.8 50.4 300.0 - - 
1973 9,875 467.3 59.1 50.4 307.5 - 50.0 
1974 8,978 2,570.7 - 51.5 982.7 1,500.0 36.5 
1975 7,239 693.1 8.6 344.5 200.0 100.0 40.0 
1976 6,413 2,229.4 239.4 475.0 750.0 750.0 15.0 
1977 7,784 1,757.0 252.0 490.0 500.0 500.0 15.0 
1978 9,014 1,811.8 266.8 525.0 500.0 500.0 20.0 
1979 13,845 4,815.0 265.0 525.0 2,700.0 1,300.0 25.0 
1980 9,694 1,811.0 261.0 525.0 500.0 500.0 25.0 
19X1 10.549 2.189.0 0 764.0 900.0 500.0 25.0 
1982 12,324 2,219.0 0 806.0** 850.0 550.0 13.0 
1983 14,202 2,498.0 0 785.0 850.0 550.0 13.0 
Total 243,542.0 25,608.2 2,104.9 5,792.3 10,262.5 6,850.0 277.5 
* Does not include Export-Import Bank Loans, American School and Hospital Program, or amounts of less than $50,000. 
** Includes $21 mil. in economic assis. reprogrammed from the Israeli in FY 81. 
Source: Agency for International Development: US overseas Loans and Grants (Annual Reports); Compilation prepared 
by the Congress Research Service, Library of Congress, Nov. 29, 1982 
2y3A.F.K. Organski, The $36 Billion Bargain; Strategy and Politics in US Assistance to 
Israel (New York; Columbia Univ. Press, 1990) pp. 15-16. 
296Leopold Y. Laufer, "US Aid to Israel," p. 126. 
b. Regional Level 
In the Middle East, the most distinguishable characteristic is extreme hostility between the 
Israeli and the Arabs. This continuous Arab-Israeli conflict has created a dilemma to US policy 
makers who have basically been eager to create peace in the region, due to its economic importance - 
that is, oil. US policies toward the Middle East can be illustrated by two concepts - 'peace in 
exchange for territories' and 'evenhandedness.'297 Table 2 shows the evenhandedness policy of the 
United States. 
 Table 2: US Assistance to Arab Front Line States and Primary Backers  
Year 1953      1954    1955      1956    1957 1958      1959      1960      1961       1962      1963 1964 
FLS&PB     8.9        0.0      42.7     11.1     54.4      77.8        11.9      6.6       9.4       13.7      29.9       6 3 
PHTTS 0 7       0 0      0 9      0 5      J1A _L& 74       07   '    i s       n^        s^ 
Year 1965 1966      1967      1968      1969      1970      1971      1972      1973      1974      1975 
FLS&PB 1,125.0       273     367.2     L14~5      4L5      244J.      667      672.9   2,737.7 2,935.2   9,480.1 
Others       217.8 257.3    419.7     200.7     548.7     319.2     761.2     911.1   4,147.2 6,195.1   2,909.9 
Year 1976 1977       1978       1979       1980       1981        1982       1983 Total 
FLS&PB 12.120.1 2,883.0   3,549.5   9,393.1   5,764.7    2,398.7   7,374.6    2,605.9 64,174.1 
Others      3,170.9 2,172.4      768.6      852.5   2,998.3       597.3   2,479.3     1,993.8 31 943.1 
Sources: A.F.K. Organski (1990) PP.145, 151-152 
If one compares Table 1 and Table 2, he can easily find that US assistance to both Israel and the Arab 
states has ascended at the same time. To draw the two obstinate 'mules' to the table, the United States 
had to give both of them carrots. Accordingly, the assistance increased in a spiral shape to 
compensate both sides. Consequently, the United States has increased the level of assistance to 
compensate the Israelis, in part for any loss of security from yielding territories, and in part for any 
loss of balancing from giving arms to the Arab states.298 
297-K l7Nachmias noted that Washington and Jerusalem had adhered to conflicting political 
doctrines because their vital interests are in conflict. She said, "the conflict is, therefore, between 
two principles; 'peace in exchange for territories,' which is America's first priority, and 'no peace 
but territories and security,' which is Israel's first priority." Nitza Nachmias, Transfer of Arms. 
Leverage, and Peace in the Middle East (New York; Greenwood Press, 1988)! * 
298 Laufer, pp. 144-145; and Organski (1990) p. 179. 
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c. Global Level 
Confrontation with the USSR was another major factor. To keep the Soviet Union out of the 
region the United States had to set up a strong and intimate ally.299 One can easily find this fact by 
examining Soviet military aid to the Arab states, which may have caused the increase in US aid to 
Israel. As for the United States, there was no alternative than to deal with the radical and whimsical 
.Arab regimes and to cope with the Russian threats, but also to enhance the military capability of its 
primary ally, Israel. Table 3 shows the arms competition between the two superpowers in the region. 
Table 3 : The changing Percentage of Arms Imported from the US, NATO and the USSR 
by Middle Eastern Countries, '70s - '80s  
% of Arms Imports 
from the US                from NATO                from the USSR 
Country 70s '80s 70s '80s 70s '80s  
7 22 87 - 
4 - - - 
20    10 1     - 
8 22 90 53 
18 21 74 72 
26 36       -  - 
Egypt 3   67 
Israel 96 99 
Iran 78    3 
Iraq 5 
Libva I     1 
.Saudi Arabia 70 46 
Svria - 
Turkey 72 40 
95    91 
28 60 
Source : SIPRI Yearbook '90, p.233 
Here, one can find the dilemma of the United States. That is, she had to consolidate Israeli 
power in order to check the Soviet involvement while it had to grant carrots to the Arab states to 
persuade them not to return to the USSR. Thus, the United States had to deal with Israel who had 
sufficient self-defense power and so was obstinate, while it had to compensate Israel for any loss of 
balance from granting arms to the Arab states.300 Accordingly, it can be said that US arms transfers 
to Israel depended on more regional and global strategies than domestic considerations in America. 
299John C. Campbell said, "In American relationship with the Soviet Union, for example, 
there is really a double aim; first, to keep the Soviet out of the Middle East, or at least keep their 
influence from being a danger to American interests there; and second, to take account of the 
danger of a nuclear war developing out of local conflicts in the Middle East." John Coert 
Campbell, Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy (New York; Harper, 1958). 
300' This opinion is well described by Nachmias. See her book, (1988) pp. 1-92. 
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Therefore, one can conclude that the effectiveness of political leverage on Israel was not fully 
guaranteed despite huge amounts of arms transfers, due to intervening variables such as Arab-Israeli 
conflict and the Soviet threats. That is, the United States had to bargain with at least three actors at 
the same time. Stephen M. wait offers a convincing conclusion about this matter; 
"As a result, a patron's willingness to enforce obedience by restricting the 
flow of aid will be reduced even more, because it will fear a loss of prestige 
should the client realign or be defeated. . . . providing aid can be self- 
defeating, because it strengthens the recipient's position and thus reduces its 
need to follow the patron's advice. . . . because relations between the 
superpowers and their regional allies focus primarily on regional issues, the 
client will usually have a far greater stake in the outcome. Thus the asymmetry 
of motivation will usually favor clients, even when they are extremely 
dependent on external support."301 
2 . Rules of the Patron-Client Relations 
Basically, political leverage works by the patron's control over arms transfers, but there is room 
for debating about its effectiveness, which depends on environments or circumstances of the patron- 
client relationships. That means it is only exerted in the well-managed situations. Then, when does 
great power leverage work efficiently? 
Rule 1 : When the client is not sufficiently strong to defend itself at least during the 
immediate term, leverage works well. 
This includes several strategic or military considerations; "the recipient's threat perception, the 
degree of self-sufficiency regarding domestic weapons system, the ability to initiate or expand 
domestic arms production, the degree of self-sufficiency regarding spare parts for imported weapons 
system, and the degree of self-sufficiency in maintenance, overhaul and repair of imported weapons 
system."302 Also, Anne Hessing Cahn articulated that "the supplier's influence is maximized when the 
recipient: 
1) has no alternative source of supply; 2) does not occupy a strategic 
geographical position; 3) perceives a real threat to its national survival; 4) is 
301 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliance (Ithaca; Cornell Univ. Press, 1987) p.238. 
302/ 
"Christian Catrina, Arms Transfers and Dependence (United Nations Institute for 
Disarmament Research; New York; Taylor & Francis, 1988) pp.354-355. 
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a 'pariah' state within the international community; 5) cannot pay for arms; 6) 
has no indigenous weapons production capability; 7) does not possess scarce 
unsubstitutable raw materials; 8) has a limited spare parts storage capacity; 9) 
requires supplier personnel for weapons maintenance and training; and/or 10) 
perceives that receiving arms from a particular patron is especially prestigious 
and has such a strong ideological orientation toward it that a switch to 
another patron is precluded ii303 
However, this was not the case of Israel. That is, the United States failed several times to exert 
leverage on Israel, because Israel was not weak enough.304 Israel has, indeed, built its own arsenals 
so that it could deter an Arab attack.305 Therefore, the weaker the client, the better the leverage 
works, and vice versa. 
Rule 2 : When the client depends on a sole patron and is trapped by an urgent situation, 
it will be more vulnerable to the patron's leverage. 
This concept is very simple and clear. Like a monopoly in commercial market, the supplier can 
control the price as she pleases. The availability of alternative suppliers is a basic determinant of 
303Anne Hessing Cahn, "United States Arms to the Middle East 1967-1976: A Critical 
Examination," in Milton Leitenberg and Gabriel Scheffer, Great Power Intervention in the Middle 
East (New York; Pergramon Press, 1979) p. 106 and Yaacov, Bar-Siman-Tov (1987) p.7. 
304For example. President Ford proclaimed the 'reassessment' of relationship with Israel 
when the Egyptian peace proposal was rejected by Israel in 1975. According to Nachmias, 
President Ford "could not understand why regardless of the fact that the Israelis were stronger 
militarily than all their Arab neighbors combined, yet peace was no closer than it had ever been. 
Indeed, because Israel was strong and well supplied, it could defy American pressures maintain its 
own independent policy." Also, Efraim Inbar said, "Israel's freedom of action in the short run was 
guaranteed by the time [Prime Minister] Begin came to power because the IDF was well- 
equipped, and its stores were full enough to wage war without needing an American aircraft, or to 
withstand temporary suspensions in the delivery of arms, or other sanctions on the part of the 
United States." See; Nachmias (1988) p.82; Efraim Inbar, "Israeli Strategic Thinking," The 
Journal of Strategic Studies. Vol.6, No.l, Mar. 1983, p.47; and Thomas R. Mattair, "Achieving 
Peace: Recommendations for US Arab-Israeli policy," Middle Eastern Policy. Vol.1, No.4, 1992 
p.4. 
305Israel's efforts to innovate and produce weapons were well surveyed by Harkavy and 
Neuman. See; Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman, "Israel," in James Everett Katz Ed., 
Arms Production in Developing Countries (Lexington, Mass.; Lexington Books, 1984) pp. 193- 
223. 
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recipient dependence.306 Harkavy mentioned the disadvantages to the recipient nation which is tied 
to a sole or dominant supplier, exemplifying the case of Israel in the wake of the Six-Day War, "when 
they were cut off by the French embargo after having built an air force primarily from that source."307 
On the other hand, when the client state is confronted with urgent situations, such as immediate 
threats and before or during wars, she is vulnerable to the patron's coercion. On October 24, 1973, 
when Nixon and Kissinger criticized the IDF's transgression of an agreement upon cease-fire line and 
evoked the issue of arms supplies. Israel had no choice but to desist. Moshe Dayan said that "the 
shells Israel was firing in the afternoon had only arrived that morning from the United States. In that 
case, a refusal to comply with the US demand was almost unthinkable."308 
This rule can be also proved conversely. Contrary to the case of 1973, in 1975 Kissinger's threat 
during his shuttle in March was futile. "All the promises to withhold arms were not effective because 
Israel was in no immediate need for arms."309 That is, "because Egypt was in poor position to resume 
hostilities, Israel could not be compelled in this military context to conform to American desires."310 
Therefore, the smaller the number of suppliers available, the more urgent the situation which the 
recipient is met, the better the leverage works, and vice versa. 
Rule 3 : When the client's needed costs for complying with the patron's policies are higher 
than benefits from persisting in its policies, leverage does not work well. 
Generally speaking, however, the Israeli case is not suited to Rule 2, partly due to the complexity 
of the regional environment and in part due to the discrepancy of strategic considerations for national 
interests between the United States and Israel, despite the latter's dependence on US support. As for 
'"'Christian Catrina (1988) p.355. 
307r Robert E. Harkavy, The Arms Trade and International Systems (Cambridge' Ballinger 
Publishing, 1975) pp.105-107. 
308William B. Quandt, "Influence through Arms Supply: The US Experiences in the Middle 
East," p. 126. 
309Nachmias(1988)p.87. 
310Thomas R. Wheelock, "Arms for Israel," International Security Vol 3 No 2 Fall 1978 
p.130. '       ' ' 
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the United States, concerns for the Soviet threat, the unique and special relationship with Israel, the 
inevitable evenhandedness policy based on the economic considerations, and the peace settlement 
between the Arab states and Israel were all important determinants for its policies.311 As for Israel, 
the ability to prevent potential challenges from Arab states, and a long-term projection of Israeli 
power hinged on a solid, unchallenged relationship with the United States.312 For achieving 
deterrence, Israel held the territories that it had occupied after June 1967. The Israelis thought their 
new borders would eliminate the threat to their existence, and enable them to absorb an Arab first 
strike. Efraim Inbar, citing Yigar Allon's comment, emphasized that; 
"only with secure borders could Israel adopt a defensive posture which 
would enable the small standing army units of Israel's Defense Force to hold 
back the invading Arab armies, until most of the country's reserves could be 
mobilized. This 'security zone' would thus guarantee enough time to launch 
the counter offensive needed to defeat any such aggression."313 
On the contrary, some argued that Israel has exerted political leverage on the United States. As 
a small country, Israel could use several strategies; "penetrating the domestic system of the United 
States; and/or threatening instability."314 For the United States, it had weaknesses of its own. Snyder 
and Diesing mentioned them: 
"When the client's particular interests are directly and deeply involved, the 
patron may feel some normative compulsion to defer to it; the superpower 
may be inhibited from exerting too much pressure on the client for fear that 
this might endanger the patron-client relationship."315 
Moreover, the Israelis knew that the United States had an interest in defending them and so that its 
threat of nonsupport was less credible. This was the US' dilemma. Thus, one can say the perceptions 
311John C. Campbell (1958) pp.38-41. 
312Shibley Telhami, "Israeli Foreign Policy: A Static Strategy in a Changing World," 
Middle East Journal. Vol.44, No.3, Summer 1990, pp.401, 407-410.. 
313Efraim Inbar (1983) p.38; Yigar Allon, "Israel; The Case for Defensive Borders," 
Foreign Affairs 55. Oct. 1976, p.44. 
314Yaacov, Bar-Siman-Tov (1987) p.9. 
315Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations (1977) pp.29, 442-443. 
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of national interest,   or costs and benefits were more important factors than a patron's tactics of 
coercion and inducement to make a client to comply. 
3 . Analysis 
The survey of the US-Israeli patron-client relationship offers us several implications. First, the 
relationship depended on conditions of the international structure more than domestic policies. 
Strategic location, threat perception, and national interests are primary factors to decide the 
cohesiveness of the relationship (Rule 1). Secondly, as Stephen Walt argued, a small state is more 
interested in regional matters than in the global scene. Thus, it is prone to be more affected by 
regional threats. This tendency usually poses a dilemma for a patron who wants to control its client 
within the global context of its own. From time to time, this bold movement of a small state makes 
a crisis worse, but at the same time, it gives more opportunities for a small state also (Rule 2 & 3 — 
Hypothesis VII). Thirdly, the relationship is principally affected by the availability of alternatives. If 
there is any other candidate for being a patron, a small state has larger freedom of maneuver in its 
foreign policy. That is, the stronger the competition between or among the would-be patrons (the 
great powers), the more advantageous for a small state in terms of autonomy, vice versa (Rule 2 — 
Hypothesis III & IV).316 Also, in a certain circumstance a small state is apt to maintain the crisis 
longer in order to induce a patron's concern. Because it is more favorable for a small state to stimulate 
the competition between or among the great powers, she is prone to balance between or among 
them.. But if the threat becomes imminent it would accept a primary power's (or threat's) leverage 
( Rule 2 & 3 — Hypothesis V & VI). 
316 Gaddis explained this tendency by the parable of giant moose; "the United States and 
the Soviet Union had developed an elaborate and intimidating set of antlers to make each secure 
against the other, but each of them soon found that, once deployed, its defense were constantly 
getting tangled up in the undergrowth, and that the burden of carrying them around all day left 
little energy for anything else. The exhausted behemoths eventually came to realize that if they 
were to try to use the weapons they had evolved to protect themselves, they would probably 
break their own necks. Meanwhile, blissfully unarmed rabbits and mice were quietly invading their 
pastures, eating up the grass, exhausting the water supply, and reproducing like crazy " John 
Lewis Gaddis (1992) p. 158. 
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D . THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
The collapse of the Cold War system brought about some difficulties for the security policies of 
small states. Now, small states have to choose their own partner and strategy, due to the lack of 
superpower patronage that had been a strong influence on small states' development in economic and 
security terms. On the other hand, it can also be said in the opposite way: the end of the Cold War 
released small states from the control and political leverage of the superpowers, and thus they gained 
greater freedom of maneuver. The emergence of the power vacuum, coincided by the disappearance 
of the reliable superpowers' patronage that used to be believed in as a tool of political leverage, makes 
a window of opportunity for small states. Thus, in several regions, some small states have vigorously 
defied the effort to create the new world order. Among them, the case of Ukrainian and North 
Korean efforts to develop nuclear weapons were, and continue, in the case of North Korea, against 
the international norm led by the United States. 
There have been several cases of small state defiances to the world order, such as Iraq's invasion 
into Kuwait, the continuing crisis in the Balkans, and other ethnic and religious conflicts. Iraq's 
invasion in 1991 ended with victory of the UN. No great power supported Sadam to persist his 
claims. Collective Security worked better that had ever done before. The result of the game was too 
obvious to fail to predict. On the other hand, the crisis in the Balkans is still not a global issue to 
affect the international system itself. However, the nuclear programs of Ukraine and North Korea 
were different from all these cases. Nuclear issue is not a regional matter. Even though those two 
countries did not use active forces to achieve their goals, potentially their programs were the most 
dangerous efforts threatening the world order. Furthermore, one more benefit to select their programs 
as a case study is that one can get significant implications not only for the hypotheses of this paper 
but also for the policy of small states through comparing them each other. Then, how could they defy 
the world order despite they were in worse situation than before 1989, due to the close of the Soviet 
aid9 What made them enable to do? 
Both Ukraine and North Korea sought "a substitute safety device" for the loss of their principal 
patron, the USSR. Thus, the nuclear option was very attractive for them, because it seemed to be an 
effective and powerful bargaining card to achieve their aims - security guarantee and financial aid. 
Undoubtedly, both countries became flashpoints in international politics. The objective of this case 
101 
study is not to survey the usefulness of the nuclear option itself as a bargaining card, but to figure out 
the necessary conditions for small states to bargain with the powerful in order to get some security 
and financial aid from them. With this viewpoint, the comparative study of the nuclear ventures of 
Ukraine and North Korea is expected to provide very interesting results. Both countries chose to 
pursue the nuclear option, but the situations of each state were fundamentally different. So were the 
results of the ventures. Then, what did each state get and lose through the bargaining process? What 
inferences can be suggested for small states to arouse the interest of the powerful and to achieve their 
aims9 
To answer these questions, at first, this study will employ the method of comparative analysis by 
using seven variables - threat perception, socio-political aspects, military aspects, nuclear technology, 
experiences of international negotiations, collective security system, and the existence of a strong 
sponsor. Then, the results of the study will be applied to the hypotheses developed in Chapter IV. 
1 . The Nuclear Adventures of Ukraine and North Korea 
a. Ukraine 
"When Ukraine issued its declaration of sovereignty on July 16, 1990, it contained a pledge 
not to maintain, produce or acquire nuclear weapons."317 This pledge reflected the overriding anti- 
nuclear sentiment at that time, influenced by Chernobyl, which led to the emergence of a strong 
environmental movement opposed to nuclear energy. This propensity was confirmed when Ukraine 
agreed with Russia in the matter of nuclear weapons on Dec.21, 1991, in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan.318 
Before then, on Oct. 22, 1991, the Rada (Ukrainian parliament) had passed legislation to make the 
country a nuclear-weapon-free zone by 1995.319 The process was accelerated in Minsk. The 
317 F. Stephen Larrabee, "Ukraine; Europe's Next Crisis?" Arms Control Today f ACT). 
July/Aug. 1994, p. 18 Also, See; John Jaworsky, The Military-Strategic Significance of Recent 
Development in Ukraine. (Ottawa, Canada; Ministry of Defense, July 1994) p. 127. 
318 The four former Soviet Republics - Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine - agreed 
on the three main issues; 1) any decision to use CIS nuclear weapons shall only be made with the 
agreement of the four leaders; 2) Ukraine and Belarus would join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon 
states; 3) Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine would withdraw all of their tactical nuclear weapons 
to Russia by July 1, 1992. See; ACT. May 1992, p.27 
319ACT, Nov. 1991, p. 17. 
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Commonwealth leaders spelt out, in Article 4, that "The decision on the need for their use is made 
by the president of the Russian Federation in agreement with [the other inheritors], and that nuclear 
weapons located on the territory of Ukraine shall be under the control of the Combined Strategic 
Forces Command —, and be dismantled by the end of 1994, including tactical nuclear weapons by 
July 1, 1992."320 
However, the mood was overturned suddenly, when Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk 
declared on Mar. 12 that he was suspending the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine 
to Russia, stating that "We cannot guarantee that weapons transported to Russia will be destroyed 
or that they will not fall into undesirable hands."321 Kravchuk succeeded in arousing US attention to 
Ukrainian problems, and the United States made several warnings to Ukraine, simultaneously giving 
Russia $400 million which would be shared by Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The withdrawal 
of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine was resumed in April and completed by May 6, 1992. On 
the same day, during the meeting in Washington, Bush and Kravchuk agreed to a START protocol 
that commits Ukraine to eliminate all strategic nuclear weapons within seven years, by 1999, and to 
join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. In exchange, the United States offered the arrangement 
of $120 million for supporting food and nuclear dismantlement.322 
Thereafter, the road of debate became relatively flat and straight until the negotiation of the 
Trilateral Agreement.323 However, during that time, Ukraine consistently tried to bargain with nuclear 
weapons on its territory. While stalling the parliamentary vote on START I, Ukrainians demanded 
320
 "Minsk Agreement on Strategic Forces," ACT. Jan./Feb. 1992, p.39. 
321That statement was the result of enhanced voices of Ukrainian nationalists in the Rada 
and harsh dispute with Russia over the Crimean issue. See; The Economist. "The Crimean 
Question: Ukraine," Jan. 11, 1992, pp.45-46; and "A New Crimean War?" Feb. 1, 1992, pp.48- 
49. Also in March the Rada's defense committee resolved to delay the removal of strategic 
weapons, too. See; ACT Mar. 1992, p. 19; and Apr. 1992, p.23 . 
322
 ACT. May 1992, pp. 16-17. 
,2
' Even with Russia, Ukraine signed a wide-ranging agreement that focused on economic 
concerns in June 1992. The two countries said they would keep open borders, speed up the 
ratification of the CFE treaty and consult each other over START. See; The Economist. June 27, 
1992, p.59. 
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three things; 1) security assistance from both the US and Russia, "including assurances not to engage 
in economic coercion against Kiev, such as a cutoff of its energy supplies"324; 2) and a share of the 
proceeds from the sale to the US of HEU, extracted from former Soviet nuclear warheads dismantled 
in Russia; 3) and reimbursement for the fissile materials contained in nuclear weapons on Ukrainian 
territory.325 
In July 1993, the policy of Ukraine hardened. The Rada passed a new defense doctrine that 
claimed Ukrainian ownership of all nuclear weapons on its territory. Furthermore, Kravchuk said on 
July 30 that START I does not cover the 46 SS-24 ICBMs in Ukraine and Ukraine will retain those 
missiles after it ratifies the treaty.326 There were several reasons of the Ukrainian fickleness. The 
Nationalist Republican Party of Ukraine favored the retention of the weapons.327 The money 
Ukrainians had got was much less($175m) than what they had expected($2.8b).328 Also, Russia was 
in the uncertain political situation.329 Meanwhile, on Oct.25, 1993, Ukraine signed an umbrella 
agreement with the US, and thus, it could gain the Nunn-Lugar assistance that would help to remove 
the ICBMs and to burn liquid fuel safely.330 
Ukraine conceded more. The Rada on Nov. 18 ratified START I, but attached 13 conditions 
to its approval. Among the conditions, the Rada reiterated Ukraine's claim to ownership and 
'
24
 ACT, Jan./Feb. 1993, p.28. 
-^ This demand was added and requested in May 1993. ACT June 1993, p.25. 
326 
327 
ACT. Sep. 1993, p.25. 
FBTS, New Statesman and Society, Aug. 6, 1993, Vol 6, No 264, p. 15. Also, when the 
summit at Massandra, in Ukraine's Crimea, they proposed that Ukraine would turn over its half 
share of 300 ship ex-Soviet Black Sea Fleet, in exchange for the cancellation of Ukraine's debts to 
Russia ($2.5 b.), mostly for oil and gas. The nationalists accused Kravchuk of treason and 
demanded his resignation. The Economist. Sep. 11, 1993, p.53 . 
328 ACT. June 1993, p.25. 
j29
 The leaders in Kiev concerned that if Yeltsin were ousted from power, he would be 
replaced by a nationalist leader like Rutskoi, who has repeatedly asserted that the Crimea and 
Black Sea Fleet belong to Russia, not Ukraine. 
330 
'ACL Sep. 1993, p.30 and ACT Oct. 1993, p.21. 
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'administrative control' over the nuclear forces on its territory ,and said that Ukraine does not have 
a responsibility to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.331 At the end of the long- 
standing negotiation, on Jan. 14, 1994, the US, Russia, and Ukraine signed a Trilateral Agreement in 
Moscow to facilitate the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine. In exchange, Ukraine would get 
security assurances from both the US and Russia, including commitment to respect Ukraine's existing 
borders and refrain from economic coercion. In addition, Russia pledged to provide Ukraine nuclear 
fuel rods.332 Also, Ukraine joined the PFP (a NATO auxiliary); and the G-7, at its summit in Naples 
in July 1994, largely agreed to make available to Ukraine some $4 billion in economic assistance. 
Moreover, the United States promised, at the US-Ukrainian summit in Washington, an extra present 
of $200 million in economic aid, outside of $700 million assigned before.333 In return for this, the 
Rada, with the overwhelming vote (301-8), decided to join the NPT on November 16th, only days 
after the summit in Washington. Observing this, Garnett said, "The key to success in US policy 
toward Ukraine was the marriage of US nuclear non-proliferation policy with a broad-based policy 
that supported economic and political reform and addressed Kiev's security concerns."334 
b. North Korea 
Since the Korean War, North Korea has had strong fears of nuclear threats coming from the 
US nuclear presence in the South. In fact, the US has bluffed the use of a nuclear bomb against North 
Korea several times.335 Therefore, "such a presence arguably provides an incentive for the North to 
331 ACT. Dec. 1993, pp.17,26. 
332
 Actually, "as of the end of Oct. 1994, Ukraine has transferred over 300 warheads to 
Russia; Moscow provided Ukraine some 50 tons of nuclear fuel." Ian J. Brzrzinsid, "After a 
Rocky Start, US Relations with Ukraine are Improving," The Washington Post. Tuesday, Nov. 
22, 1994, p. A21. 
333
 The Economist Nov. 26, 1994, p.27. 
334Sherman W. Garnett, "Ukraine's Decision to Join the NPT." ACT. Jan./Feb. 1995, p. 12. 
333
 Peter Hayes exemplified several cases of US' bluffs. According to his article, the US 
threatened North Korea by proclaiming, demonstrating, exercising or moving weapons and forces; 
in 1966 and 1967 (planning conference), 1968 (Pueblo incident), 1975(after the Vietnam War), 
and 1979(evacuation of US forces in Korea). Peter Hayes, "American Nuclear Dilemma in 
Korea," pp.9-36 . 
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336 pursue the nuclear option, which, in turn, could be likely to ensure a South Korean response." 
Thus, North Korea has developed its nuclear program with the help of the Soviet Union in the early 
stages. The program culminated in the mid-1980s with the completion of a medium-size nuclear 
reactor, a gas-cooled graphite reactor, built by the North Koreans themselves at Yongbyon. 
Pyoungyang signed the NPT in Dec. 1985. By 1991, however, refused to sign a comprehensive 
safeguards agreement with the IAEA. North Korea pointed to two major roadblocks; US nuclear 
weapons in South Korea and Team Spirit' exercises.337 Throughout 1991, Washington and Seoul 
tried to deprive Pyoungyang of those excuses. As a result, on Dec.31, 1991, the two Koreas signed 
an agreement(the Declaration of NWFZ) banning nuclear weapons on the peninsula. 
Only one month after then, North Korea signed a full scope safeguards agreement with the 
IAEA. It would require Pyongyang to accept IAEA inspections and monitoring of all its nuclear 
facilities and activities.338 The first inspection was conducted from May 25 through June 7, 1992. 
After the inspection, Hans Blix told reporters at his news conference that "if the building at 
Youngbyon were completed, he had no doubt the IAEA would consider it a reprocessing plant."339 
Concerned about evidence that North Korea had lied to the IAEA about its plutonium stocks, on 
Feb.25 the agency called for special inspection of two suspect sites. 
The response of Pyongyang was very firm. On Mar. 12 North Korea announced that it decided 
to withdraw from the NPT. North Korea claimed that the resumption of Team Spirit was "a nuclear 
war rehearsal," and the demand of special inspection of its "military sites" as the reasons for its 
withdrawal.34" Moreover, Pyoungyang received indirect support from China. On Mar.22, Chinese 
president Qian Qichen stated his country's opposition to the application of any direct UN-related 
pressure against North Korea. 
336
 P. Polomka, "The Two Koreas; Catalyst for Conflict in East Asia?" Adelphi Paper 208. 
London, Summer 1986, p.51. 
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 ACT July/Aug. 1993, p.8. 
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However, progress was restarted by the "carrots" of the US. On June 11, 1993, the US and 
North Korea signed the "first-ever" joint declaration which contained the North Korea's suspension 
of its decision to withdraw from the NPT and its admission to the "impartial application of full-scope 
safeguards," with the exchange of US promises to cancel 'Team Spirit' exercise, to allow North 
Korean inspections of US bases in the South, and not to attack or threaten to attack North Korea 
with nuclear weapons.341 Also, in July, after the bilateral talks with North Korea, the US said it was 
prepared to support the introduction of LWRs (Light Water Reactors) and to explore with North 
.Korea ways in which LWRs could be obtained.342 But, in August Pyongyang impeded the special 
inspection and demanded further discussions with the US. The North Koreans might feel they had 
conceded too much too easily, or that they could acquire more carrots from the US.343 
Tedious 'on-again-off-again' negotiations followed. On Feb. 15, 1994, North Korea agreed to 
accept inspections of its seven declared nuclear facilities and signed a four part agreement, which 
appeared to form the basis for a third round of talks. In March, nevertheless, IAEA inspectors at the 
reprocessing facilities in North Korea were blocked again. As a result, Washington canceled the third 
round talks, and on Mar.31 the Security Council issued a statement calling on North Korea to honor 
its non-proliferation commitments. Despite the hard pressure of the US, the presidential statement 
of the Security Council became milder than what the US had expected, because of China's threats to 
veto any resolution and its opposition to any tough language against the North.344 On June 10, the 
IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution which deplored North Korea's failure to implement 
essential elements of its safeguards agreement and ended all non-medical technical assistance with the 
341ACT, July/Aug. 1993, p. 19. 
342
 ACT, Sep. 1993, p.21. 
343
 Wolfsthal, a senior analyst of Arms Control Association (AC A), said at the ACA news 
conference on May 5, "At this point, the focus of the dialogue changed. Until then, IAEA had 
been trying to acquire historical information about Pyongyang's nuclear program, dating to the 
beginning of its activities. When North Korea began to restrict regular IAEA inspections, the US 
was forced to negotiate just to get Pyongyang to live up to basic, regular inspections to maintain 
the continuity of safeguards and to make they were not losing ground." ACT. June 1994, p. 18. 
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North worth approximately $500,000. On June 13, in response to the IAEA, North Korea withdrew 
from the IAEA. The tension increased sharply. On June 16, the US Senate approved an amendment 
calling on the US to "immediately take all necessary and appropriate actions" to enhance its ability 
to "deter and, if necessary, repel an attack from North Korea."345 
At this point, former president Carter met with Kim II Sung. The scene was suddenly changed 
again. On June 18, Kim said that he had intention to meet Kim Young Sam, the President of South 
Korea, as soon as possible and to freeze all nuclear activities.346 Even though Kim II Sung died 
abruptly, the US-North Korean high level talks resumed in August, and the two sides agreed the basis 
for a "final resolution of the nuclear issue."347 North Korea promised not to produce any additional 
nuclear weapons-usable materials or reprocess any of the 8,000 spent fuel rods now in storage in a 
cooling pond. In return for the continued freeze, the US was to provide North Korea LWRs and 
alternative sources of energy until the LWRs are completed.348 
Eventually, the two sides reached an accord on Oct.21, 1994. North Korea agreed to 
eliminate its nuclear reactors and seal and permanently cease operations at its plutonium reprocessing 
facilities. Also, it agreed to allow 8,000 spent fuel rods to be removed to a third country once 
components for the first reactor are delivered. In exchange, the US would arrange for the 
construction of two proliferation-resistant 1,000 megawatt LWRs at a cost of approximately $4 
billion and would normalize economic and diplomatic relations with Pyongyang, which Japan will 
follow. In addition, the US also agreed to supply 3.65 million barrels of heavy oil per year to North 
Korea to compensate for projected lost electricity production. 
However, there are several negative assessments ofthat accord. The Economist enumerated 
them very concisely.349 First of all, the fuel rods in the North could act as another bargaining card. 
345
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Secondly, North Korea will not obligate to the NPT "until the promised LWRs are ail-but built - 
perhaps five years from now. Which is where the real trouble starts." Also, there is still an unresolved 
question of "past cheating." 
2 . Comparative Analysis 
Ukraine has succeeded in arousing the interests of the West, especially the US, in its security and 
economic matters. The leaders of Kiev could not expect to get security assurance and economic aid 
from Moscow. With this conception, one can say Ukraine's nuclear venture was worthy of doing in 
order to attract US' attention which has been mainly directed toward Russia. However, there are still 
many sources of conflicts with Russia. Furthermore, it is not believed that Ukraine will be able to 
bargain with its nuclear warheads again in the near future in order to get more concessions. 
On the contrary, even though the nuclear program in North Korea is proclaimed to be ended, the 
leaders of Pyongyang can still turn the direction of the results. 
a. Threats Perceived 
For the Ukrainians, Russia has been the greatest and the most imminent threat to their 
independence. Russians have never thought Ukraine as a independent state, since Kiev has been one 
of the oldest Slavic cities. Thus, "For Ukraine, [the CIS] is a temporary arrangement of convenience, 
primarily designed to facilitate a civilized divorce between Russia and Ukraine. For Moscow, [it] is 
a more or less permanent institution, intended to facilitate a painless political transition toward a 
union and legitimize Russian economic, political, and even military dominance over the countries of 
the former Soviet Union."350 Mr. Kravchuk said that Ukraine would continue to remain "in bed with 
an elephant. This is a nightmare. I am afraid that I might accidentally wake him up."351 
Moreover, during 1992-1993 Russian security policy towards former Soviet republics shifted 
towards a more conservative and interventionist agenda - a "Russian Monroe Doctrine."352 In 
35(1
 Paula J. Dobriansky, "Ukraine; A Question of Survival," The National Interest, 
Summer 1994, p.66. 
331
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addition, the issues of the Black Sea Fleet, dual citizenship and the large Russian minority in Ukraine, 
a "cold-war" between Ukrainian and Russian central banks, Russian threats to cut its energy supplies, 
and the territorial dispute over Crimea all enhanced the Ukrainian perception of threats. Thus, the 
nuclear venture of Ukraine "represents an attempt to demonstrate to the West that the question of 
national security is of paramount importance to Ukraine."353 As for Ukrainians, nuclear weapons were 
a valuable bargaining chip "to gain the attention of NATO and the nuclear weapon states, ensure that 
Ukraine will not be forgotten once the nuclear weapons are gone, and achieve security guarantees 
.against the colossus to the north" as well as to acquire economic compensations.354 
On the other hand, the North Korean causes of the nuclear venture seems to be more 
domestically originated ones. In the first place, the economic hardship of North Korea was the critical 
factor for deciding its behavior. Nowadays North Korea suffers from lack of oil and other materials 
needed to operate factories.355 Secondly, Pyongyang's military capabilities also are waning compared 
to the South. This result is originated from asymmetrical economic development. SIPRI data explicitly 
reveals South Korea has overtaken North Korean military expenditures, since 1972, and moreover, 
1992, the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences drew up a confidential 
document that proposed new policies toward the former Soviet Republics. The document argued 
that Russia should isolate Ukraine and restrict its economic growth and independence. See; Taras 
Kuzio, op. cit. pp.4-12. 
John Jaworsky, The Military-Strategic Significance of Recent Development in Ukraine. 
p.131. 
354 William H. Kincade and Natalie Melnyczuk, "Eurasia Letter; Unneighborly neighbors," 
Foreign Policy. Spring 1994 No 94 p 88 
355 
' Ed Paisley, "Prepared for the Worst," The Far Eastern Economic Review Feb. 10, 
1994, p.23. This magazine reported that "North Korea's agricultural output declined by 9% in 
1993, to 3.88 million tons from 4.27 tons the year before. — Still, the country needs to mine 52 
tons of brown, or anthracite, coal a year to provide 84% of the country's energy needs at close to 
full capacity. But in 1993 the nation produced only 29 million tons of brown coal." Also, See; 
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the situation. "Motionless construction cranes droop over abandoned building projects, foreigners 
in the capital say the paralysis is due to mainly lack of Russian oil and former-East-bloc spare 
parts: North Korea's old suppliers now want dollars instead of barter goods." 
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in 1991 the gap was expanded to the point that the South expended four times as much as the North 
did.356 
Besides these domestic problems, the American nuclear presence in the South had been a 
great threat to North Korea, as previously mentioned. Also, potential regional instability was another 
impetus to proliferation. Even if one presumes that there is no willingness to pursue nuclear 
development in North Korea, there are still many inducements to nuclear proliferation in Northeast 
Asia. The primary concern is Japan's rearmament. A secondary concern is that, in the wake of the 
Cold War, North Korea lacks a plausible "nuclear protection" of either Russia or China. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia wants to sell its old weapons to Southeast 
Asian countries, which can threaten the oil communication line of Japan. Also, this peril of being 
suffocated, in these days, has been emphasized by the consolidation of Chinese naval power in the 
South China Sea, and stimulated Japan to rearm. Moreover, gradual evacuation of US troops from 
this region, might give an incentive to Japan rearm. As a matter of fact, as for Japan, in long term 
perspective, there is little reason not to have nuclear weapons when she considers the potential 
nuclear threats of China and Russia, the latter of which is still classified as the most dangerous 
potential enemy due to the friction of the Northern territorial debate.357 
Therefore, one can say that both Ukraine and North Korea chose the nuclear option for their 
survival. However, there is a point of difference. Ukrainians perceived the threats from Russia as 
direct and imminent ones to their independence. Meanwhile, North Korea perceived relatively less 
threat from outside, thus, at least at that time, the biggest concern of Pyongyang was not whether it 
remain independent or retains sovereignty over its territory, but whether the regime is to be 
356
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successfully succeeded and is able to open its market without harming itself.358 On the basis of this 
conceptualization, therefore, one can say North Korea had greater freedom of maneuver than 
Ukraine, when it chose the nuclear option. 
b. Socio-political Aspect 
The apparent difference between Ukraine and North Korea is the socio-political context. 
Ukraine is composed of several nationalities, while North Korea is an unitary nation state. According 
to the 1989 population census, Ukrainians in Ukraine marked 72.7%, and Russians 22.1%.359 The 
more important thing is growing nationalism and the increase of mistrust among the variety of ethnic 
groups, especially over the Crimean issue. Furthermore, this cleavage has directly affected the 
political disharmony.360 Even though the voices of the Rada on the nuclear issue was relatively 
consistent, there is no doubt that the ethnic cleavage diminished the bargaining power of nuclear 
warheads. 
c. Military Aspect 
In the military aspect, there is also comparable difference between the two countries. Russia 
has overwhelmingly superior military power to Ukraine in all aspects of conventional and nuclear 
power. Meanwhile, North Korea still maintains a quantitative superiority over the South. Pyongyang's 
vast and forward-deployed forces, which have large-scale armored and artillery units for use in a 
blitzkrieg attack are enhancing the bargaining power of its nuclear card. Also, if one considers the 
underground tunnels in the DMZ (De-militarized Zone), one cannot underestimate the possibility of 
North Korea's military attack against US's firm response.361 In addition, North Korea has about 
358 
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100,000 well-trained guerrillas, and it is not believed that even the most accurate smart bomb could 
penetrate and destroy the underground facilities of North Korea covered by granite mountains.362 
On the contrary, Ukraine has ethnic problem even in the military. Nearly half of the Ukrainian 
Armed Forces are composed of Russian officers, and moreover, "the majority of these officers are 
positioned in key influential billets, with 53% with Russian background working at the Ministry of 
Defense. Additionally 90% of generals are ethnic Russians as well as approximately 80% of all the 
officers in the Air Force. "363 
d. Nuclear Technology 
Ukraine inherited its nuclear warheads from the Soviet Union. So, it can be said that they may 
not even have really had a nuclear card to play. Kincade and Melnyczuk considered them "virtually 
useless to Ukraine," and said that "Gaining physical and effective operational control of them would 
probably be beyond Ukraine's technical capacity and would risk Russian military reprisal."364 Also, 
it is said that "The missiles in Ukraine are more suitable for striking the US rather than Russia, and 
Russia might possibly leave behind disabled, rather than functional, nuclear weapons."365 Furthermore, 
there are other inabilities and weaknesses of Ukrainian technology. For example, it was reported that 
"Some Ukrainian ICBMs have overrun scheduled inspection and maintenance dates and that 
popular South Korean daily newspaper, that it reported there were 18 additional underground 
tunnels in DMZ, except for 4 tunnels which had been found until then. See; The Chosun Ilbo. 
Nov. 14, 1986. 
362
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scheduled technical servicing of nuclear weapons have been violated."366 Also, Ukraine lacks the 
capability of producing bomb-making quantities of HEU of plutonium, and is dependent on Russian 
spare parts or technical expertise to maintain its Arsenal.367 
On the other hand, the North Korean nuclear program is indigenous. It has built two nuclear 
reactors and one plutonium separation facilities with its own hands, and also, has three nuclear 
research centers. Since these capabilities are not to be easily acquired, the development of the North 
Korean nuclear program seemed to be more threatening to the world community, especially to the 
IAEA and the NPT 
e. Experiences of International Negotiations 
Another variable to compare both countries' ventures is the experience of international 
negotiation. Historically, Ukraine has had few opportunities to sit at the negotiation table with other 
nations, except for Russians. Moreover, Ukraine just became independent when the leaders of Kiev 
began to bargain with Russia and the US. Therefore, it is not irrational to say that Ukrainian 
diplomatic skill was embryonic. Jack Mendelsohn pointed out the inability and confusion of Kiev, 
saying "Ukraine needed security assurances, compensation and economic assistance. Unfortunately, 
the demands were not always specific. The amount of money required varied; the scope of the 
assurance continued to expand; and also they had a number of demands that were clearly not going 
to be met."368 
On the contrary, North Korea has much experience in international negotiations, especially 
with the US. The leaders of Pyongyang had met with Americans at least three times, for negotiating 
over the emergent issues of the Pueblo incident in 1968, the EC-121 incident in 1969, and the Axe- 
slaying incident in 1976, before the nuclear issue was put on the table. If one examines the three 
cases, he could find that North Korea was a very smart and competent bargainer. In addition, North 
Martin J. Dewing, "The Ukrainian Nuclear Arsenal; Problems of Command, control, 
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Korea has skillfully hidden its nuclear development. Camouflaging its ability to its counterparts, 
bluffing to attack the South when its sovereignty or security is threatened, Pyongyang has managed 
to keep the initiative in negotiations.369 
/. Collective Security System 
Ukraine has continually sought to put its Russian problem in an international context, 
"increasing bilateral relations with all of the former Soviet republics, searching for allies jointly to 
confront Russia, increase Ukraine's integration with Central Europe and the West, build up its state 
apparatus and make Ukraine's presence known on the international stage. "370 Ukraine proposed the 
establishment of the Baltic-Black Sea Zone' or 'CEESSA(Central and Eastern European Stability and 
Security Area)'. However, it was doomed to fail due to, at least, three reasons. First of all, "Russia 
regards any Ukrainian alliance with the other ex-communist states-perhaps linked to NATO-as an 
anti-Russian coalition unless it too is not included."371 Secondly, knowing the anxiety of Russia, 
Ukraine's neighbors worry about that if they involve into the collective system, they would be 
automatically engaged in Kiev's quarrel with Moscow, and moreover, they are much lured by the 
West, NATO and EU.372 
On the other hand, North Koreans take advantage of the weak basis for collective security 
system in the Northeast Asia. A very concise explanation was made by Michael Mazarr: "Collective 
security organization in Asia could promote peace and allow the US to reduce its military presence 
on the area. Constructive discussions would have been unlikely, however, in an atmosphere of 
tension, especially when Russia and China held different opinions from the US on how to deal with 
369An Ed-op article of HKJBCThe Korea Times) on Mar. 13, 1994, commented that "The 
US and South Korea just made the North retreated to the posture of Mar. 11, 1993; the situation 
that North Korea reversed its declaration of withdrawal from the NPT." Using the term "the 
retreat of 24 hours," the article credited North Korea's negotiation skill. 
370Taras Kuzio, "Russia-Crimea-Ukraine; Triangle of Conflict," p. 13. 
371William Kincade and Natalie Melnyczuk, "Unneighborly Neighbors," pp.84-85. 
372Stephen J. Blank, "Proliferation and Nonproliferation in Ukraine; Implications for 
European and US Security," US Army War College. July 1994, pp. 1-31. 
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North Korea. "37j In addition, mutual distrust between Japan and other Asian countries diminishes the 
possibility of cooperation among them.374 
g. A Powerful Sponsor? 
Ukraine never had a strong sponsor during its nuclear venture. Besides Eastern and Central 
European states, even the West did not back up Ukraine. When Yeltsin said that "We are at one time 
creating the CIS and statehood in each new state. This is obviously a different process, but it is only 
skeptics who say the CIS was needed only to dismantle the old union," the West backed Russia, 
"labelling Ukraine the spoiler republic for opposing reintegration of the former Soviet republics."375 
On the contrary, North Korea was supported by China throughout the process of the 
negotiation. As for small states who inherently lack the alternatives to pick up as a bargaining card, 
the existence of a powerful sponsor could be great encouragement in morale as well as be physical 
reinforcement. 
Generally speaking, there are two alternatives for small states to survive, bandwagoning and 
balancing. Since small states are generally not able to depend only on their own power, they have to 
maintain mutually advantageous relationships with the powerful. When the linkage is disconnected 
or threatened to be disconnected, or when small states cannot take any advantage from it, or when 
they need to get more advantages from the powerful, they must seek other alternatives. 
Unfortunately, however, most small states have few and unattractive options. 
Then, what principles should small states keep in mind in order to arouse the interest of 
sponsoring greater powers to help in achieving their goals? First of all, small states should set up clear 
and acceptable objectives before they sit at the negotiation table, because they are restricted during 
the bargaining process. Second, they have to make counterparts know their objectives, while 
373Michael J. Mazarr, "Lessons of the North Korean Crisis," ACT. July/Aug. 1993, p.10. 
,74Friedberg argued that even economic or cultural linkage in the region is very weak and 
undeveloped. He said they "lack both a recent memory of cooperation and a tradition of thinking 
of themselves as members of distinct political entity."  See; Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry; 
Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security. Vol 18, No 3, Winter 
1993/1994, pp.15-25. 
375 Taras Kuzio, "Russia-Crimea-Ukraine; Triangle of Conflict," p.8. 
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concealing their restrictions and weaknesses, even with the use of bluff and camouflage. To do this, 
it may be required that they have the ability to threaten the interests of the counterparts^', e. taking 
hostages, threatening regional stability essential to greater states, and so on). Third, small states 
should develop positive bargaining cards which can induce counterparts not to be extremely firm or 
to give up the negotiation. Fourth, small states must keep a strong sponsor on their side. Without a 
doubt, this will offer them bargaining power and information about the counterparts' strategies. 
3 . Analysis 
Simply, the demise of the Soviet Union was a very significant incident for both Ukraine and North 
Korea. Ukraine could achieve its independence and North Korea became to have greater freedom of 
maneuver. The North Korean regime, however, became more vulnerable to influence from outside, 
to keep its regime consolidated, to bargain with the west, and to reduce its vulnerability it has tried 
to use its increased freeom of maneuver. Because those two countries had not connected with the 
West and belonged to the Communist bloc exclusively, it can be said that they were under the 
hegemonic system during the Cold War era. Then, released from the control of a hegemon, they came 
to have greater freedom of maneuver, and at the same time, to be more vulnerable to external threats 
(Hypotheses I & II). The option taken by them for reducing this vulnerability was not allying with 
other powers, as most countries do, but defying the world order and bargaining for advantages. This 
bargaining depended not only on the capability of each state but also on the international (either 
regional or global) system. As surveyed, the important thing to decide the character of bargaining was 




A . IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORIES : THE COMPARISON OF THE TWO THEORIES 
Both hegemonic theory and balance of power theory can be applied to figure out the significance 
and role of small states in the international system. Theoretically, however, in a hegemonic system 
a small state has no choice but to follow the will of a hegemon. The case of Far Eastern states largely 
controlled by the Chinese Empire illustrates the argument. On the other hand, as the power of the 
Chinese Empire decreased and the involvement of Russia and other western powers grew in the late 
•nineteenth century, small states in the region came to have several alternatives. Thus, it is not until 
a hegemonic power begins to decline that a small state is to be regarded as a somewhat important 
player in international politics. There is also another shortening of hegemonic theory with regard to 
small states. Hegemonic theory is principally concerned with great powers, especially about the 
hegemon and its challengers. Thus small states are usually ignored by the hegemonic theorists.376 
Nevertheless, hegemonic theory gives us a very clear understanding of the changing process of 
the international system. Noting the recurrent patterns of systemic change, one can find which stage 
of development he is on. Then, he could predict the direction of the change. Knowing the changing 
nature of international system and believing the future decline of the contemporary hegemon and the 
rise of a new challenger, a small state would endeavor to figure out the particular time to switch 
patrons and to search out the most viable challenger among would-be hegemons. These are the most 
important questions for small states' policies. However, unfortunately, the use of only hegemonic 
theory can not lead one to find answers. Here is the most serious limitation of hegemonic theory for 
small states, while, on the other hand balance of power theory is quite useful in many ways. 
The biggest merit of balance of power theory is that it is applicable to all states no matter how 
great their power is in a certain international system. It offers a paradigm explaining and predicting 
movement of states in general not only at the global level, but also at the regional level. From the 
perspectives of small states, the comparison of the two structural theories can be summarized, as in 
376For example, Gilpin in his book did not mention small states to develop and consolidate 
his hypotheses. See; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (1981). 
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Table 4, using the four categories: the unit of analysis (main actor), and three functions of theory 
explanation, prediction, and description.377 
Table 4 : The Comparison of The Two Structural Theories 
HEGEMONIC THEORY BALANCE OF POWER THEORY 
MAIN ACTOR A Hegemon and Challengers A State 
EXPLANATION Causes and Processes of change 
in Leadershipof the International 
System 
Behavior Patterns of States in A 
Certain Environment 
PREDICTION The Next Steps of International 
Order, such as Stability and 
Change, Growth and Expansion, 
Equilibrium and Decline, and 
Hegemonic War and Change 
The Policy of States to Meet Others' 
Policies (especially, when this means 
a threat to the former.) 
DESCRIPTION Under the control of a 
hegemonic power, the 
international system is stable. 
Monopoly of power is the most 
important factor for the stability 
of the system. 
With more than one great power, 
international system is stable. 
Equilibrium of power among states 
is the most important factor. 
  
In addition, the cases previously surveyed reveal the validity of this argument as in the following. 
Table 5 : The Comparison of the Validity of the Hypotheses 
HYPOTHESIS I: If the international system is stable, that is, if a predominant power controls the whole system firmly, 
there is little choice for small states but to bandwagon to the hegemonic power. 
HYPOTHESIS II : The more unstable the dominance of the hegemonic power, the greater the importance of small 
states, but the more dangerous to their security, or even survival. 
HYPOTHESIS III: If the division of strength between (or among) great powers is almost even - if the system is in 
tension and there is a state of conflict, that is if the balance of power context is at stake, or if all great powers are weakened 
or not willing to take part in the balance of power system, the significance of small states increases and so does their freedom 
of maneuver in foreign policy. On the other hand, fee greater the gap between (or among) great powers, the less the powerful 
pa\- attention to small states. 
HYPOTHESIS IV : If "great powers are oriented toward maintaining the Status Quo, or when no agreement can be 
7Kenneth Waltz, The Theory of International Politics (1979) pp. 1-17. 
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reached between (or among) them, they neutralize each other (or one another) and thus strengthen the position of small 
states. [But,] if they can reach an agreement, it would be disadvantageous to small states," and thus, small states' concerns 
are likely to be ignored. 
HYPOTHESIS V: The less the number of the balancing great powers (or group of nations), the more the significance 
of small states, because a great power is generally "interested in a balance which is in her favor" - "balance of disequilibrium" 
and is thus willing to aggregate power by allying with the greatest one among others not involved in alliance with her. 
HYPOTHESIS VI : Therefore, from the viewpoints of small states, the more competitive and the more balanced the 
international system, the more advantageous to them, and thus, the more they are apt to pursue the policy of status quo (a 
kind of balancing behavior). Besides this, in this situation they can also seek to change the status quo by enticing a giant 
power's support (another type of balancing behavior). Accordingly, in the competitive system small states would prefer 
balancing to bandwagoning in order to maintain the favorable environment longer. 
HYPOTHESIS VII : Ironically, however, this movement, termed as the policy of "escapism" and "anti-balance of 
power," may accelerate the de-stabilization of the international system. 
Hegemonic Theory Balance of Power Theory Small States' Policy 
Hypothesis # I II III IV V VI VII 
Concert of Europe X X X 
Interwar X* X* X X X X X 
Cold War X X a X X 
Post-Cold War X** Y** b X c 
X = Hypothesis Confirmed 
* It is true that in the interwar period small states were released from the control of great 
powers. But they were not released from a hegemonic power because there was not a truly 
predominant power during the nineteenth century. Great Britain was not predominant on the 
Continent. Germany and Russia were still vulnerable to the Royal Navy at sea. Thus, through 
the case study ofthat period Hypothesis I and II were supported by the release of control from 
great powers' agreements to exploit small states not by the collapse of a particular hegemon. 
** However, the cases of Ukraine and North Korea are more applicable to hegemonic 
theory, because they were the clients of the Soviet Union and totally not connected with opposite 
power, the United States. The increase of their freedom of maneuver resulted from the demise 
of the their hegemon not from the break down of great powers' agreement to keep small states 
out of the scene. 
a: In the Cold War era there was no great power to balance against a Superpower. Also, 
the cohesiveness of them based on ideological consensus was firm enough so that switching 
blocs was unthinkable. Thus, it can be said that a Superpower did not have to sacrifice small 
states to concentrate its power to ally with great powers. Even if it was needed, small states 
would have been cared by a Superpower too, because a it had enough surplus of power. 
b andc. This is clear if one looks at the global system in terms of power politics. There is 
no power enable to challenge to the United States, even though it is too exaggerating to say that 
the contemporary system is a hegemonic system run by the United States. This is as close to 
hegemony as the system has ever come. 
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The above analysis reveals the greater validity of balance of power theory for small states than 
hegemonic theory. And also, it shows the greatest reliability of Hypothesis IV, because in most case 
studies it was validated. 
Consequently, one can say that it is more valuable for small states to look at the international 
system through the window of balance of power theory, and that the most important factor for 
enhancing the prestige of small states is the existence of great power disagreement, even if there is 
no equilibrium among great powers. 
. B . IMPLICATIONS FOR SMALL STATES POLICIES 
Then, what lessons can we get from the case studies, mentioned so far? First of all, a small state 
should figure out its position not only through the regional context but also through the global 
context of power relationships. Israel could keep its position, even though sometimes it was against 
the will of the United States, its exclusive sponsor, because she knew the limit of US alternatives. 
Small states are not producers of international system, but users. Like the users of a computer, they 
should follow the rule of the international system. However, as a competent user can maximize their 
usefulness through acknowledging all basic hardware set of a computer, small states can optimize its 
positions through understanding the global structure of international system. Sometimes, a regional 
threat can be an opportunity at the global level. 
Second, by the same token, small states should have the ability to balance between the long-term 
interests and the short-term ones.  That is, they should be able to compare the results of 
bandwagoning with the imminent threat, and of balancing against it. This is extremely hard to achieve. 
But, one should notice that in a certain situation a very small shift of state policy could bring about 
the change of the whole international structure. 
Third, and probably the most important, a small state should avoid being caught in a power 
vacuum. Because it means being a defenseless prey for great powers like the small states at the turn 
of the twentieth century, which fell into the hands of the colonial powers. Even more in the 
contemporary world, a power vacuum is the worst scenario for small states. Why? Let's look at the 
Balkans. Now, the West may not perceives vital interest in the region, and thus, it seems that they 
lack the intention to engage or settle the problems, such as can be seen in the calculations of Britain 
and the US in the interwar period. Therefore, the small nation-states in the Balkans can proclaim their 
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needs more freely and without any strong pressure to concede or negotiate. They are like children 
playing in the school yard without being supervised by a teacher. Also, for achieving their goals, they 
will try to make alliances with great powers or their enemy's neighbor, or religiously or ethnically 
fraternal countries. This effort may make the situation more complex. Without perceiving exactly, 
great powers may be dragged into the region. Let us assume the Greece-Bulgaria-Rumania-Serbia 
alliance based on the Orthodox Christian religion. What would be the responses of Turkey, Italy, and 
Russia? Great powers may become attracted by the existence of the 'power vacuum,' as time goes by. 
Then, compete for the chips. History does not repeat in the same way with the past. But, the 
important thing is that most decision makers of most of nations DO think about it much. 
Then, how can a small state avoid being caught in a power vacuum? Two different ways are 
conceivable. One is internal balancing. This means the enhancement of its defense power and of its 
attractiveness as an ally of great powers. With strong military power, however, can a small state 
attract a great power's attention. It should have some bargaining cards, especially economic 
inducements in exchange for security guarantee. The other is, of cause, external balancing. Not only 
for security but also for economic reasons, a small state should avoid bandwagoning to one power. 
Bandwagoning should be reserved as a last option for its survival. Yet, the balancing behavior also 
should be somewhat different between peacetime and in crisis. In peacetime, It is more beneficial for 
a small state to ally with more than two powers, especially if they (the powers) are expected to be 
hostile in the future crisis. That is, the Bismarckan alliance system is one of the most desirable for 
small states, if they take the positions of Germany, the center of the alliance web. Even though it is 
difficult to achieve, in peacetime it's not impossible to do. On the other hand, in crisis, in general, it 
would be more profitable for small states to balance against the imminent threat through allying or 
bandwagoning with the most powerful state among others. However, this behavior (bandwagoning 
to the most powerful or balancing against the imminent threat) should not violate the primary 
principle; "Don't forget to look at the global context." 
C . THE ROLE OF KOREA AS A BALANCER IN NORTHEAST ASIA : SUGGESTIONS 
FOR POLICY 
Northeast Asia has become a region where prosperity and uncertainty co-exist, especially since 
the collapse of the Cold War system. Rapid economic growth, juxtaposed with the end of ideological 
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confrontation, unleashed regional states from the leverage of the superpowers. Nonetheless, unlike 
in Europe, there are still gloomy expectations about the future of Northeast Asia. 
In general, there are two conflicting opinions. One is that "rapid national economic growth, and 
the shared feeling of power and entitlement that tend to go with it, may be at least as important a 
cause of expansionism."378 The other one is the neo-liberal view, focused on growing economic 
liberty - free market and trade, division of labor according to comparative advantage, and 
interdependence - and political liberty as well as the role of international organization.379 
Generally speaking, to predict and to prepare for the future one must be aware past experience. 
But this argument still has uncertainty. History has been changed continuously. So has the 
international political system. No one can say the future will be the same as the past beyond a certain 
point. From this perspective, one can avoid the failure to look at the "Forest" without failing to pay 
attention to each "tree." 
Then, what are the implications of the past and contemporary situation for the future of Northeast 
Asia? Is the future of the region really tenuous? And, what suggestions can be proposed to maintain 
peace in the region'? To answer these questions, at first, the author will examine the reliability and 
validity of contemporary threats through looking into the defense policies and military postures of 
Japan and China, and propose several policies for security cooperation in the region. 
1 . Is The Future Really Gloomy? 
Obviously, there are many unfavorable factors in the region;  l)historical distrust among nations, 
territorial disputes, 3)industrial development and economic growth patterns which might induce 
expansionism, 4)increasing military expenditures and possibility of arms race, 5)inexperience of 
cooperation, and 6)nuclear proliferation. But, these threats are not impossible to solve. 
a. Historical Distrust 
When Shin Sakurai, the former environment minister of Japan, denied that his country had 
waged an aggressive war in the 1930s and 1940s, the South Korean and Chinese governments at once 
? 
378Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry; Prospect for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," 
International Security. Vol. 18, No. 3 ( Winter 1993/94 ) p. 16. 
7,19-f Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability; East Asia and the United States after 
the Cold War," International Security. Vol. 18, No. 3 ( Winter 1993/94 ) p. 38. 
124- 
protested against Mr. Sakurai's remarks.380 Japan's harsh dominion during World War II left a deep 
scar on neighboring nations. So, many South Korean and Chinese people worry about Japan's 
growing power in terms of military and political position as well as economic size. This kind of 
distrust has kept region from a making multilateral security alliance such as NATO, even during the 
Cold War period. 
However, this argument has some weaknesses. Japan has changed since World War II. She 
is not prone to take an aggressive posture. By the same token, Japan has a very uncommon defense 
structure. Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) is not an independent ministry of government but a 
subordinate second agency directly controlled by the Prime Minister. Most of important decisions are 
made by the Security Council which includes second rank officials from the Foreign Affairs, Finance, 
and Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Therefore, "in the broadest sense, the 
Japanese notion of security makes no distinction between economic and military considerations,—in 
addition, industry seeks certain defense projects for their commercial spin-off and spin-on value."381 
Moreover, Japanese people have had the propensity for favoring the pacifist "Yoshida 
Doctrine." In a recent survey, concerning Japanese roles and responsibilities, 63.6% of respondents 
answered against Japan's commitment to the PKO type of international activities without drawing any 
demarcation between PKF and PKO in terms of enforcement structures.382 
Also, if one takes notice on the process of Franco-German military cooperation that 
culminated in the establishment of the 'Eurocorps,' he may see that no one can deny the possibility 
of military cooperation in Northeast Asia just with the excuse of historical experience. 
,8(l
"War Shadows," The Economist. Aug. 20, 1994, p.30. Also, on 7 June 1995, The New 
York Times reported that the Japanese parliament accepted to apologize their behavior during the 
World War II. However, it does not really mean an apology. The word 'Hansei' means a reflection 
and a remorse, which is sometimes used to correct the failure of the former experience (in this 
case, a remorse for the lost of the war). See; The New York Times. 7 June 1995, Al. 
381Tetsuya Kataoka and Ramon H. Myers, Defending an Economic Superpower; 
Reassessing the US-Japan Security Alliance. (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1989) p. xiii. 
382Takehiko Kamo, "National Security in Japan: Struggling between Continuity and 
Change," Pacific Focus. Vol. VII, No. 2, (Fall 1992), pp. 100, 111. 
- 125- 
b. Territorial Disputes 
Considering territorial disputes in Northeast Asia, there are relatively fewer issues than in 
Southeast Asia - 5 of all 25 issues in East Asia, according to Desmond Ball's calculation.383 Those are 
the dispute about the Northern Territories of Japan, the unresolved dispute between Japan and South 
Korea over the Liancourt Rocks (Tokdo) in the southern part of the Sea of Japan (East Sea), and the 
dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku (Diaoyutai) Islands in the East China Sea. 
Among them, the Northern Territories are the most visible obstacles to reduce the threat 
perception of Japan. The islands (Kunashiri, Etofuru, Shikotan, and the Habomai group) have been 
the source of political dispute throughout the post-war period and the dispute is the single issue 
preventing the conclusion of a full-scale peace treaty between Japan and Russia.384 
Secondly, the dispute over the Senkaku Islands also poses an immediate challenge to Japan, 
whose 1891 claim of sovereignty over the inhabited islands had gone largely unchallenged until China 
adopted the Territorial Waters Law. Brown explained, "China's aggressive pursuit of foreign oil 
exploration firms to drill the coastal waters thought to contain petroleum deposits puts it squarely in 
conflict with Japan's claim to sovereignty over the Senkaku and their surrounding waters."385 
Thirdly, the dispute over Tokdo has been a heated one between South Korea and Japan. The 
importance of this territory is based on the considerations of fisheries and military use. South Korea 
claims the sovereignty of these small islands on grounds of historical precedent, and a family of 
Korean lighthouse keepers reside there. 
383Desmond Ball, "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisition in the Asia-Pacific Region," 
International Security. Vol.18, No.3 (Winter 1993/94) pp. 88-89. 
384Michael W. Chinworth, "Japanese Security: The Participants and Their Concerns," in 
Inside Japan's Defense (Washington; Brassey's, 1992)pp.7-8. Another fine paper about this 
dispute is "Japan and The Northern Territories Dispute - Past, Present, Future," which was 
written by Richard deVilafranca; Asian Survey. Vol. xxxiii, No. 6, June 1993, pp.610-624. In this 
paper he had the propensity of supporting Russian argument rather than Japan's, comparing them 
in terms of debate between justice (Japan) and law (Russia). He thought that "the idea of 
resolving the dispute on the basis of law and justice by its nature suggests the possibility, and 
perhaps the necessity of compromise." See; Ibid., p.620. 
385T 
'Eugene Brown, "Japanese Security Policy in The Post-Cold War Era; Threat 
Perceptions and Strategic Options," Asian Survey. Vol. xxxiv, No.5, May 1994, p.436. 
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However, all these disputes are not serious, compared with other disputes in Southeast Asia. 
Furthermore, these "could be resolved through negotiation, possibly involving the institution of joint 
surveillance and development zones encompassing the areas of disputation."386 In addition, because 
the disputed territories lack material value, even though these issues are related with national pride, 
the conflicts for territorial sovereignty such as Yom Kippur War and the Falklands War are not likely 
to happen.387 One can easily agree on this argument if he consider costs and benefits of those 
conflicts. Also, one can be optimistic when observing the changed German conception. Robert Jervis 
said that Germans may "no longer seem to care that Alsace and Lorraine are French. "388 Therefore, 
the matter of territorial disputes depends on, in large part, mutual confidence building. 
c. Industrial Development and Economic Growth 
The Economist claims that "China's real GNP has grown by an average of almost 9% a year. 
By 1994, China's economy is almost sure to be four times bigger than it was in 1978; if China hits its 
targets, which are reasonable, by 2002 the economy will be eight times bigger than it was in 1978. "389 
Also, one report expected that "in terms of global trade, market size and sheer economic bulk, China 
is becoming a fourth pole in the international system."390 If they do, the long-term prospects for the 
balance of power - global as well as regional - would be fundamentally changed, because "If the 
country ever achieved a per-capita GNP just one-fourth that of the United States (about South 
Korea's ratio today), it would have a total GNP greater than that of the United States."391 
When other regional states see China's rapid growth, they cannot but be concerned. 
Especially, as for Japan, she fears that "[She] will lose its control over the international [or regional] 
386Desmon ball, "Arms and Affluence," p.87. 
387Aaron L, Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry," p.27. 
3xsRobert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics; Will It Reasonable the Past?," 
International Security. Vol.16, No.3 (Winter 1991/92) p.53. 
389
"China; The Titan Stirs," The Economist. 28 Nov. 1992, p.3 . 
390Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Rise of China," Foreign Affairs. Vol.72, No.5, (Nov./Dec. 
1993) p.61. 
39IRichard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability," p.52. 
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system, while the rising challenger (China) begins to flex its newfound muscle by demanding self- 
serving changes in the system. "392 
However, when one turns his eyes to inherent problems of China, he can find that the 
prospects for China are not necessarily bright. Many articles point out the potential problems of 
China; a high rate of population growth393; low quality of labor394; the possibility of fractionalization 
and continued state ownership of much of China's economy395; "bottleneck in the transportation, 
telecommunications and energy sectors; inflation, gaps between coastal province and the 
hinterland."396 
In addition, China's first priority is the economic growth which fundamentally needs foreign 
investment and political stability. An anecdote said by the former Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee 
Kuan Yew, reveals the present primary concern of Chinese people. 
"Two years ago I was in Gansu looking at 2,000-year-old Buddhist caves 
in grottoes. The governor turned up to accompany me. He was a Soviet- 
trained engineer, 51 years old, learning English. He was extremely keen to 
improve his tourist industry because Takeshida had visited the grottoes a year 
before and given money for a foundation to encourage Japanese scholar to 
study how Buddhism came to Japan along the Silk Road. He had been to 
Europe, America, Japan. He was keen to find out about tourism, the oil 
industry, oil rigs. He heard that we make oil rigs in Singapore. Could he sell 
us parts? At that age, at that level, deep in the northwest China, on the edge 
of the Gobi desert, he's thinking of development of tourism, oil rigs, drilling 
bits."397 
392Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon; China's Threat to East Asian Security," 
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994) p. 165 . 
393K.C.Yeh, "Macroeconomic Issues in China in the 1990s," The China Quarterly. No 131 
(Sep. 1992) pp.503-511. 
394Qui Shijin, "High-Tech Industrialization in China," Asian Survey. Vol xxxiii No 12 
(Dec. 1992), p. 1133. 
395Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon9" p. 153 . 
396Ji Guoxing, "The Multilateralisation of Pacific Asia: A Chinese Perspective," Asian 
Defense Journal, July 1994, p.23. 
397The Economist. 28 Nov. 1992, p. 18. 
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On the other hand, according to Ji Guoxing, there is a new pattern of economic organization 
in East Asia, called 'the dual-locomotive train pattern.' He explained, "For instance, the East Asian 
economy looks like a train climbing in mountainous regions, with Japan as the locomotive in the front 
drawing the train, and with China as the locomotive in the back pushing the train, and the train jointly 
driven forward by them."398 
This 'economy-priority-policy' was confirmed by the CCP's 14th Congress in October 1992, 
during which the conservative's apprehension of Huishi Dongxiang was discarded 399and several 
elderly hardliners lost their seats.400 The Congress also "endorsed the 'socialist market economy' as 
the new gospel - a phrase which can cover a multitude of meanings, but basically allows Guangdong 
and the other progressive provinces to carry on with deregulation and profit seeking."401 
On the other hand, there is another concern about Japan's demand for an active political role 
in world politics. One report, drafted by the LDP, claims that Japan should be a permanent member 
of the United Nations Security Council for the security of the world.402 This tendency makes the 
neighboring states nervous because the permanent seat will give Japan the Veto right. 
But, that kind of apprehension is also baseless. If one compares Germany's role in the security 
of the world after the Versailles Treaty in 1918, and then after the end of World War II, he can 
imagine that the most dangerous thinking is isolating and quarantining a country from the scene. It 
is natural, therefore, that, as economic superpowers, Japan and Germany should have a permanent 
398
 Ji Guoxing, "Multilaterlisation of Pacific Asia," p.23 . 
399This term means China is becoming a immediate ideological enemy of the West, led by 
the United States, because of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. 
400
 Ji Gouxing, "Multilateralisation of Pacific Asia," p.23 . 
401
"China: Pragmatism Pronounced," Asian Defense Journal. Jan. 1993, p.44. 
402
"Bridge to the 21th Century: A New Course of Politics," a report from the 21th Century 
Committee of the Liberal Democratic Party, p. 9. 
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seat. As getting a permanent seat, to the contrary, they will be bound by other powers like as one in 
the Concert of Europe in 19th Century.403 
d. Military Expenditures and Arms Race 
It would be incorrect to say that there is an arms race in the region, but it is true that regional 
states have been expanding and improving the quality of their armed forces for some years. The most 
worrying aspect is the fact that most improvements that have been achieved and that are planned 
involve naval and air forces which are the most suitable for projecting military force in a region where 
distances are great. 
Table 6 : Defense Expenditures and Percentage of GNP 1984-1993 
CHINA JAPAN N.KOREA S.KOREA TAIWAN 
1984 A 8.26(1.8) 11.6(1.0) 4.1(16.2) 4.49(5.9) 3.42(6.3) 
1984B 25.0(5.7) 24.0(1.0) 6.5(20.0) 7.39(5.1) 6.91(6.4) 
1985 A 8.56(2.1) 12.5(1.0) 4.2(16.0) 4.40(5.3) 4.46(6.6) 
1985 B 25.0(3.3) 25.2(1.0) 6.6(20.0) 7.85(5.1) 8.03(7.0) 
1986 A 8.51(2.0) 15.1(1.0) 4.3(15.7) 5.11(5.2) 5.02(5.8) 
1986 B 25.0(3.3) 26.4(1.0) 6.6(20.0) 8.44(4.8) 8.34(6.5) 
1987 A 8.15(1.9) 19.3(1.0) 4.2(15.3) 5.73(4.7) 5.50(6.3) 
1987 B 25.0(3.3) 27.8(1.0) 6.6(20.0) 8.63(4.3) 6.54(4.6) 
1988 A 7.27(1.9) 24.6(1.0) 4.6(16.2) 7.55(4.3) 6.71(5.5) 
1988 B 26.0(3.3) 29.1(1.0) 6.6(20.0) 9.27(4.2) 7.61(4.9) 
1989 A 6.67(1.6) 28.4(1.0) 4.2(14.8) 8.96(4.2) 8.18(5.5) 
1989B 25.0(3.3) 30.3(1.0) 6.5(20.0) 10.2(4.3) 8.92(4.3) 
1990 A 6.06(1.6) 28.7(1.0) 5.6(20.5) 9.38(3.8) 8.69(5.4) 
403> 
"Nevertheless, that kind of concert among the contemporary great powers will be 
different from that of the Concert of Europe, in terms of dealing with small states. The reason is 
that the contemporary world system is more legal-bound and more institutionalized. Above all, 
attacking even a small state costs too much to bear unlike the nineteenth century. 
130 
1990 B 27.0(3.3) 31.5(1.0) 6.2(20.0) 11.2(4.3) 9.43(5.4) 
1991 A 6.11(1.6) 32.7(1.0) 5.6(25.8) 10.2(3.6) 8.50(4.8) 
1991 B 26.0(3.3) 32,6(1.0) 4.7(20.0) 10.6(3.8) 9.75(5.2) 
1992 A 6.71(1.5) 35.9(1.1) 5.5926.4) 11.2(3.8) 10.3(4.9) 
A=( )fficial(national) data in current US dollars 
B=daia provided by US Amis Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) m constant US dollars, using 1991 exchange 
rates or conversion rates estimated by ACDA 
Source: The Military Balance, Asia: The Rise in Defense Capability 1984-1993 (Appendix, Map) 
(1) Military Posture of Japan 
Then, what about the military posture of Japan and China? What types of military 
construction are being pursued now? The composition of SDF can be apparently characterized as 
a 'defensive defense' force. As Table 7 shows, Japanese main forces are deployed in the Northern 
District. Considering Japan's geographical situation, it would appear that the SDF has to have 
Anti-Surface Missiles, a Marine Corps and Bombers in order to seize the initiative, and have 
deterrent or preventive power. But, it doesn't. In addition, it has few landing ships (6LST, 4Lct) 
and cargos(15C-130, 38CH-47, 30C-1) that are essetial for attacking. 
This means Japan's defense posture is not offensive but defensive. This characteristic is also found 
from the data which reveals US-Japan combined training in 1991.404 
Japan's defense policy has been the reflection of the overall US-Japanese relationship, 
in which the United States has been figured as the controlling power. One of the key purpose of 
United States'« occupation of Japan was to demilitarize the country so that it would not pose a 
threat in the future. This was clearly reflected in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which 
stated that, "—, the Japanese people forever renounce was as a sovereign right of the nation and 
404Michael W. Chinworth, "Performance of Japan-US Combined Training in FY1991," in 
Inside Japan's Defense, pp.230-232. Most of training were defensive such as Anti-Submarine, 
Air Defense, Electronic Warfare Training. See; Andrew K. Hanami, "The Emerging Military- 
Industrial Relationship in Japan and the US Connection," Asian Survey. Vol.xxxiii, No.6, June 
1993, pp.595-596. He cited an American military experts' comment that revealed Japan's training 
level is not high. 
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the threat or use of force as means of setting international disputes—, land, sea, and air forces, as 
well as other war potential, will never be maintained."405 By the same token, Shigeru Yoshida, the 
Prime Minister from 1948 to 1954, opted for the strategy under which Japan would accept the 
new Constitution and security treaty. Thus, he advocated the subordination of Japan's 
international posture to the requirement of national economic growth, and reliance on a moderate 
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AIR FORCE 470,000 44,700 
H-6(120),H-5(350), F-1(73),F-4EJ(21), 
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Source: The Military Balance 1993/94, p. 152-159 
In short, Japan's postwar defense policy was not made by its own doctrine for real self- 
defense. Japanese people, to the contrary, have had the propensity to favor the Yoshida Doctrine. 
So, almost all changes in defense policy resulted from external pressures, especially from the 
United States, and inner political debates which have been more inclined to economic problems. 
Surely, Japan has much power, including potential military power, but she still lacks a 
grand strategy for the long-term. Some scholars pointed out this weakness, saying "Without a 
long-term strategy, the powerful US-Japanese alliance, Japan's own defense effort and, indeed, 
Japan's direction in the world would be without chart of compass."407 
Consequently, Japan's security policy is still largely controlled by civilian officials who 
each have their own concerns.408 This arrangement has been endorsed wholeheartedly by Japan's 
postwar political and economic elites who, on the basis of its prewar experience, retain a 
profound distrust of the professional military. 
407Fred C. Ikle and Terumasa Nakanishi, "Japan's Grand Strategy," p.95. 
408Peter J.Katzenstein and Noburo Okawara, "Japan's National Security-Structures, 
Norms, and Policies," International Security. Vol.17, No.4 (Spring 1993), pp.92-93. Japanese 
security policies are formulated and implemented largely by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA), Finance(MOF), and International Trade and Industry(MITI), as well as JDA. With 
regard to the economic security issue, the MITI, the MOF and the MOFA determine the policy 
while in the military security matters they include the JDA. 
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In the second place, the Japanese believe that their economic might may be useful 
'substitute' for military power, enhancing global stability, provided the United States continued to 
buttress them militarily.409 This strong economic concern reinforces the strong political 
preferences against building up a powerful military. A rough estimate of the costs Japan would 
incur if it were to build a conventional military force commensurate with its economic strength 
and the size of its population suggests annual expenditures of 150 to 200 billion dollars for a 
decade - considerably more, that is, then current estimates of the economic costs of German 
unification in the 1990s.410 
Lastly, Japanese political leaders are anxious about Japan becoming a great power in 
the traditional sense because it will make other countries in the region unstable and stimulate them 
to pursue a spiral arms race.411 
(2) Military Posture of China 
On the other hand, Chinese armed forces, which feature a huge army had been mainly 
constructed to meet the Soviet threat. But, since 1985, they have changed their military policy 
emphasizing 'modernization.' 
The PLA appears to continue to reorganize, with the loss of some units. Nevertheless 
its equipment is not the most effective. "Artillery tubes wear out rapidly in heavy firing, 
compromising safety and accuracy. Tires on Chinese vehicles do not hold up, and drive trains and 
transmission break down with regularity."412 
The PLA Navy's recent build-up is remarkable. The Chinese Navy is acquiring a new 
class of destroyer(Zw/2w, or Type 052), upgraded version of the Luda-chss destroyers, a new class 
(Jiangwei) of missile frigates, and new classes of resupply and amphibious assault ships for 
409T l9Deger and Saadet, "The Asia-Pacific Region: the Emerging Powers," in Military 
Expenditure: The Political Economy of International Security. (Oxford, New York; Oxford 
University Press, 1990) p. 113. 
™Ibid. 
Takehiko Kamo, "National Security in Japan," p. 102. 411 
412T Larry M.Wortzel, "China and Strategy; China Pursues Traditional Great-Power Status " 
Orbis, Spring 1994, p. 171. 
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sustaining operations farther from shore and for longer periods.413 In addition, Chinese frigates 
and destroyers are equipped with sophisticated missiles such as HY-2(Sea Eagle; a radar homing 
and infrared homing anti-ship SSM), the Yingji(a. shorter-range, active radar homing missile) and 
PL-8 missile. However, despite of their modernization efforts, "the PLANavy still hard pressed to 
absorb new technology. Naval personnel are having trouble mastering the new, sophisticated 
system."414 An article in Far Eastern Economic Review reports that the first Luhu was returned to 
be rebuilt because the hull would not accept the LM 2500 engines.415 
Moreover, China lacks a redundant under way replenishment capability prerequisite 
for power projection. Wortzel said, "With only two Fuqing under way replenishment 
oilers(AORs) in China's inventory, the eighteen-ship task forces that China deployed in 1980 may 
still be about the limit that can venture out without forward operating bases. "416 This weakness 
stimulates the Chinese to seek a aircraft carrier.417 With regard to this matter, however, a scholar 
pointed out that China has neither the intention nor the ability to sustain the maintenance of the 
carrier group. He said, "The disintegration of the Soviet Union was due to its economy not to its 
lack of oceangoing fleet. That is sufficient lesson for China to learn."418 Therefore, whether China 
acquires a aircraft carrier or not, its implication would be inevitably limited. 
The PLA Air Force is planning to buy "72 SU-27 fighters, 300 MiG-31 interceptors 
under the manufacture license and SA-10 SAM for which an anti-ballistic missile capability is 
413Desmond Ball, "Arms and Affluence," p.86. 
414Larry M.Worzel, "China and Strategy," p. 164. 
415Far Eastern Economic Review. 1 Apr. 1993, p.9 . 
416Larry M.Wortzel, "China and Strategy," p. 167. 
4170ne report said, "China is negotiating the purchase of a Tbilisi class aircraft carrier 
named the Varyag, which is under construction at the Nikolayev south shipyard in the Ukraine." 
See; "Beijing's Secret Weapons," Asian Defense Journal. Nov. 1992, p. 101. 
4,!<Ji Guoxing, "The Multilateralisation of Pacific Asia," p.24. 
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claimed."419 This procurement is a bridge to develop indigenous fighter and combat aircraft 
manufactures aimed to make the B-6, a licensed version of the Soviet TU-16 twin jet Badger, and 
A-5 attacker.420 However, China is not yet able to master systems integration and engine design 
and manufacturing. Also, it lacks ground attack aircraft needed to landing operations.421 
Therefore, China's military capability is now being modernized, but it still lacks the capability to 
threaten other nations without "a warning time of a few years."422 
Defense policy in China has been changed since the end of the Cold War. Now, threats 
are defined in, aside from military security, economic, technical, and ideological dimensions. Also, 
the concept of'People's war' which emphasized protraction, attrition, large land maneuver and 
whole mobilization has gone. Instead ofthat, the new concepts are employed, "called Jubu 
Zhanahen (local war) and Tufa Shijian (contingencies) associated with quickness, surprise, short 
duration and limited scope, which requires high quality military training, lethality and variability of 
weapons used."423 For achieving these goals, China launched its National Defense Development 
Strategy (NDDS), which focused on defense science and technology instead of defense 
infrastructure construction. But, this kind of transition of defense policy is just a matter of course. 
As for undeveloped and developing countries, including Northeast Asian countries, the Gulf War 
was a shocking incident. When they saw the high-technology weapons through the CNN news, 
they might think there was no other way to defend themselves but to have or to keep enemies 
from having those capabilities. 
Nonetheless, the acquisition of high-technology weapons will not lead the region to an 
arms race. Desmond Ball explained very concisely, saying "This can be regarded as a healthy 
trend.— Since"the requirements for defense self-reliance cannot be defined without some 
419The Military Balance, p. 148 . 
420Larry M.Wortzel, "China and Strategy," p. 169 . 
421/A/tf, p.172. 
i22Ibid. 
423Weixing Hu, "China's Security Strategy in a Changing World," Pacific Focus. Vol viii 
No.l (Spring 1993) pp.119,125. 
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consideration of the capabilities possessed by neighbors and potential adversaries further afield, 
there must come a point when further acquisitions begin to generate counter-programs to the 
detriment of both self-reliance and regional security."424 
e. Inexperience of Cooperation 
Many reports point out the inexperience of cooperation among Northeast Asian countries 
as one of the prominent unfavorable factors for multilateral security cooperation. Friedberg 
argued that even economic or cultural linkage in the region is very weak and undeveloped. He 
said they "lack both a recent memory of cooperation and a tradition of thinking of themselves as 
members of distinct political entity."425 
In fact, unlike European case, in Asia, most treaties have been established on the basis of 
bilateral relationships. But, one should be cautious to conclude that Asian states lack the will or 
the ability to cooperate one another. Considering the recent history of Northeast Asia, one can 
find that there was no opportunity for them to make a foreign policy with their own sovereignty, 
except Japan from the end of 19th Century through the end of the Pacific War. Even before the 
regional states set up a full-fledged regimes, there were interruptions such äs the Civil War in 
China and the Korean War. Furthermore, the following ideological confrontation had been a 
bulwark for making a consensus among them. 
But, the whole atmosphere has been changed fundamentally. It is the first time for Japan 
and China to think through their foreign policy without the immediate threat from Russia, and to 
feel relatively enhanced freedom of maneuver. As for South Korea, now it has confidencein its 
own ability to defend itself from North Korea's threat. Thus, despite the concerns of many 
pessimists, Northeast Asian countries are now more readily consulting each other and discussing 
political and security issues. Yoichi Funabashi, a journalist of Asahi Shimbun, remarked "Since the 
end of the Cold War, some political commentators have suggested that Asia is being rediscovered 
424Desmond Ball, "Arms and Affluence," p. 104. 
423Aaron L.Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry," pp. 15-25. He distinguished Asia from Europe in 
terms of the prospects for the cooperation. He employed three levels of analysis - state, linkage, 
and costs and benefits - and compared Asia with Europe. But, his arguments agree too pessimistic 
so that he couldn't avoid some weaknesses. 
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or 're-Asianized.' On the contrary, the spirit of these times is predominantly affirmative and 
forward-thinking, not reactionary or nostalgic. The region is not being 're-Asianized;' it is being 
Asianized.—Economic vitality and interdependence have given Asia new confidence."426 Also, the 
possibility of cooperation was confirmed by the successful cooperation in Cambodia, where a 
Chinese lieutenant colonel had some supervisory role over a Japanese major.427 
/. Nuclear Proliferation 
No one can doubt that the most immediate threat to the security of Northeast Asia is 
North Korea's nuclear development program. As a political bargaining card rather than a military 
tools. North Korea may want to sell its program at the price of economic assistance and the 
normalization guaranteed by the West, especially by the United States and Japan. In a short-term 
view, this is the matter of a bargain at the negotiation table. But, considering this matter in a long- 
term view, one cannot but apprehend the possibility of Japan's pursuit of nuclear weapons. 
One report claims that the Chinese warn that "evolution of regional and international 
situation could compel Japan to develop nuclear weapons," citing three factors that could propel 
Tokyo to go nuclear; "l)North Korea's alleged nuclear capability; 2)the possibility of several 
nuclear-capable republics in the CIS; and 3)nuclear proliferation from the CIS to the Middle East, 
South Asia, and other regions."428 This apprehension was intensified by the fact that Japan planned 
and accomplished the first shipment of importing 50 tons of highly toxic plutonium from 
France.429 Also, another article reveals the secret document written by Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in 1969. On that document, it was revealed that the Foreign Policy Planning 
426-1 Yoichi Funabashi, "The Asianization of Asia," Foreign Affairs. Vol 72 No 5 (Nov/Dec 
1993)pp.77-78. 
427T 7David I. Hitchcock, Jr., "East Asia's New Security Agenda," The Washington Quarterly. 
Vol.17, No.l, Winter 1994, p.96. 
428i Bonnie S.Glaser, "China's Security Perceptions; Interests and Ambitions," Asian Survey 
Vol.xxxiii, No.3, Mar. 1993, pp.258-9. 
He excluded China's nuclear threat as one of factors threatening and stimulating Japan to 
develop nuclear bombs, maybe because he wrote the paper on the Chinese perspective. 
429ii 
"Tokyo's Import of Plutonium Threatens Region," Asian Defense Journal Julv 1992 
p.84. 
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Committee proposed the necessity of acquiring nuclear bomb technology and of the ability to 
reject the intervention of other nations when Japan tries to develop a nuclear bomb.430 
However, such a policy might well induce several other countries in the region to form an 
alliance against Japan. Moreover, it would have to overcome deeply embedded opposition from 
the nation's own people. Also, if Japan begins the nuclear development program, Ikle and 
Nakanishi claimed, "It would take some ten years or more to build a survivable nuclear force. If 
the decision were taken in response to a sudden threat to the nation, that ten-year delay would be 
far too long."431 
Therefore, there is little reason for Japan to pursue nuclear weapons unless the US- 
Japanese alliance system has no guarantee to protect her from nuclear or conventional threats. It 
is irrational to think Japan will discard its long-standing Yoshida Doctrine in the name of national 
pride, in spite of abandoning the benefits. 
On the other hand, China is a unique nuclear power in the region. Lewis and Hua reported 
that China is developing the DF-31, a mobile land-based version of the JL-2 SLBM, and projected 
that the new 8000-km range ICBM will become operational in the mid-to late 1990s. Also, they 
assert that Beijing is developing a three-stage solid propellant missile called the DF-41, which will 
be deployed between the year 2000 and 2010.432 This article also pointed out that China planned 
to develop MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles) for its mobile ICBMs.433 
As for its navy, China is expected to deploy the new 8000-km JL-2 SLBM on its second- 
generation 09-4 Xia class nuclear-powered submarine in the mid- to late 1990s.434 
430,1
 Japan's Secret Document; to have a nuclear bomb," The Korea Times (Hankuk Ilbo). 2 
Aug. 1994. 
431Fred Charles Ikle and Terumasa Nakanishi, "Japan's Grand Strategy," Foreign Affairs. 
Vol.69. No.3, Summer 1990, p.91. 
432Lewis, J.W. and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs: technologies, strategies, 




Table 8 : C hinese Nuclear Forces, 199343S 
LAND BASED SEA TACTICAL 
MISSILE BASED BOMBS NUCLEAR TOTAL 
BOMBERS MISSILE WEAPONS 
H-6(120) DF-3/3A (50) JL-1 (24) 150 150 434 
H-5 (30) DF-4 (20) 
Q-5 (30) DF-5/5A (4) 
DF-21/21A(36) 
Source: Chinese Nuclear Forces, 1964-1993, Nuclear Databook Volume v (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994) 
p.359 
Besides, according to the expectations of the recently published "Nuclear Databook 
Volume V, China (l)will continue to maintain a triad of nuclear forces; land-based-missiles, 
bombers, and sea-based-missiles; (2)will improve the survivability of the missile forces by 
reducing the prelaunch time period, to find less vulnerable basing modes, and to make general 
improvements in accuracy, guidance, and control; (3) will probably devote a declining share of its 
national budget to military programs in general and a steady portion to nuclear weapons 
maintenance and development; (4) However, a significant increase in nuclear weapons funding or 
research and development is not anticipated.436 
Consequently, China is considering nuclear weapons as very useful for achieving 
deterrence. Thus, she will maintain a nuclear force and develop the technology. But, there is no 
reason for China to spend too much money for those objectives, because the main purpose of 
doing that is becoming more dependent on economic concerns. 
As surveyed so far, Northeast Asia is confronted with many problems. But, they are not 
unpredictable or insoluble. Historical distrust can be overcome by establishing transparency of 
each nation's security policy. Territorial disputes could also be resloved by negotiation rather than 
43:,Current number of warheads of other nations are like the following: the United States 
(10,500 active, 6,000 awaiting disassembly), CIS (15,000 active, 17,000 awaiting disassembly), 
Britain (200), and France (524). 
4j6Robert S.Norris, Andrew S.Burrows,and Richard W.Fieldhouse, "British, French, and 
Chinese Nuclear Weapons," Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume V (San Francisco- Westv'iew 
Press, 1994)pp.372-376. 
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confrontation in terms of costs and benefits. In addition, except for North Korea, the regional 
states' military postures are still defensive, and there is no immediate threat of expansionism. 
Expansionism is just one of many possible scenarios. Even North Korea doesn't have the ability to 
wage all-out war against the South with reasonable prospect for success. This argument can be 
applied to the matter of nuclear weapons proliferation in the same way. Also, the problem of 
inexperience of cooperation is now being solved by making multi-channel webs of negotiation. 
Obviously, all nations in the region, including North Korea, are considering economic 
issues as a top priority. If there is a confrontation, it could be an economic one rather than a 
military conflict. Generally speaking, economic discord is prone to depend on negotiation rather 
than military or political or ideological dispute is, because the former has more options than the 
latter has. 
2 . Suggestions 
a. Balancing 
South Korea is now generally in favorable situation, even though the threat from the 
North is continuing. The probability of a war on the Korean Peninsula considerably decreased 
after 1989. If North Korea invades the South, it would have to fight alone, possibly against a 
defending coalition. Furthermore, the North is rapidly losing its power relative to the South. This 
continuing change of the balance gives the South more freedom of maneuver regarding the North 
Korean threats that have largely bound the South in the ideological framework of bipolarity. Thus, 
especially since 1989, South Korea has expanded its domain and range of activities over the other 
part of the world. 
However, there is also an unfavorable development. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
makes the United States hesitate to be firm, even when confronted with nuclear threats that might 
not have been tolerated before. Had the nuclear program of North Korea emerged in the Cold 
War system, with the sponsorship of the Soviet Union, it might have been dealt by the Unites 
States even without asking South Korea to pay for solving it. The global problem in the Cold War 
system is prone to be regarded just as a regional issue in the Post-Cold War era. Thus, South 
Korea now should take more burden than before for its security. 
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In this more complicated situation, then, which policies should Korea take? Let's try to 
apply the previously suggested policies for small states. First of all, Korea now has to prepare for 
balancing in the future multipolar world.437 This means that Korea should prepare for balancing 
among greater powers. As history shows us, balancing behavior needs acute calculation of the 
situation and strong resolve based on the belief that the calculation is right. Above all, however, to 
be a balancer requires the proper weight of power. For this, Korea should first be unified. Internal 
conflict between the two Koreas will make a power vacuum on the Korean Peninsula in certain 
circumstances. This will be the worst scenario, repeating the history of the early twentieth 
century. The unified Korea would be powerful enough to hold the balance, or even to mediate the 
conflict in the region. 
The second way to have the proper weight of power is a policy of external balncing. 
Korea has to develop a situation where it can play as a balancer by creating the Bismarckian 
version of an alliance system. As surveyed previously, it is not impossible. The time is ripe for the 
establishment of new security cooperation. President Clinton announced, when he visited South 
Korea, that "There is no need for us to create one single alliance. The Challenge for the Asia 
Pacific in this decade, indeed, is to develop multiple new arrangements to meet multiple threats 
and opportunities, —[it will function] like overlapping plates or armor individually providing 
protection and together covering the full body of our common security concern."438 
Then, what kind of cooperation system would be the most proper one for this region? 
First of all, it should be a multi-layer cooperation which means the system incorporated by both 
bilateral and multilateral relations as well as connected with the global and other regions' systems. 
This kind of multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia basically needs the leading role of the 
United States within the system as a guarantor or a balancer or an arbitrator who is connecting 
4,/The strong impression of contemporary changes is written in The Economist: "the world 
has turned back to the riskier maneuvering of a multi-power system. The 21st century will in this 
respect be more like the 19th century than like the dying 20th century." The Economist. 
"Situation, Mission, Execution," December 24, 1995, p. 17. 
438Address of President Clinton to the Korean National Assembly, July 10, 1993. Quoted 
by David I.Hitchcock, Jr., "East Asia's New Security Agenda, The Washington Quarterly. Vol 17 
No. 1, Winter 1994, p. 104. 
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with each nation and linking each nation to others. As we can find a lesson from the success of 
NATO, multilateral cooperation basically demands a leading power. That should be the United 
States because any one else in the region does not want to see other states leading. In addition, 
once the regional cooperation system is inaugurated, it should keep pace with the United Nations. 
A group of Japanese scholars support this conception that one journalist termed "Japan-US 
security plus alpha".439 
Then, who should be included? There are several suggestions for this matter.440 The 
cooperation should be started with conformity. So, it is more comfortable that the cooperation 
would include Taiwan with 'two + four,' because the reunification, or even stabilization, of Korea 
and China would be the first step into creating genuine cooperation in a situation of enemy 
absence. 
Second, the system should be a multi-channel one. That is, it should include all disputes, 
such as the issues of the environment, transportation, trade, arms control, military doctrine, 
refugee movement, piracy, terrorism, and so on. Besides, it should be "webbed" by both a 
governmental and non-governmental network. Surely, it is not easy to establish this kind of 
multicooperation, but also it is not impossible. Brian Bridges' comment is proper as a concluding 
remark for this matter. He said, "For the immediate future informal and ad hoc discussions will 
419Liyoshi Hasegawa, "World Trends: Creating Framework Toward Asian Security," 
Nihon Keizai. Nov. 23, 1992., in DSJP. Dec.8, 1992. Quoted by Eugene Brown, "Japanese 
Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era," p.443. 
440Joseph Nye proposed a Northeast Asia Security and Cooperation Conference for Japan, 
China, Russia, the United States, and two Koreas, and presumably including Mongolia. See; 
David I.Hitchcock, Jr., "East Asia's Security Agenda," p.103. Also Polomka, warning the danger 
of'the Japanese-Republic of Korea-US security cooperation,' suggested 'two+four' system which 
is the same with Nye's proposal. See; Peter Polomka, "Towards a Pacific House," Survival, Vol. 
xxxiii, No.2, Mar./Apr. 1991, p. 180. Those two scholars emphasized the resolution of the matter 
of unification on the Korean Peninsula as a primary task. On the other hand, Japan planned to 
suggested for Asian Arms Conference composed often countries except Russia. See; "Japan plans 
for Asian Arms Conference." Asian Defense Journal. Mar. 1993, p.98. 
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remain the norm,— but the growing recognition that stability and security has to be founded on 
mutual confidence rather than just military hardware/?^ se gives grounds for optimism."441 
Another viable way to have the proper weight is keeping the United States on its side. 
This suggests balancing by allying with the United States or supporting the United States to hold 
the balance in the region - "offshore balance of the United States." Retaining the commitment of 
the United States in the region should be first priority at least in the short-term. Several reasons 
support this argument. 
Surely, the impact of US forces' evacuation would be so great that other regional states 
may step into the arena of arms racing. One article reported that even the North Korean authority 
seemed to accept the necessity of a positive US role for maintaining peace in the Northeast 
Asia.442 On the other hand, the US forces in Japan have eased the concerns of Japanese 
themselves and other nations. Above all, it helps dispel the impression that the United States, the 
'cap in the bottle,' might withdraw from Asia, leaving a vacuum that Japan might fill.443 In 
addition, reducing naval and air forces supported out of Japan, which operate throughout Asia 
and even into the Persian Gulf, would eliminate major geographical advantages for the United 
States and require the nation to rely on CONUS-based forces for the region.444 
Moreover, the evacuation or reduction of the forces in the region doesn't guarantee the 
enhancement of increased US competitiveness, the improvement of the United States balance of 
trade, or the reduction of her national debt. On the contrary, it would be a threat to US longer- 
term interests and access, because there are a host of international challenges such as the 
environmental issue, international drug trade, refugees, poverty and disease in the developing 
world, more importantly, and the United States needs Japanese economic commitment. Therefore, 
441Brian Bridges, "Nurturing a New Order in Northeast Asia, " Asian Defense Journal Jan 
1993, p.47. 
442Chang-Il Ohn, "South Korea's New Defense Policy and Military Strategy, " Korea 
Observer. Vol.xxv, No.l, Spring 1994, p.29. 
443 
444 
William J.Growe, Jr. and Alan D.Romberg, "Rethinking Security in the Pacific," p. 13 
William T. Pendley, "US Security Strategy in East Asia for the 1990s," p. 13. 
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the reduction of US forces should keep pace with the confidence building and the establishment of 
a multicooperation system in the region. 
b. Bandwagoning 
This policy should be the last resort. However, in the face of an imminent threat to its 
survival, Korea should not hesitate to make minor concessions for preserving itself. The opposite 
two experiences of the century illustrate this argument. When Korea became unable to balance 
among great powers any more at the end of the nineteenth century, it should have bandwagoned 
.with the rising power, Japan, at least until the Sino-Japanese War. On the other hand, 
bandwagoning with the United States during the Korean War and the Cold War era was the right 
policy in order to survive in the face of the threat from the Communists. Thus, in future crises, 
Korea should simplify all complicated alliance and bandwagon with the most powerful to survive. 
However, one should remind also that to choose the right time to so this is as difficult as it is to 
select the right power with which to bandwagon. 
3 . Conclusion 
As estimated so far, the future of Northeast Asia is not so gloomy. All nations of the region 
want to progress. All of them have the aim and direction to pursue; full-fledged industrialization, 
welfare, or sovereignty. Therefore, in order to examine the region, one should be careful not to 
overlook the overall movement and atmosphere. 
Especially for the South Korean government, the author would like suggest not to be nervous 
about the contemporary situation. Instead, she should adapt to new ideas and circumstances. 
Most of all, the Korean-US relationship should be firmly maintained, including military cohesion, 
even while Korean armed forces pursue modernization. Secondly, South Korea should move 
toward a closer military relationship with Japan. There are several measures. One of them might 
be a combined naval exercise such as anti-submarine warfare and minesweeping. Others could be 
joint intelligence gathering operations, exchanges of officer corps for education, periodic 
friendship-sports games, and so on. Thirdly, South Korea also should not exclude China from the 
list of military cooperators. One possible approach may be participating in the conversion of 
Chinese military industries. Foreign policy is not a zero-sum game. Even if one obtains 'A1, that 
doesn't mean the other loses 'A' but, to the contrary, it can be a good opportunity for him to get 
145 
'B.' Whether or not 'B' is worthier than 'A' is the matter of ability to deal or negotiate. South 
Korea's many options suggest, finally, that small states may, indeed, be "holder of the balance." 
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